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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Economists have long recognized a connection between outcomes in the home
and outcomes in the labor market. A large theoretical and empirical literature has
explored the implications of this connection for men and women in traditional families
– primarily heterosexual, married couples who live together, often with their children.
Families have evolved considerably in the last half-century, however, and traditional
families comprise a declining proportion of households in the United States. This
dissertation contributes to a broader scope for family economics with essays that
examine the work-family trade-offs of two groups of non-traditional couples: same-
sex couples and committed couples who live apart. The results presented in the
dissertation show that families are innovative in the face of changing constraints and
suggest that those in the vanguard of family change have much to teach us, not just
about their own family lives, but about family life in general.
The first essay shows that marriage-market incentives can motivate observed dif-
ferences in work and family arrangements between sexual minorities and heterosexual
men and women. Empirical studies have identified a sex-asymmetric relationship be-
tween sexual orientation and labor-market outcomes: gay men earn less and work less
in the market than heterosexual men, while lesbians earn more and work more than
heterosexual women. Empirical studies have also found that same-sex couples share
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household and market work more equally than different-sex couples and are less likely
to have children. Existing theoretical explanations for the impact of sexual orientation
on labor-market outcomes reference theories developed with different-sex couples in
mind and do not offer clear predictions about the division of labor in same-sex house-
holds. I show that marriage markets, which are important determinants of marital
outcomes for heterosexual men and women, can also shape differences between sexual
minorities and their heterosexual peers.
I develop the first formal model of a same-sex marriage market and identify a
consequential structural difference between this market and the different-sex marriage
markets economists have traditionally studied. In light of this structural difference, I
argue that same-sex marriage markets engender stronger incentives than different-sex
marriage markets for both men and women to prepare for work in both the home
and the market. In addition, I describe conditions under which the specialization
patterns of same-sex couples are likely to resemble those of different-sex couples and
conditions under which they are likely to diverge. Finally, I argue that, because
specialized investments are more difficult to coordinate in same-sex marriage markets,
the relative scarcity of children in same-sex households may be a consequence, as well
as a cause, of less extensive specialization.
The second essay, which is collaborative work with Uniko Chen, Brooke Helppie
McFall, and Robert J. Willis, describes the surveys and dataset for the third essay
and provides context for the discussion in that essay. In particular, the second essay
uses results from the Job Seekers Project, a longitudinal survey project tracking the
personal and professional lives of early-career economists, to provide a current, com-
prehensive summary of the job-market outcomes of new entrants to the junior PhD
job market in economics. We provide the first description of experiences with appli-
cations, interviews, fly-outs, and job offers based on a representative sample of new
entrants to the job market, and we demonstrate a correspondence between job-market
2
outcomes and pre-market preferences and expectations using unique prospective mea-
sures. We find some evidence that some job candidates from countries in Asia and
job candidates from lower-ranked departments fare worse than job candidates from
the United States and job candidates from top-ten departments. On the whole, how-
ever, the Job Seekers survey suggests that job candidates are optimistic about their
prospects when they enter the job market and satisfied with their results when they
leave it.
The third essay, which is collaborative work with Brooke Helppie McFall, uses data
from the Job Seekers project to assess the impact of dual-career location constraints on
the initial job placements and relationship outcomes of new economists. We provide
the first estimates of the prevalence of tied migration (moving with a partner to an
individually sub-optimal location) and non-cohabitation (living apart from a partner
for purposes of moving to an individually optimal location) based on representative
data from a known sub-population of dual-career couples. In addition, we describe
the career and relationship costs associated with each outcome. We find that non-
cohabitation is a surpringly common margin of adjustment for couples facing joint
migration constraints. New economists in our sample were as likely to live apart
from their spouse or partner in the year after the job market as to sacrifice a first-
choice job in order to live together. Because the standard economic model of joint
migration does not allow for non-cohabitation, it cannot account for these results. We
develop a simple extension of the model and identify, theoretically and empirically,
the conditions under which couples are most likely to live apart. We argue that, for
couples who have invested heavily in the human capital of both partners and whose
career opportunities are geographically diffuse, moving up sometimes means moving
out.
3
CHAPTER II
Same Sex, Same Skills?
2.1 Introduction
The family lives of lesbians and gay men have recently been the focus of significant
social and legal controversies. In the United States, between 2000 and 2005, the
number of self-identified same-sex couples grew five times faster than the general
population (Gates, 2006). As the visibility of sexual minorities has grown, public
opinion has divided over the meaning and value of same-sex marriage and parenting
(Herek, 2002; Avery et al., 2007). In some states, courts, legislators, or voters have
moved to limit opportunities for family formation by same-sex couples; in other states,
they have moved to expand opportunities (Polikoff, 2009; Meyer, 2010). Across the
country, battles are ongoing over the rights of sexual minorities to legal recognition
for their partnerships and support in their roles as parents.
In part, concerns about sexual minorities and their families reflect anxieties about
changing gender norms and the evolving roles of men and women at home and in
the workplace (Appleton, 2005; Polikoff, 2005; McVeigh and Diaz, 2009; Gaines and
Garand, 2010). Questions about gender, work, and family, are central to debates
about same-sex marriage and parenting: How do men and women perform as spouses
and parents? Do husbands and wives, or fathers and mothers, play distinctive roles?
To the extent that work and family roles differ by sex, are the differences rooted in
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innate differences between men and women, or are they a product of cultural norms
and expectations? Do families function best when they are headed by one man and
one woman?
Empirical evidence suggests that gay and lesbian families differ from heterosexual
families in some respects. Studies using data from several countries have found that
gay men earn less than heterosexual men, while lesbians earn more than heterosexual
women (Badgett, 1995; Klawitter and Flatt, 1998; Allegretto and Arthur, 2001; Clain
and Leppel, 2001; Berg and Lien, 2002; Black et al., 2003; Blandford, 2003; Plug
and Berkhout, 2004; Arabsheibani, Marin and Wadsworth, 2005; Carpenter, 2005,
2007; Jepsen, 2007; Antecol, Jong and Steinberger, 2008).1 Similarly, a small group
of studies have found that gay men work less in the labor market than heterosexual
men, while lesbians work more than heterosexual women. (Antecol and Steinberger,
2009; Leppel, 2009; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2006). Descriptive analyses of labor-force
participation and work hours suggest that same-sex couples share market work more
equally than different-sex couples (Black, Sanders and Taylor, 2007). Finally, same-
sex couples and are less likely than different-sex couples to have children (Black et al.,
2000; Black, Sanders and Taylor, 2007).
The most prominent economic theory of household specialization explains dif-
ferences between sexual-minority families and heterosexual families as outcomes of
biological differences between men and women (Becker, 1991). In this theory, het-
erosexual women specialize in home production, and heterosexual men specialize in
market work, because biological differences between the sexes give women a compar-
ative advantage at home and men a comparative advantage in the market. Same-sex
1Depending on the data source, studies identify sexual minorities using reports of attraction to
same-sex others; desire for sex with same-sex partners; sexual experience with same-sex partners;
self-identification as gay, lesbian or bisexual; or cohabitation with a same-sex partner. Some studies
treat sexual minorities as a single group. Others conduct separate analyses for gay men, lesbians,
and bisexual men and women.
The finding that lesbians earn more than similar heterosexual women is not without exception.
Badgett (1995) and Carpenter (2005) do not find evidence of a lesbian earnings premium.
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partners do not have an innate difference in comparative advantage, so they gain less
than different-sex partners from specialization.
This paper argues that marriage markets provide a stronger theoretical basis than
biology for the stylized facts about work, family, and sexual orientation.2 In a com-
pelling criticism of the biological theory of household specialization, Hadfield (1999)
shows that biological differences in comparative advantage are not necessary to mo-
tivate a division of labor between heterosexual men and women. Instead, cultural
norms conditioning work and family roles on sex may arise in heterosexual marriage
markets because young men and women who are intrinsically identical seek to coor-
dinate specialized human capital investments with wives and husbands they have not
yet met. I extend Hadfield’s coordination theory of household specialization to show
that marriage-market incentives can motivate the differences we observe between sex-
ual minorities and their heterosexual peers. The central insight of this paper is that,
because gay and lesbian marriage markets are not divided by sex, sexual minorities
cannot use sex as a signal for optimal human capital accumulation before marriage.
I analyze the accumulation of specialized human capital in the context of same-
sex and different-sex marriage markets when couples benefit from specialization and
people make human capital investments before they know whom they will marry. For
each marriage market, I describe the equilibrium assignment of partners, conditional
on the distribution of pre-marital human capital investments in the market. I then
characterize the returns to pre-marital human capital investments; the equilibrium
investment distributions of gay men, lesbians, heterosexual men, and heterosexual
women; and the human capital profiles of same-sex and different-sex couples. I show
that, because gay men and lesbians, but not heterosexual men and women, compete
with their prospective partners in the marriage market, optimal human capital ac-
cumulation differs by sexual orientation: gay men accumulate less market-oriented
2Throughout the paper, I treat marriage and unmarried cohabitation as equivalent.
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human capital than heterosexual men, and lesbians accumulate more market-oriented
human capital than heterosexual women. I also show that, when marital matching is
random, same-sex partners are less likely than different-sex partners to have comple-
mentary human capital.
This paper makes two contributions. First, I present a theory of marital matching
and pre-marital human capital accumulation that includes both sexual minorities
and heterosexual men and women. I develop a formal model of a same-sex marriage
market and identify a consequential structural difference between same-sex marriage
markets and the different-sex marriage markets economists have traditionally studied.
Second, I provide a clear theoretical rationale for several stylized facts about sexual
minorities. The finding that same-sex marriage markets encourage balanced human
capital investments provides a rationale for the fact that the earnings and work hours
of gay men and lesbians fall between those of heterosexual men and heterosexual
women. The finding that same-sex partners are less likely than different-sex partners
to have complementary human capital provides a rational for the fact that same-sex
couples share market work more equally than different-sex couples and are less likely
to have children.
While I focus on differences between sexual minorities and heterosexual men and
women, this paper highlights issues of broad importance for family economists. Re-
cent decades have seen dramatic changes in the structure of families and households
in the United States. Beyond the growing number of same-sex couples, there are more
different-sex couples cohabiting outside of marriage (Bumpass and Lu, 2000), more
people living alone (Hobbs and Stoops, 2002), more singe-parent families (Bianchi and
Casper, 2000), and more families that cross household boundaries (Cherlin, 2010) than
there were fifty years ago. Models developed to predict or explain the behavior of
heterosexual married couples may not apply to these or other non-traditional group-
ings because they contain assumptions that do not generally hold. To understand
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the full range of modern families and households, economists will have to revisit their
fundamental assumptions and rebuild models on more general foundations.
2.2 Theoretical framework
In his foundational theory of household specialization, Becker (1991) argues that
the specialization patterns of couples reflect the comparative advantage of the part-
ners. Partners with large endowments of market-oriented human capital earn signifi-
cant rewards in the labor market and pay a high opportunity cost for time spent at
home. Partners with smaller endowments of market-oriented human capital face con-
trasting incentives. To the extent that couples consume goods and services produced
at home, Becker indicates that they assign primary responsibility for those goods
and services to the partner with less market-oriented human capital. As a result of
this division of labor, men and women who invest heavily in market-oriented human
capital are likely to spend more time in the labor market and less time at home than
those who limit their acquisition of market-oriented human capital.
The human capital endowments that partners bring to marriage depend on the
investments they make in their education and training before marriage. Before they
form partnerships and establish joint households, young men and women know that
the investments they are making will shape the opportunities of their future house-
holds. Accordingly, they tailor their investments to suit the roles they expect to play
in those households (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1991). Young people who
expect to spend most of their time working in the labor market invest heavily in
market-oriented human capital; those who expect to spend substantial time working
at home limit their market-oriented investments.
Because people begin accumulating human capital before they form partnerships,
the signals young men and women receive about their future roles are a key link
between the time allocation of couples and the human capital investments of individ-
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uals. Becker (1991) identifies sex as the most important of these signals. Women,
Becker maintains, have a comparative advantage in household work because they
bear and nurse children. Men have a comparative advantage in market work because
they are less biologically committed to children. Women who expect to marry men
know that almost all men have a comparative advantage in market work, relative
to almost all women, so they accurately expect that their future partners will have
a comparative advantage in market work, relative to themselves. Women respond
to these expectations by preparing to specialize in home production and by limiting
their accumulation of market-oriented human capital. The reverse is true for men.
Recently, several papers have argued that marriage markets, and not biology,
imbue sex with information about work and family roles. Hadfield (1999) shows
that, even when men and women are intrinsically identical, a desire to coordinate
specialized human capital investments before marriage can prompt them to adopt
traditional gender roles. When people make human capital investments before they
know whom they will marry, and frictions in the marriage market interfere with as-
sortative matching, unmarried men and women face uncertainty about the human
capital endowments of their future partners. Fixed gender roles eliminate this uncer-
tainty by requiring that people of the same sex make the same investments. When
men are homogenous with respect to pre-marital human capital, a woman need not
know which man she will marry to choose human capital investments that will com-
plement his. When women are homogenous, a man need not know which woman he
will marry to choose human capital investments that will complement hers.
In a similar vein, Engineer and Welling (1999) show that the problem of coordi-
nating specialized human capital investments can prompt men and women to adopt
traditional gender roles even when some women are more talented at market work
and some men are more talented at household work. Like Hadfield, Engineer and
Welling assume that frictions in the marriage market cause uncertainty about the
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human capital endowments of future partners. They find that, when training is suf-
ficiently important, relative to ability, sex can trump ability as a guide to optimal
human capital accumulation before marriage. Lommerud and Vagstad (2006) obtain
results that parallel those of Engineer and Welling in a model where employers, rather
than workers, control human capital accumulation. They show that employers may
direct men and women with identical abilities to different tasks because they antic-
ipate household specialization and expect future husbands and future wives to play
different roles.
Finally, Baker and Jacobsen (2007) show that, when partners bargain over their
marital surplus, and frictions in the marriage market force some people to spend
time unmarried, strategic considerations can induce men and women to over-invest
in human capital that improves their well-being outside of marriage. Baker and Ja-
cobsen argue that a sexual division of labor that prescribes some tasks for each sex
and proscribes other tasks can reduce incentives for strategic over-investment and
may increase social welfare. These papers are part of a growing theoretical litera-
ture that explores the implications of market incentives for pre-match investments in
different-sex matching markets, including heterosexual marriage markets (Echevar-
ria and Merlo, 1999; Engineer and Welling, 1999; Hadfield, 1999; Cole, Mailath and
Postlewaite, 2001; Cole, J. Mailath and Postlewaite, 2001; Felli and Roberts, 2002;
Peters and Siow, 2002; Lommerud and Vagstad, 2006; Baker and Jacobsen, 2007;
Iyigun and Walsh, 2007; Nosaka, 2007; Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss, 2009).
Gay men and lesbians, like heterosexual men and women, meet and match in
marriage markets.3 Economists, however, have not developed formal models of these
markets. Empirical economists have turned to the biological theory of household
3By “gay men” and “lesbians” I mean men who seek male partners and women who seek female
partners. In my theoretical analysis, I abstract away from the true complexity of sexual behavior and
identity and assume that sexual orientation is binary and exogenous. Throughout the theoretical
exposition, I use “gay men” to refer to men who seek only male partners and “lesbians” to refer to
women who seek only female partners.
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specialization to explain the sex-asymmetric relationship between sexual orientation
and labor-market outcomes. Following Becker, some have attributed differences be-
tween sexual minorities and heterosexual men and women to the biological similarity
of same-sex partners (Plug and Berkhout, 2004; Black, Sanders and Taylor, 2007).
Others have simply observed that same-sex couples cannot adopt a sexual division
of labor and have posited that gay men and lesbians specialize less intensively than
heterosexual men and women in the tasks members of their sex have traditionally
performed (Allegretto and Arthur, 2001; Black et al., 2003; Jepsen, 2007).
While the biological theory of household specialization can account for the average
differences researchers have found between sexual minorities and their heterosexual
peers, it does not make clear predictions about the distribution of human capital
and work hours among sexual minorities. Nor does the biological theory make clear
predictions about the specialization patterns of same-sex couples. On its own, the
absence of a sexual division of labor between same-sex partners tells us little about the
actual division of labor in same-sex households. In one scenario that is consistent with
the empirical evidence, same-sex partners share home and market work more equally
than different-sex partners, and the moderate average outcomes of sexual minorities
approximate the experiences of individual gay men and lesbians. I call this scenario
egalitarianism. In an alternative scenario, same-sex partners adopt household roles
that resemble those of different-sex couples. One partner acts as a traditional man,
the other acts as a traditional woman, and the moderate average outcomes of sexual
minorities mask polarization among individual gay men and lesbians. I call this
scenario specialization.
While Becker (1991) asserts that same-sex couples adopt a less extensive division
of labor than different-sex couples, his theory does not unambiguously support his
assertion. The biological theory of household specialization supplies reasons that
same-sex couples might practice either egalitarianism or specialization. On one hand,
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if Becker is right that biological differences between men and women drive the division
of labor between different-sex partners, same-sex couples might be more egalitarian
than different-sex couples because they have more similar biological endowments.
To the extent that gains from specialization are larger when couples have children,
same-sex couples might also be more egalitarian because they are less likely to be
parents.
On the other hand, same-sex couples might adopt specialized roles because invest-
ments in specific human capital yield higher returns when the human capital is used
more intensively. Although Becker invokes biology to explain the sexual division of
labor between men and women, he argues that increasing returns to specific human
capital make some division of labor efficient even when household members are intrin-
sically identical. It is not obvious why, if gains from specialization are available to all
households, same-sex couples would choose to forgo these gains. There is, in princi-
ple, no reason why same-sex couples could not assign one partner to focus on market
work and the other to focus on home production. In keeping with these observations,
Antecol and Steinberger (2009) report that lesbians they classify as secondary earners
spend less time in market work overall and reduce work hours more in response to
children than do lesbians they classify as primary earners.
This paper extends the coordination model of household specialization to sexual
minorities and uses the model to identify conditions under which same-sex couples
are likely to practice egalitarianism. My analysis shows that, because gay and les-
bian marriage markets are structured differently than heterosexual marriage markets,
sexual orientation conditions the value of sex as a signal for optimal human capital ac-
cumulation. In heterosexual marriage markets, gender roles can facilitate specialized
human capital investments before marriage because every married couple contains
one man and one woman. No matter how heterosexual couples form – even if they
form randomly – complementary investment norms for men and women guarantee
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that partners will have complementary human capital. Thus, when there are frictions
in heterosexual marriage markets, sex contains valuable information about the roles
of men and women. On the basis of their sex alone, heterosexual men and women
who have not yet met their partners can determine whether they or their partners
will be the market specialists in their future households.
Gender roles cannot facilitate specialized human capital investments for same-sex
couples because gay and lesbian marriage markets are not divided by sex. Every
gay couple contains two men, and every lesbian couple contains two women. While
complementary investment norms for men and women might ensure that the human
capital of gay men complements the human capital of lesbians, they are of little help
to same-sex couples. Indeed, I posit that gay men and lesbians transgress traditional
gender norms because these norms do not promote their interests. Since gay and
lesbian marriage markets are same-sex markets, there is no coordinating mechanism
that sexual minorities can substitute for sex. Thus, when there are frictions in the
gay and lesbian marriage markets, same-sex couples are less likely than different-sex
couples to have complementary human capital and are more likely to be egalitarian.
The essential argument of this paper is that sex and sexual orientation interact
to shape expectations about work and family roles. Because they shape expectations
about work and family roles, sex and sexual orientation also shape the investment
decisions of unmarried men and women, and the consumption and time allocation
decisions of couples. Human capital accumulation and family formation unfold in
tandem, with decisions and outcomes in each realm influencing decisions and out-
comes in the other. Figure 3.1 presents stylized timeline of this process. The figure
shows, and I will assume, that some human capital investments are made after gay
men and lesbians adopt minority identities, but before men and women form part-
nerships and establish joint households.
The assumption that couples benefit from specialization is central to my analysis
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Figure 2.1: Stylized timeline of human capital accumulation and family formation
and merits elaboration. Both the biological and coordination theories of household
specialization present specialization as the primary source of marital surplus. Becker
(1991) suggests that men and women form joint households to exploit biological dif-
ferences in comparative advantage. Proponents of the coordination theory question
Becker’s emphasis on biology, but retain his emphasis on specialization. Whether spe-
cialization models of marriage are germane in an era of low fertility and dual-earner
couples is an important question. My analysis does not require that men and women
live in separate spheres or that couples embrace gender roles reminiscent of the 1950s.
The conclusions I present hold as long as optimal human capital accumulation entails
some degree of differentiation between partners.
Empirical evidence suggests that, even in the contemporary United States, het-
erosexual couples allocate tasks on the basis of sex. While it is now common for both
husbands and wives to work outside the home, married women continue to spend
more on household work and less time on market work than married men (Sayer,
2005; Bonke et al., 2008). Thus, while there may be fewer breadwinners and home-
makers than there were fifty years ago, there are still primary and secondary earners.
The human capital investments in my model should be understood in this context,
as investments that are optimal for primary earners or for secondary earners.
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2.3 Stylized facts
For sexual orientation to influence human capital accumulation, young men and
women must know their orientation before their human capital investments are com-
plete. Savin-Williams and Diamond (2000) present evidence that key milestones in
the development of minority sexual identities do, in fact, occur while young people are
still acquiring education and training. The researchers interviewed men and women
between the ages of 17 and 25 who expressed physical or romantic interest in members
of their own sex. On average, these young people had experienced their first same-sex
attractions before the age of 10 and their first same-sex sexual contact before the
age of 17. By the end of high school, the average interviewee identified as a sexual
minority and had disclosed that identity to others.
The findings of Savin-Williams and Diamond, which are summarized in Table
2.1, are broadly consistent with the findings of other studies of young adults. This
body of research has not used probability samples and does not provide information
about the developmental trajectories of older gay men and lesbians. Nevertheless,
the studies indicate that some sexual minorities are aware of their minority status
at an early age. It is sexual minorities with an early awareness of difference whose
investment choices are most likely to be influenced by expectations of entering a same-
sex marriage market. While there are certainly gay men and lesbians who develop
minority identities later in life, the insights of this paper should be understood as
applying to sexual minorities who come out as adolescents or young adults.
Whatever their sexual orientation, young men and women will be responsive to
marriage-market incentives only if they expect to form partnerships. This paper ar-
gues that gay men and lesbians make different human capital investments than het-
erosexual men and women because they expect their partners to have made different
investments. It is possible, however that sexual minorities have different expectations
than their heterosexual peers, not just about whom they will marry, but also about
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Table 2.1: Mean ages at sexual identity milestones
Men Women
First same-sex attractions 7.7 9.0
First same-sex sexual contact 14.1 16.4
First self-labeling 16.4 17.6
First disclosure 17.9 17.9
Source: Savin-Williams and Diamond (2000)
Notes: Data are from interviews with 78 men and 86 women between the ages of 17
and 25 who expressed physical or romantic interest in members of their own sex.
whether they will marry. If sexual minorities believe, for example, that they are
less likely to find partners, they may invest more heavily than heterosexual men and
women in human capital that improves the well-being of single people.
Black, Sanders and Taylor (2007) present evidence that the likelihood of partnering
is not substantially different for gay men or lesbians than it is for heterosexual men
and women. Using data from the General Social Survey, a nationally representative
sample of United States households, they identify gay and lesbian households as
households in which the person interviewed had only same-sex sexual partners in
the year before the survey and partnered households as households in which the
person interviewed had a “regular” partner and lived with at least one other adult.
Black, Sanders and Taylor report that 49 percent of gay households and 63 percent of
lesbian households are partnered. The comparable figure for heterosexual households
is 59 percent. Table 2.2 summarizes these results. While gay households are slightly
less likely than heterosexual households to be partnered, and lesbian households are
slightly more likely to be partnered, the findings of Black, Sanders and Taylor (2007)
do not suggest that sexual orientation should have a dramatic impact on expectations
about partnership formation.
With respect to work and family outcomes, sexual minorities differ from heterosex-
ual men and women in several important ways. In the remainder of this section, I use
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Table 2.2: Prevalence of partnerships
Partnered
Gay men 49%
Lesbians 63%
Heterosexuals 59%
Source: Black, Sanders and Taylor (2007)
Notes: Data are from the General Social Survey between 1989 and 2004. Gay men
and lesbians are men and women who had only same-sex sexual partners in year before
the survey. Partnered people are people who had a “regular partner” and lived with
at least one other adult. The sample includes 212 households in which the person
interviewed was a gay man, 156 households in which the person interviewed was a
lesbian, and 18,707 households in which the person interviewed was a heterosexual
man or woman.
data from the 2006-08 three-year sample of the American Community Survey, accessed
through the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), to illustrate differences
in time allocation and household production between same-sex and different-sex cou-
ples (Ruggles et al., 2010). The American Community Survey identifies couples on
the basis of relationships between household heads and other household members.
Married couples are men and women who are classified on the survey form as the
spouse of the household head and the different-sex household heads with whom they
are linked. Unmarried couples are men and women who are classified on the survey
form as the unmarried partner of the household head and the same-sex or different-sex
household heads with whom they are linked.4 I construct a sample of couples that
includes all of the same-sex couples and 10 percent each of the different-sex married
and unmarried couples in the American Community Survey sample.
For each work and family outcome I consider, I plot means for groups defined by
sex and sexual orientation against age, starting at age 20 and ending at age 60. For
4The American Community Survey form includes several additional categories for men and women
who live with household heads to whom they are not related by blood or a federally recognized
marriage: roomer or boarder, housemate or roommate, foster child, and other non-relative. Con-
sequently, household respondents are not likely to classify household members who fall into these
categories as unmarried partners. Because the federal government does not recognize same-sex
marriages, the Census Bureau reclassifies same-sex spouses as same-sex unmarried partners.
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individual-level outcomes, I plot means for gay men, lesbians, heterosexual men, and
heterosexual women. For couple-level outcomes I plot means for gay couples, lesbian
couples, and heterosexual couples. In each case, I apply the person-level or household-
level sample weights provided by IPUMS. With the exception of the residuals from an
earnings regression that includes these variables as covariates, I also weight the means
to account for differences in race, ethnicity, urbanicity, and region across groups.5
To start, Figure 2.2 presents a graphical illustration of the stylized facts about sex-
ual orientation and earnings. As discussed above, empirical studies in labor economics
have found that gay men earn less than similar heterosexual men and that lesbians
earn more than similar heterosexual women. I illustrate these patterns by plotting
mean residuals from a log wage regression in which race, ethnicity, urbanicity, region,
and educational attainment enter as covariates. The patterns in Figure 2.2 broadly
corroborate the findings of earlier studies. Gay men earn less than heterosexual men
at all ages, and lesbians earn more than heterosexual women after early adulthood.
To the extent that differences in earnings between men and women with the same
observable characteristics, including the same educational attainment and potential
labor-market experience, reflect differences in unobservable human capital, Figure 2.2
suggests that gay men invest less in market-oriented human capital than heterosex-
ual men and that lesbians invest more than heterosexual women. The finding that
lesbians earn less than heterosexual women at young ages appears to contradict the
general pattern. It is worth noting, however, that lesbians have a steeper age-earnings
profile than heterosexual women. Human capital theory predicts that people who ex-
pect to work continuously make larger human capital investments early in their careers
than people who expect to take breaks from the labor force (Mincer and Polachek,
1974). In a standard human capital framework, the rapid earnings growth of young
lesbians, relative to young heterosexual women, may reflect a stronger commitment
5Within each single-year age group, I standardize the weights for subgroups defined by race,
ethnicity, urbanicity, and region to be identical across groups defined by sex and sexual orientation.
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Figure 2.2: Unobservable human capital
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Source: American Community Survey, 2006-08 three-year sample, IPUMS (Ruggles
et al., 2010)
Notes: Covariates are race, ethnicity, urbanicity, region, and educational attainment.
Regression sample excludes students and self-employed workers. Estimates were com-
puted using person-level sample weights. Sample excludes men and women without a
spouse or unmarried partner because the American Community Survey does not con-
tain a measure of their sexual orientation. Following Gates and Steinberger (2010),
I exclude from the sample same-sex couples who submitted their Census responses
by mail and had the martial status of one or both partners allocated by the Census
Bureau.
of lesbians to market work.
Investments in observable human capital follow a slightly different pattern. Both
gay men and lesbians acquire more education than their heterosexual peers. Figure
2.3 shows that, as young adults, sexual minorities are more likely than heterosex-
ual men, and about as likely as heterosexual women, to have a college degree. By
their early thirties, sexual minorities are more likely than both heterosexual men
and women to have a college degree. While it is not clear from these cross-sectional
data whether young gay men and lesbians will ultimately surpass their heterosexual
peers in educational attainment, Figure 2.3 presents evidence that they might. Until
at least their forties, sexual minorities are more likely than heterosexual men and
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Figure 2.3: Observable human capital
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Source: American Community Survey, 2006-08 three-year sample, IPUMS (Ruggles
et al., 2010)
Notes: Means are weighted averages, with weights for subgroups defined by race,
ethnicity, urbanicity, and region standardized across groups. Estimates were com-
puted using person-level sample weights. Sample excludes men and women without a
spouse or unmarried partner because the American Community Survey does not con-
tain a measure of their sexual orientation. Following Gates and Steinberger (2010),
I exclude from the sample same-sex couples who submitted their Census responses
by mail and had the martial status of one or both partners allocated by the Census
Bureau.
women to be enrolled in school. The finding that, on average, gay men and lesbians
are more educated than heterosexual men and women is consistent with results from
previous studies and obtains for single men and women as well as for couples (Black
et al., 2000; Black, Sanders and Taylor, 2007).
As discussed above, the results from empirical studies of labor supply have par-
alleled the results from studies of earnings. Gay men work less in the labor market
than heterosexual men, and lesbians work more than heterosexual women. Figure
2.4 presents graphical illustrations of these findings. Of the groups defined by sex
and sexual orientation, heterosexual women are the most likely to do no work in the
market, and heterosexual men are the least likely. The outcomes for gay men and
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Figure 2.4: Labor supply
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Source: American Community Survey, 2006-08 three-year sample, IPUMS (Ruggles
et al., 2010)
Notes: Sample for left panel excludes students and self-employed workers. Sample
for right panel excludes students, self-employed workers and people who do not work
for pay. Means are weighted averages, with weights for subgroups defined by race,
ethnicity, urbanicity, and region standardized across groups. Estimates were com-
puted using person-level sample weights. Sample excludes men and women without a
spouse or unmarried partner because the American Community Survey does not con-
tain a measure of their sexual orientation. Following Gates and Steinberger (2010),
I exclude from the sample same-sex couples who submitted their Census responses
by mail and had the martial status of one or both partners allocated by the Census
Bureau.
lesbians fall between those for heterosexual men and heterosexual women. The same
pattern holds for weekly work hours. Conditional on doing some work in the labor
market, heterosexual men work the longest hours each week, and heterosexual women
work the shortest hours. The weekly work hours of gay men and lesbians fall between
those of heterosexual men and heterosexual women. Interestingly, the labor supply
of sexual minorities does not differ substantially by sex and more closely resembles
the labor supply of heterosexual men than that of heterosexual women.
Turning to the specialization patterns of couples, Figure 2.5 indicates that same-
sex couples share market work more equally than different-sex couples. Of the total
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Figure 2.5: Division of labor
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Source: American Community Survey, 2006-08 three-year sample, IPUMS (Ruggles
et al., 2010)
Notes: Sample excludes couples in which either partner was a student or a self-
employed worker. Means are weighted averages, with weights for subgroups defined
by race, ethnicity, urbanicity, and region standardized across groups. Estimates were
computed using household-level sample weights. Sample excludes men and women
without a spouse or unmarried partner because the American Community Survey does
not contain a measure of their sexual orientation. Following Gates and Steinberger
(2010), I exclude from the sample same-sex couples who submitted their Census
responses by mail and had the martial status of one or both partners allocated by the
Census Bureau.
hours a couple supplies to the labor market, the proportion supplied by the partner
who works the longest hours is larger among different-sex couples than same-sex
couples. Put differently, the primary worker in a different-sex couple – most often
the man – works a larger share of the couple’s total market hours than the primary
worker in a same-sex couple. This pattern suggests that same-sex couples specialize
less extensively than different-sex couples.
Finally, and perhaps not surprisingly, same-sex couples are less likely than different-
sex couples to have children. Figure 2.6 shows that, at the peak ages for parenting,
over 80 percent of households headed by different-sex couples contain children, and
almost 60 percent contain children under the age of six. At the same ages, less than
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Figure 2.6: Households with children
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Source: American Community Survey, 2006-08 three-year sample, IPUMS (Ruggles
et al., 2010)
Notes: Means are weighted averages, with weights for subgroups defined by race, eth-
nicity, urbanicity, and region standardized across groups. Estimates were computed
using household-level sample weights. Sample excludes men and women without a
spouse or unmarried partner because the American Community Survey does not con-
tain a measure of their sexual orientation. Following Gates and Steinberger (2010),
I exclude from the sample same-sex couples who submitted their Census responses
by mail and had the martial status of one or both partners allocated by the Census
Bureau.
50 percent of households headed by same-sex couples contain children, and less than
30 percent contain children under the age of six.
In the remainder of this paper, I show that a model of marital matching and
pre-marital human capital accumulation in gay, lesbian, and heterosexual marriage
markets can account for most of the empirical differences between same-sex and
different-sex couples. I characterize the human capital investments of individuals,
and the human capital profiles of couples, under two opposing scenarios. First, I as-
sume that matching in the marriage markets is frictionless. In this scenario, marital
matching is driven by human capital endowments. Next, I assume that matching
in the marriage markets is random. In this scenario, martial matching is driven by
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non-economic concerns. I show that outcomes at the individual level are similar in
the two scenarios. Whether matching is frictionless or random, gay and lesbian mar-
riage markets engender stronger incentives than heterosexual marriage markets for
people of each sex to prepare for work both at home and in the market. In con-
trast, outcomes at the couple level turn on the matching process. When matching
is frictionless, both same-sex and different-sex couples adopt a specialized division
of labor When matching is random, same-sex couples specialize less extensively than
different-sex couples.
2.4 Model
2.4.1 Assumptions
Choices and timing
There are two marriage markets: a same-sex market and a different-sex market.
The different-sex marriage market matches men from a large population with women
from equally large population. The same-sex marriage market matches men or women
from a large population with partners from the same population. People live for two
periods. In the first period, they make human capital investments. In the second
period, they enter the appropriate marriage market, decide whether and whom to
marry, and produce and consume in their chosen household.
Investments
People choose one of two investments: high or low. The cost of the high investment
is cH and the cost of the low investment is cL, where cH > cL.
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Household production
People have one unit of time to allocate between the home and the market. High
investors are more productive than low investors in the market. Accordingly, they
earn a higher wage: wH > wL. High investors and low investors are equally productive
in the home.
People obtain utility from housing, children, and market goods. Housing and
children are public goods for married couples and private goods for single people. All
households, whether married or single, must spend a fixed amount, h ∈ (0, wL), on
housing. Parental status is binary: either a household has children, or it does not.
Children are produced at home using inputs of parental time. If a household has
children, it must devote a fixed amount of time, t ∈ (0, 1), to their care.
The utility of single person i is
ui (xi, Ii, h) = xi (h+ Iib) ,
where xi represents market goods consumed by person i, h represents the fixed ex-
penditure on housing, Ii is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if person i
has children, and b is a benefit from children that is the same for all people. If person
i marries person j, the utility of married person i is
ui (xi, Iij, h) = xi (h+ Iijb) ,
where Iij ≡ Ii = Ij takes a value of one if the couple has children, and the other inputs
are defined as before. The utility of married person j is defined symmetrically. The
form of these utility functions guarantees that, when married, person i and person j
can transfer utility between them at a constant rate (Bergstrom and Cornes, 1983).
To verify that utility is transferable within marriage, observe that married person i
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and married person j have the same marginal utility of market consumption, h+ Iijb
, no matter how market consumption is allocated within the household.
Households maximize utility subject to the constraint that expenditures equal
market income. Because utility is transferable within marriage, married couples max-
imize the sum of their utilities (Lam, 1988):
uij (xi, xj, Iij, h) = (xi + xj) (h+ Iijb) .
The budget constraint of single person i is
xi + h = (1− Iit)wi.
The budget constraint of couple ij is
xi + xj + h = (1− Iijdi)wi + [1− Iij (t− di)]wj,
where wi ≥ wj and di is the time married person i spends caring for children. While
married parents can, in principle, share responsibility for childcare, their budget con-
straint shows that efficient households assign all of the time at home to the partner
with the lower wage. The budget constraint for couple ij can thus be written as
xi + xj + h = wi + (1− t)wj.
Households have children if parenthood is feasible and utility-improving. Parent-
hood is feasible for single person i if housing remains affordable when person i spends
time caring for children: h < (1− t)wi. Parenthood is always feasible for married
couples. Conditional on parenthood being feasible, households gain utility from hav-
ing children if the common benefit from children exceeds a threshold benefit that
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depends on household composition. Specifically, single person i gains utility from
having children if
b > b¯i (wi) ≡ thwi
(1− t)wi − h,
and married couple ij gains utility from having children if
b > b¯ij (wi, wj) ≡ thwj
wi + (1− t)wj − h.
For married couples, the threshold benefit from children, above which parenthood
is utility-improving, is highest when both partners are low earners and lowest when
the partners earn different wages. Letting b¯xy ≡ b¯ij (wx, wy) be the threshold benefit
for a couple with wages wx and wy, it can be shown that b¯HL < b¯HH < b¯LL. If it is
optimal for two low earners to have children, then it is optimal for two high earners
to have children; and if it is optimal for two high earners to have children, then it
is optimal for a high earner and a low earner to have children. These results are
consistent with the idea that children are a normal good whose price increases with
the opportunity cost of parental time (Becker, 1991). I assume that the common
benefit from children exceeds the threshold benefit for couples with unequal earnings,
but not for couples with equal earnings:
b¯HL < b < b¯HH < b¯LL.
Under this assumption, couples have children if and only if the partners earn different
wages. A comparison of the threshold benefits for single people and married couples
reveals that, if it is not optimal for two high earners or two low earners to have
children together, then it is not optimal for anyone to have children alone.
Using the budget constraints to express private consumption in terms of market
income and expenditures on housing, and recalling that only couples with unequal
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earnings have children, the maximal utility of a single earner is
UL ≡ u∗i (wL) = (wL − h)h, (2.1)
UH ≡ u∗i (wH) = (wH − h)h (2.2)
for a low earner and a high earner, respectively. The maximal utility of a couple with
equal earners is
ULL ≡ u∗ij (wL, wL) = (2wL − h)h, (2.3)
UHH ≡ u∗ij (wH , wH) = (2wH − h)h (2.4)
for two low earners an two high earners, and the maximal utility of a couple with
unequal earners is
UHL ≡ u∗ij (wH , wL) = [wH + (1− t)wL − h] (h+ b) . (2.5)
Let b˜ ≡ b [wH + (1− t)wL − h] − thwL be the utility a couple with unequal earners
gains from having from having children, and let Zxy ≡ Uxy− (Ux + Uy) be the surplus
output from a marriage between an x-investor and a y-investor. Then,
ZHL = h
2 + b˜, (2.6)
ZHH = h
2, (2.7)
ZLL = h
2. (2.8)
When equal earners marry, they gain h2 in utility to divide between them. When
unequal earners marry, they gain h2 + b˜. Whatever their own wages and the wages
of their prospective partners, all people are better off married. Table 2.3 summarizes
the time allocation, parental status, income, and marital surplus of married couples
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Table 2.3: Optimal household production
Human capital Market work Children Incomea Surplusb
High / Low Full-time / Part-time Yes Lower Larger
High / High Full-time / Full-time No Higher Smaller
Low / Low Full-time / Full-time No Lower Smaller
a Couples with one high earner and one low earner have income wH+(1− t)wL, where
t is the proportion of time the part-time worker spends at home. Couples with two
high earners have income 2wH , and couples with two low earners have income 2wL.
b Couples with one high earner and one low earner produce a surplus of h2 + b˜, where
h is expenditures on housing and b˜ is the utility gain from children. Couples with two
high earners or two low earners produce a surplus of h2. Marital surplus is distinct
from marital output, which is highest for couples with two high earners.
with each human capital profile when they maximize the sum of their utilities.
High earners are more productive than low earners in any marriage. Comparing
the maximal utilities of couples with each human capital profile, and remembering
that couples have children only when children make them better off, we find that
UHH > UHL > ULL.
The substitution of a high-earning partner for a low-earning partner adds to the utility
of a couple no matter what wage the second partner earns.
A related, but less obvious result, is that high earners are more productive, relative
to low earners, in marriages with low earners. The substitution of a high-earning
partner for a low-earning partner adds more to the utility of a couple when the
second partner earns a low wage than it does when the second partner earns a high
wage:
UHL − ULL > UHH − UHL. (2.9)
Intuitively, high earners make a larger marginal contribution to marriages with low
earners because partners with unequal earnings realize gains from specialization in
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addition to gains from household public goods. As we saw in the preceding discussion,
the surplus output – as opposed to the total output – from marriages between unequal
earners exceeds the surplus output from marriages between equal earners, including
marriages between high earners. I assume, further, that
UHL − ULL > cH − cL > UHH − UHL. (2.10)
This assumption says that the marginal gain in marital output from the high wage
exceeds the marginal cost of the high investment if the high earner is married to a low
earner, but not if the high earner is married to another high earner. Put differently,
the high investment pays off, in terms of social welfare, if and only if the high investor
marries a low investor.
2.4.2 Frictionless marriage markets
I characterize matches in the frictionless marriage markets using the concept of
a stable assignment. An assignment of men to women in the different-sex marriage
market, or of men to men or women to women in the same-sex marriage market, is
stable if the following conditions hold: No married person would rather be single, and
no two people, married or single, would rather marry each other than remain in their
current situations. Because all marriages generate a strictly positive surplus, all men
and women marry in any stable assignment.
Stable assignments in the different-sex marriage market maximize the total output
from all marriages (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). When they exist, stable assignments
in the same-sex marriage market also maximize the total output (Quint, 1997).6 Given
my assumptions about household production, the requirement that stable assignments
6See his Theorem 4.3. Quint (1997) proves this result for restricted house-swapping games with
transferable utility, a class of games that includes the roommate problem with transferable utility as
a special case. The same-sex marriage market, as I have described it, is equivalent to the roommate
problem with transferable utility.
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maximize the total output implies that a stable assignment can include marriages
between high earners or marriages between low earners, but not both. Suppose, to
the contrary, that a stable assignment includes a marriage between high earners and
a marriage between low earners. Then, since stable assignments maximize the total
output, UHH + ULL ≥ 2UHL. But this result contradicts (2.9), which follows from
optimal household production.
Although stable assignments maximize the total output from all marriages, their
implementation need not be centralized. In fact, any stable assignment can be sup-
ported as a competitive equilibrium by a vector of reservation utilities for marriage
(Shapley and Shubik, 1972; Quint, 1997). People agree to marry only if they receive
their reservation utility and each person chooses the partner whose reservation utility,
once paid from their marital output, leaves the largest share of utility remaining. In
the stable assignment, the sum of the reservation utilities in each marriage exhausts
the marital output, and people consume their reservation utilities. Let Si and Sj be
the reservation utilities of person i and person j. Formally, the reservation utilities
satisfy
Si + Sj = Uij (2.11)
if person i and person j are married and
Si + Sj ≥ Uij (2.12)
if they could be married but are not.
Because the output of a marriage depends only on the wages of the partners,
people who earn the same wage are perfect substitutes from the perspective of their
prospective partners. A person who demands more than competitors with the same
wage can be replaced in his or her marriage by a competitor who is less expensive
but equally productive. In this way, competition in the marriage markets ensures
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that identical characteristics command identical prices. Heterosexual men who earn
the same wage obtain the same utility in a stable assignment, no matter whom they
marry, because the market prices their characteristics uniformly. The same is true
for heterosexual women, gay men, and lesbians. I use SMx , SFx , and SSx to denote
the common reservation utilities and equilibrium consumption levels of heterosexual
men, heterosexual women, and sexual minorities who earn wage wx.
Given that marriages between high earners and marriages between low earners
cannot coexist in a stable assignment, the human capital profiles of stable couples
can be distributed in three ways. I consider each case in turn.
Case 1 Some marriages are between high earners and low earners, and some mar-
riages are between low earners. In this case, (2.11) and (2.12) imply that consumption
levels in the stable assignment satisfy
SMH + S
F
H ≥ UHH , SML + SFL = ULL, (2.13)
SMH + S
F
L = UHL, S
M
L + S
F
H = UHL
for heterosexual men and women and
2SSH ≥ UHH , 2SSL = ULL, SSH + SSL = UHL (2.14)
for sexual minorities. These equations imply that
SgH − SgL = UHL − ULL,
where g ∈ {M,F, S}. When there are more low earners than high earners in a mar-
riage market, high earners in every market group receive a utility bonus that equals
their marginal contribution to marriages with low earners. Intuitively, competition
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for high earners in the marriage market bids their marginal cost up to the marginal
value of a high-earning partner to the last person who “wins” one. Both high earners
and low earners are willing to pay a premium for a high-earning partner, but low
earners are willing to pay a larger premium than high earners. When low earners
compete against high earners for high-earning partners, low earners win. But when
low earners outnumber high earners in the marriage market, it is not possible for
every low earner to marry a high earner. In that situation, the last low earner to
win a high-earning partner must win that partner from another low earner. Then,
because competition for high earners occurs between low earners on the margin, high
earners receive a bonus equal to the largest premium low earners are willing to pay.
Case 2 Some marriages are between high earners and low earners, and some mar-
riages are between high earners. Now, (2.11) and (2.12) imply that consumption
levels in the stable assignment satisfy
SMH + S
F
H = UHH , S
M
L + S
F
L ≥ ULL, (2.15)
SMH + S
F
L = UHL, S
M
L + S
F
H = UHL
for heterosexual men and women and
2SSH = UHH , 2S
S
L ≥ ULL, SSH + SSL = UHL (2.16)
for sexual minorities. These equations imply that
SgH − SgL = UHH − UHL.
When there are more high earners than low earners in a marriage market, high earners
in every market group receive a utility bonus that equals their marginal contribution
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to marriages with high earners. This bonus is smaller than the bonus high earners
received in Case 1 because, when high earners outnumber low earners in the marriage
market, competition for high earners occurs between high earners on the margin. In
that situation, high earners receive a bonus equal to the largest premium high earners
are willing to pay – and less than the largest premium low earners are willing to pay.
Case 3 All marriages are between high earners and low earners. In this case, (2.11)
and (2.12) imply that consumption levels in the stable assignment satisfy
SMH + S
F
H ≥ UHH , SML + SFL ≥ ULL, (2.17)
SMH + S
F
L = UHL, S
M
L + S
F
H = UHL
for heterosexual men and women and
2SSH ≥ UHH , 2SSL ≥ ULL, SSH + SSL = UHL (2.18)
for sexual minorities. These equations imply that
UHL − ULL ≥ SgH − SgL ≥ UHH − UHL.
When the numbers of high and low earners in the marriage market are equal, the util-
ity bonus of high earners in every market group is bounded between their marginal
contribution to marriages with high earners and their marginal contribution to mar-
riages with low earners.
The stable assignments I have characterized determine the distribution of utility in
the second period, conditional on the distribution of investments in the marriage mar-
ket. In the first period, people choose investments to maximize their expected utility
from marriage, net of investment costs. They take the choices of their competitors
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and prospective partners, and the resulting returns to the high and low investments
in the marriage market, as given. If the high investment yields a higher net return
than the low investment for the members of a market group, then everyone in that
group chooses the high investment. If the low investment yields a higher net return,
then everyone chooses the low investment. People in the same market group will
choose different investments only if the net returns to the high and low investments
are equal.
Reviewing the payoffs in the stable assignments, we find that the marginal return
to the high investment depends on the supply of high and low earners in the marriage
market. In Case 1, when there are more low earners than high earners in the market,
high earners receive a utility bonus of UHL − ULL, relative to low earners. In Case
2, when there are more high earners than low earners, high earners receive a smaller
bonus of UHH − UHL. In Case 3, when there are equal numbers of high earners and
low earners in the market, high earners receive a utility bonus that is bounded above
by the bonus from Case 1 and below by the bonus from Case 2. The remainder of
this section shows that the marriage-market returns in Case 1 and Case 2 cannot
support the underlying investment distributions as equilibria. When the returns
to pre-marital investments are determined in frictionless marriage markets, every
investment equilibrium contains equal numbers of high and low investors.
Let piM , piF , and piS be the proportions of heterosexual men, heterosexual women,
and sexual minorities who choose the high investment in the first period. When low
earners outnumber high earners in the second period, the investment distributions
satisfy piM < 1−piF and piS < 1
2
, and the stable assignments are as described in Case
1. But when the stable assignments are as described in Case 1, (2.10) implies that
the marginal return to the high investment exceeds its marginal cost for everyone
in the marriage markets. In that situation, people who choose the low investment
can improve their payoffs by switching to the high investment. Since low investors
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have an incentive to change their strategy when they outnumber high investors in a
marriage market, piM < 1− piF and piS < 1
2
cannot be investment equilibria.
When high earners outnumber low earners in the second period, a parallel analysis
applies. The investment distributions satisfy piM > 1 − piF and piS > 1
2
, and the
stable assignments are as described in Case 2. But when the stable assignments are
as described in Case 2, (2.10) implies that the marginal cost of the high investment
exceeds its marginal return for everyone in the marriage markets. In that situation,
people who choose the high investment can improve their payoffs by switching to the
low investment. Since high investors have an incentive to change their strategy when
they outnumber low investors in a marriage market, piM > 1−piF and piS > 1
2
cannot
be investment equilibria.
Finally, when there are equal numbers of high and low earners in the second
period, the investment distributions satisfy piM = 1− piF and piS = 1
2
, and the stable
assignments are as described in Case 3. These investment distributions highlight a
crucial difference between the same-sex and different-sex marriage markets. In the
same-sex marriage market, equal representation of high and low earners in the second
period requires that people of the same sex – gay men or lesbians – choose different
investments in the first period. In the different-sex marriage market, in contrast,
equal representation of high and low earners can be achieved with people of the
same sex choosing different investments, or it can be achieved with all men choosing
one investment and all women choosing the other. To characterize the equilibrium
investments the marriage markets, it will be useful to consider these these possibilities
separately.
First, suppose that all men in the different-sex marriage market choose the high
investment, and all women choose the low investment. This distribution of invest-
ments is an equilibrium in the first period if and only if the marginal return to the
high investment in the second period is at least its marginal cost for men and no more
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than its marginal cost for women. Consulting (2.10), we find that these conditions
can be met by marriage-market payoffs satisfying
UHL − ULL ≥ SMH − SML ≥ cH − cL ≥ SFH − SFL ≥ UHH − UHL. (2.19)
By parallel reasoning, an equilibrium in which all men choose the low investment and
all women choose the high investment can be supported by marriage-market payoffs
satisfying
UHL − ULL ≥ SFH − SFL ≥ cH − cL ≥ SMH − SML ≥ UHH − UHL. (2.20)
Now, suppose that some heterosexual men and some heterosexual women choose
each investment. We have already observed that people in the same market group will
choose different investments only if the net returns to the high and low investments
are equal. Furthermore, we know that the net returns to the investments are equal if
and only if the payoffs in the marriage market satisfy SMH −SML = SFH−SFL = cH−cL.
This requirement is consistent with (2.10), so 0 < piM = 1−piF < 1 can be supported
as an investment equilibrium in the different-sex marriage market. By the same
argument, piS = 1
2
can be supported as an investment equilibrium in the same-sex
marriage by marriage-market payoffs satisfying SSH−SSL = cH−cL. Figure 2.7 depicts
the investment equilibria of the frictionless marriage markets.
We are now ready to describe the human capital profiles of the couples in each
marriage market. When matching in the marriage markets is frictionless, every in-
vestment equilibrium corresponds to a stable assignment of the kind described in
Case 3. These stable assignments are characterized by perfect negative assortative
matching: every low earner marries a high earner, and every high earner marries a low
earner. Thus, in both the same-sex and different-sex marriage markets, frictionless
matching facilitates specialization. Every couple, whether same-sex or different-sex,
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Figure 2.7: Investment equilibria of the frictionless marriage markets
(a) different-sex (b) same-sex
Table 2.4: Human capital profiles of couples in the frictionless marriage markets
Proportion of couples
Different-sex Same-sex
High / Low 1 1
High / High 0 0
Low / Low 0 0
contains partners with complementary human capital. Every couple allocates time to
both the home and the market and, every couple has children. Table 2.4 summarizes
the human capital profiles of same-sex and different-sex couples in the frictionless
marriage markets.
As Hadfield (1999) observes in a similar analysis of pre-marital investments by
heterosexual men and women, frictionless marriage markets produce household spe-
cialization, but not necessarily sex-based specialization. An equilibrium in which all
heterosexual men choose the high investment and all heterosexual women choose the
low investment is possible in such markets, but it is just one possibility on a contin-
uum of equilibria that includes complete differentiation in the opposite direction and
complete non-differentiation of human capital by sex. The average heterosexual man
or woman may be a high investor, a low investor, or a moderate investor. Further-
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more, while all heterosexual couples are specialized, the partner who spends time at
home may be either the man or the woman.
In contrast to the wide range of outcomes that are possible in the different-sex
marriage market, there is only one investment equilibrium in the same-sex market:
half of the people in the market choose the high investment, and half choose the
low investment. Thus, when matching is frictionless, the investments of gay men
and lesbians may be identical to, or very different from, the investments of their
heterosexual peers. We have seen that the average heterosexual man or woman may
be a high investor, a low investor, or a moderate investor. The average gay man or
lesbian is always a moderate investor.
While the frictionless marriage markets shape human capital accumulation dif-
ferently for individual gay men and lesbians, compared with individual heterosexual
men and women, they produce identical outcomes for same-sex and different-sex cou-
ples. Every couple matched in a frictionless marriage market contains partners with
complementary human capital. As a result, every couple finds it optimal to special-
ize, and every couple has children. Nothing in my analysis so far has suggested that
household arrangements will differ by sexual orientation.
In the next section, I characterize the pre-marital investments of individuals and
the human capital profiles of couples when there are frictions in the marriage markets.
At the individual level, I show that the possibility of mismatches encourages sex-based
investment choices in the different-sex marriage market but does not substantially
alter investment choices in the same-sex marriage market. At the couple level, I show
that same-sex couples, but not different sex couples, are less likely to be specialized
when they meet in marriage markets with frictions.
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2.4.3 Random marriage markets
To explore the impact of marriage-market frictions on the pre-marital investments
and human capital profiles of same-sex and different-sex couples, I consider the polar
case to frictionless matching: random matching. The most plausible interpretation
of random matching, in marriage markets where people differ only in their human
capital endowments, is that the value of prospective partners depends primarily on
factors outside the model – for example, emotional compatibility, shared interests, or
common values. I assume that, holding these outside factors constant, people prefer
partners with human capital that complements their own. At the same time, I assume
that people are sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to the outside factors – true
love strikes sufficiently rarely – that human capital is never decisive.
When matching is random, the likelihood that a person marries a high or low
investor in the second period depends only on the distribution of investments among
the person’s prospective partners. It does not depend, as it did when matching was
frictionless, on the distribution of investments among the person’s competitors or the
person’s own investment. Because all marriages generate a strictly positive surplus,
all men and women marry the partner with whom they are randomly matched in the
second period. I assume that, due to social norms, couples share their marital surplus
evenly.7
As before, people choose investments to maximize their expected utility from
marriage, net of investment costs. Using vyx to denote the utility of an x-investor who
marries a y-investor, recalling that b˜ ≡ b [wH + (1− t)wL − h]− thwL is the utility a
couple with unequal earners gains from having from having children, and consulting
7When utility is transferable and remaining single is the outside option that defines the threat
points for bargaining within marriage, even sharing of the surplus is also the Nash bargaining
solution.
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(2.6)-(2.8), the ex post utilities from the high and low investments are
vHH = UH +
1
2
h2,
vLH = UH +
1
2
h2 +
1
2
b˜,
vHL = UL +
1
2
h2 +
1
2
b˜,
vLL = UL +
1
2
h2.
Before people know whom they will marry, the expected utilities from the high and
low investments are
VH (pi
p) = pipvHH + (1− pip) vLH ,
VL (pi
p) = pipvHL + (1− pip) vLL,
where pip is the proportion of prospective partners who choose the high investment.
For both high and low investors, expected utility is increasing in the proportion of
prospective partners whose human capital complements their own.
People in the same market group will choose different investments only if the
net returns to the high and low investments are equal. Otherwise, people choose
the investment that yields the higher net return for their group. Setting VH (pip) −
VL (pi
p) = cH − cL and solving for pip yields the proportion of prospective partners,
pip = p¯i ≡
(
vLH − vLL
)− (cH − cL)
(vLH − vLL)− (vHH − vHL )
,
who must choose the high investment to equalize the expected utilities of high and
low investors. Substituting the values of the ex post utilities, we have
p¯i =
(UH − UL)− (cH − cL) + 12 b˜
b˜
.
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When pip < p¯i, high investors obtain greater expected utility than low investors. When
pip > p¯i, low investors obtain greater expected utility.
Relative to frictionless matching, random matching narrows the conditions under
which investment choice is an interesting problem. People will choose the high invest-
ment only if p¯i ≥ 0 and the low investment only if p¯i ≤ 1. Examining the expression for
p¯i, we find that people will choose the high investment only if cH− cL ≤ UH−UL+ 12 b˜
and the low investment only if cH−cL ≥ UH−UL− 12 b˜. These bounds on the marginal
cost of the high investment are tighter than the comparable bounds under frictionless
matching. From (2.1)-(2.5) and (2.19)-(2.20), we know that people in the frictionless
marriage markets will choose the high investment only if cH − cL ≤ UH −UL + b˜ and
the low investment only if cH − cL ≥ UH − UL − b˜. Intuitively, random matching
weakens the link between investment choices and marriage-market payoffs. Because
couples in the random marriage markets share their marital surplus evenly, high in-
vestors stand to gain less from complementary matches and stand to lose less from
non-complementary matches than they do when the marriage markets are compet-
itive. To ensure that 0 < p¯i < 1 in the random marriage markets, I assume that
UH − UL + 12 b˜ ≥ cH − cL ≥ UH − UL − 12 b˜.
When matching in the marriage markets is random, there is one internal invest-
ment equilibrium in each marriage market. In the different-sex marriage market, the
internal investment equilibrium is piM = piF = p¯i. In the same-sex marriage market,
it is piS = p¯i. To confirm that these proportions constitute equilibria, recall that p¯i
is the proportion of high-investing prospective partners that equalizes the expected
utilities from the high and low investments. When the members of each market group
choose the high investment in this proportion, no person can obtain greater utility by
switching investments. I will refer to the internal investment equilibria of the random
marriage markets as the egalitarian equilibria.
The egalitarian equilibria of the random marriage markets, unlike the internal
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investment equilibria of the frictionless marriage markets, need not contain equal
numbers of high and low investors. When the marginal return to the high investment
exceeds its marginal cost for single men and women, UH − UL > cH − cL and p¯i > 12 ,
which means there are more high investors in the egalitarian equilibria of the random
marriage markets than in the internal investment equilibria of the frictionless marriage
markets. When the marginal cost of the high investment exceeds its marginal return
for single men and women, the inequalities are reversed.
These shifts in the proportion of high investors reflect the non-competitive allo-
cation of marital surplus in the random marriage markets. In large, frictionless mar-
riage markets, competition for partners internalizes the social benefits of pre-marital
investments for individual men and women and induces efficient levels of investment
(Peters and Siow, 2002; Iyigun and Walsh, 2007). In marriage markets with frictions,
pre-marital investments may be inefficient. When men and women in the random
marriage markets choose the high investment rather than the low investment, they
generate a positive externality for prospective partners who are low earners and a
negative externality for prospective partners who are high earners. Because people
do not take these externalities into account when they choose investments in the first
period, the proportion of high investors in the egalitarian equilibria of the random
marriage markets may be higher or lower than the proportion that maximizes the
total welfare in the markets.
In addition to the egalitarian equilibrium that it shares with the same-sex mar-
riage market, the different-sex marriage market has two corner investment equilibria.
These equilibria are characterized by sex-based investment choices. In each corner
investment equilibrium of the different-sex marriage market, all men choose one in-
vestment, and all women choose the other. Sex-based specialization is an equilibrium
arrangement in the different-sex marriage market because, if all members of one sex
choose the high investment, all members of the other sex can guarantee themselves a
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complementary match by choosing the low investment. There is no corner investment
equilibrium in the same-sex marriage market because, were all gay men or lesbians to
choose the same investment, they would guarantee themselves a non-complementary
match and would have an incentive to choose differently. I will refer to the corner
equilibria of the different-sex marriage market as the specialized equilibria.
Formally, investment equilibria other than the egalitarian and specialized equilib-
ria characterized above do not exist because alternative distributions of pre-marital
investments present opportunities for utility-improving deviations. To rule out other
investment equilibria in the same-sex marriage market, suppose that piS∗ < p¯i. Then,
high investors obtain greater expected utility than low investors and all sexual mi-
norities choose the high investment, which contradicts that piS∗ < p¯i. By the same
reasoning, piS∗ > p¯i cannot be part of an investment equilibrium in the same-sex
marriage market.
To rule out other investment equilibria in the different-sex marriage market, sup-
pose that 0 < piM∗ < p¯i. Then, high-investing women obtain greater expected utility
than low-investing women and all women choose the high investment. But when all
women choose the high investment, low-investing men obtain greater expected utility
than high-investing men and all men choose the low investment, which contradicts
that piM∗ > 0. By the same reasoning, p¯i < piM∗ < 1, cannot be part of an invest-
ment equilibrium in the different-sex marriage market. A parallel argument rules out
0 < piF
∗
< p¯i and p¯i < piF ∗ < 1. Figure 2.8 depicts the investment equilibria of the
random marriage markets when UH −UL > cH − cL. Changes in the marginal return
to the high investment, relative to its marginal cost, would shift the locations of the
egalitarian equilibria in the figure but would not alter its qualitative properties.
Turning from the investment choices of individuals to the human capital profiles
of couples, random matching opens the possibility that different-sex couples have
non-complementary human capital. In the internal equilibrium of the different-sex
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Figure 2.8: Investment equilibria of the random marriage markets
(a) different-sex (b) same-sex
marriage market, there is a positive probability, p¯i2, that a randomly matched cou-
ple contains two high investors. There is also a positive probability, (1− p¯i)2, that
a randomly matched couple contains two low investors. At the same time, random
matching increases the likelihood that different-sex couples with complementary hu-
man capital adopt fixed gender roles. In the specialized equilibria of the different-sex
marriage market, biology is destiny. People of the same sex always choose the same
investment. It is not possible, as it was when matching was frictionless, for the sex
of the high-investing partner to vary across couples. Either high investors are always
men, or they are always women.
In the same-sex marriage market, the move to random matching has dramatic
consequences for the human capital profiles of couples. When matching is frictionless,
every same-sex couple, like every different-sex couple, contains one high investor and
one low investor. When matching is random, the proportion of same-sex couples with
complementary human capital drops to 2p¯i (1− p¯i) and never exceeds one-half. Table
2.5 summarizes the human capital profiles of same-sex and different-sex couples in
the random marriage markets.
The essential result of this section is that, relative to frictionless matching, ran-
dom matching amplifies the differences between sexual minorities and heterosexual
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Table 2.5: Human capital profiles of couples in the random marriage markets
Proportion of couples
Different-sex
specialized
Different-sex
egalitarian
Same-sex
High / Low 1 2p¯i (1− p¯i)a 2p¯i (1− p¯i)a
High / High 0 p¯i2 p¯i2
Low / Low 0 (1− p¯i) (1− p¯i)
a The value of this expression and, hence, the proportion of high-low couples in the
egalitarian equilibria never exceeds one-half.
men and women. At the individual level, random matching maintains incentives for
sexual minorities of the same sex to choose different investments but encourages het-
erosexual people of the same sex to choose the same investment. At the couple level,
random matching preserves specialization as a likely outcome for different-sex couples
but renders specialization much less likely for same-sex couples. By increasing the
likelihood of fixed gender roles for heterosexual men and women, and by reducing
the likelihood of specialization for same-sex couples, the random marriage markets
generate outcomes that more closely approximate the stylized facts.
The changes in investment and specialization patterns that attend the move from
frictionless to random matching reflect the introduction of uncertainty to the mar-
riage markets. When matching is frictionless, competition in the markets allocates
human capital to the partners who value it most and assigns identical prices to equally
productive people. Within each market group, people who choose the same invest-
ment enjoy the same utility in the second period, no matter whom they marry. That
is, conditional on the distribution of investments in a person’s marriage market, the
person’s return to each investment is certain. When matching is random, in contrast,
a person’s return to each investment depends on the human capital of a particular
future partner whose identity is not known at the time the investment is chosen. If
the partner turns out to be a low investor, the marginal return to the high investment,
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net of investment costs, will be positive; if the partner turns out to be a high investor,
it will be negative. People in the random marriage markets cannot condition their
investment choices on the choices of their unknown future partners. Thus, random
matching gives rise to a coordination problem.
In the different-sex marriage market, the structural separation of competitors
from prospective partners provides a means by which the coordination problem can
be solved. While they cannot condition their investment choices on the choices of their
future partners, heterosexual men and women can condition their investment choices
on sex. When all heterosexual men choose the same investment, all heterosexual
women know with certainty what human capital their partner will bring to marriage.
By choosing the other investment, they can ensure that their human capital will be
complementary. This solution to the coordination problem is not possible in the
same-sex marriage market for the obvious reason that the market is not divided by
sex. As we saw in the preceding discussion, sexual minorities do worse, not better,
when everyone of a given sex chooses the same investment.
A second way to understand the divergence in outcomes between the same-sex
and different-sex marriage markets is to examine the sources of within-couple dif-
ferences in each market. In the different-sex marriage market, partners may have
different levels of human capital because matching is negatively assortative, or they
may have different levels of human capital because they are drawn from populations
with different investment distributions. If matching is not negatively assortative in
the different-sex marriage market – for example, because there are frictions in the
market – different-sex couples can still achieve specialization by shifting the location
of the male or female investment distribution. In the same-sex marriage market, on
the other hand, partners are drawn from the same population and, hence, from the
same investment distribution. Because they are drawn from the same investment
distribution, same-sex couples can achieve specialization only if matching is nega-
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tively assortative.8 In sum, the different-sex marriage market has a degree of freedom
the same-sex market does not have: the relative locations of the male and female
investment distributions. As a result of this difference, matching patterns matter
considerably more in the same-sex marriage market.
While my analysis to this point suggests that same-sex couples will be less spe-
cialized than different-sex couples under random matching, the prediction is tentative
because there are multiple equilibria in the different-sex marriage market. In the next
section, I use the tools of evolutionary game theory to sharpen my predictions about
the different-sex marriage market and, by extension, about the differences between the
same-sex and different-sex markets. I show that, although the egalitarian equilibrium
is possible in both marriage markets, it is stable only in the same-sex market. In the
different-sex market, evolutionary pressures on investment choices make a specialized
equilibrium the overwhelmingly likely outcome.
2.4.4 Evolution and stability of investment norms
Large populations strain the plausibility of a key assumption underlying the Nash
equilibrium concept: that the players in a game know the strategies of the other
players.9 In large marriage markets like those considered here, it is not clear how
men and women can learn which equilibrium the market is playing. And if they do
not know how many of their competitors and prospective partners are choosing each
investment, men and women cannot determine the expected return to either invest-
ment. Rationality assumptions motivate the requirement that, in a Nash equilibrium,
players choose best responses to the choices they believe their opponents are mak-
8Matching need not be perfectly negatively assortative. Partners drawn from populations with
identical investment distributions may have different levels of human capital as long as matching is
not perfectly positively assortative.
9The problem is not limited to games with many players. Samuelson (2002) observes that, in
general, the notion that players know what others are doing does not follow from standard rationality
assumptions. But large populations dramatize the issue because, to apply the Nash criterion to such
populations, we would have to believe that people know the strategies of innumerable others.
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ing. But rationality assumptions do not explain how players arrive at accurate beliefs
(Samuelson, 2002).
Evolutionary game theory offers a solution to this problem. Rather than assum-
ing that people are perfectly rational and all-knowing, evolutionary models assume
that they are “myopic and unsophisticated” (Mailath, 1992, p. 261). Specifically,
evolutionary models assume that members of a large population meet randomly and
repeatedly to play a game. In each round, people observe what has happened in the
past – the strategies previous players have used and the payoffs those strategies have
produced – and repeat behavior that has been successful. They do not know what
others are doing in the current round, do not imagine that others are re-optimizing in
response to the past, and do not consider the impact of their behavior on their own
future payoffs. Over time, play of this kind converges to a stationary state.10 As it
happens, every Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game is a stationary state of
the corresponding evolutionary model. What is more, every stable stationary state
of an evolutionary model is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding non-cooperative
game. In this way, evolutionary game theory provides a motivation for the Nash
criterion.
Although they originated in biology, evolutionary models provide a natural frame-
work for analyzing the evolution and persistence of social norms. In culture, as in
biology, evolutionary pressures reinforce adaptive behavior. Successful people may
have more children who inherit their beneficial habits. Or they may serve as role
models for their peers, with others imitating their behavior. Evolutionary game the-
ory makes explicit the dynamic process through which adaptive behaviors may be
established as norms. In the context of marriage markets, it describes a process
through which pre-marital investments consistent with Nash equilibrium behavior in
each marriage market may emerge as investment norms for men and women in that
10There exist evolutionary models in which the dynamics never converge to a stationary state. In
the models presented here, however, the dynamics always converge.
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market.
Evolutionary game theory offers an additional benefit in the present setting: it
generates sharper predictions than the Nash criterion about outcomes in the different-
sex marriage market. We saw, in the preceding section, that random matching with-
out evolutionary pressures gave rise to two specialized equilibria and one egalitarian
equilibrium in the different-sex marriage market. Because the egalitarian equilibrium
was also the unique equilibrium of the same-sex marriage market, we were left with
the prediction that outcomes in the two markets might diverge or coincide – and we
had no way to choose between these outcomes.11 By placing the marriage markets in
an evolutionary framework, we can use the dynamic concept of stability to rule out
implausible equilibria. In particular, we can rule out investment equilibria that are
not robust to evolutionary pressures.
Intuition suggests that the egalitarian equilibrium of the different-sex marriage
market is fragile. The equality of payoffs to people of the same sex who choose
different investments depends on a precise balance of the investments on each side
of the market. A marginal shift away from that balance on one side of the marriage
market effects a discrete shift in payoffs on the other side of the market. What is
more, movements of heterosexual men and women toward specialization are mutually
reinforcing. A marginal increase, above the equilibrium level, in the proportion of
heterosexual men who are high investors induces all heterosexual women to choose
the low investment. This change in the behavior of women, in turn, induces all
heterosexual men to choose the high investment. In this way, any movement – even
a very small movement – away from the egalitarian equilibrium is sufficient to propel
11The standard, rationality-based refinements of non-cooperative game theory do not help us.
For example, trembling-hand perfection requires that the equilibrium in question be robust with
respect to some low-probability trembles in the strategies played. Strict perfection, a more stringent
refinement that implies trembling-hand perfection, requires robustness with respect to all trembles.
Weibull (1995) shows an equilibrium is strictly perfect if it is interior. Okada (1981) shows that
an equilibrium is strictly perfect if the strategy of each player is the unique best response to the
strategies of the other players. Taken together, these results imply that all of the equilibria in the
different-sex marriage market are both trembling-hand perfect and strictly perfect.
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the different-sex marriage market to a specialized equilibrium.
To formalize the intuition that egalitarianism is unstable in the different-sex mar-
riage market, I model the evolution of pre-marital investment norms using the baseline
dynamic model of evolutionary game theory: the replicator dynamics. Suppose that,
rather than choosing an investment as a best response to the choices of their prospec-
tive partners, individuals in each marriage market are pre-programmed to choose
either the high investment or the low investment. Suppose, also, that the marriage
markets arrange random matches repeatedly, in continuous time. If we interpret the
payoff to each matched partner as an incremental gain in his or her reproductive
fitness, and if children inherit the investment strategy of their single parent, then the
distribution of investments in the marriage markets evolves according to the replicator
dynamics (Weibull, 1995).
The replicator dynamics capture the idea that successful behavior reproduces itself
at a faster rate than unsuccessful behavior. In a population that evolves according
to these dynamics, the proportion of individuals programmed to a given strategy
increases at a rate equal to the difference between the payoff to that strategy and the
average payoff in the population:
p˙ix = pix {ux (pip)− Σypiyuy (pip)} ,
where x represents the strategy of interest, y indexes all of the strategies in the game,
including x, and p represents the population of prospective partners. In the model
we have been considering, the replicator equation simplifies to
p˙i = pi (1− pi) {[UH (pip)− cH ]− [UL (pip)− cL]} .
The intuition behind this equation is straightforward. In a game with two strategies,
the first strategy earns a higher payoff than the average payoff in the population if
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and only if it earns a higher payoff than the second strategy. We know from the
previous section that, in the same-sex and different-sex marriage markets, the high
investment earns a higher net payoff than the low investment when pip < p¯i and vice
versa when pip > p¯i. Thus, the proportion of high investors in each market group
increases when the proportion of high investors among their prospective partners is
below p¯i and decreases when it is above p¯i.
These dynamics have starkly different implications for the same-sex and different-
sex marriage markets. In the different-sex marriage market, the prospective partners
whose behavior determines the payoffs in the replicator equation are distinct from the
group whose evolution is described by the equation. Heterosexual men respond to the
behavior of heterosexual women, and heterosexual women respond to the behavior of
heterosexual men:
p˙iM = piM
(
1− piM) {[UH (piF )− cH]− [UL (piF )− cL]} ,
p˙iF = piF
(
1− piF ) {[UH (piM)− cH]− [UL (piM)− cL]} .
This dynamic system has five stationary states: piM = piF = p¯i; piM = piF ∈ {0, 1};
and 1−piM = piF ∈ {0, 1}. When the different-sex marriage market is not in a station-
ary state, its separation of competitors and prospective partners tends to pull men
and women apart. Figure 2.9a illustrates the evolution of the male and female invest-
ment distributions in the different-sex marriage market. The figure shows that, from
almost any initial state, the populations of heterosexual men and women converge to
investment distributions that are heterogeneous within sex and complementary be-
tween the sexes – that is, to one of the specialized equilibria of the marriage market.
The corollary to this result is that the egalitarian equilibrium in the different-sex
marriage market breaks down under evolutionary pressures. Small perturbations of
the market from the egalitarian equilibrium can set it on a dynamic path toward a
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Figure 2.9: Stable investment equilibria under the replicator dynamics
(a) different-sex (b) same-sex
specialized equilibrium.
In the same-sex marriage market, in contrast, the prospective partners whose
behavior determines the payoffs in the replicator equation are the same group whose
evolution is described by the equation. Gay men respond to the behavior of other
gay men, and lesbians respond to behavior of other lesbians:
p˙iS = piS
(
1− piS) {[UH (piS)− cH]− [UL (piS)− cL]} .
This dynamic system has three stationary states: piS = p¯i; piS = 0; and piS = 1.
Because evolutionary pressures reward investments that are rare among a person’s
prospective partners, the equivalence of competitors and prospective partners in the
same-sex marriage market encourages sexual minorities of the same sex to make differ-
ent human capital investments. Figure 2.9b illustrates the evolution of the investment
distribution in the same-sex marriage market under the replicator dynamics. When
there are many high investors in the market, the population share of low investors
grows; when there are many low investors, the population share of high investors
grows. In light of these dynamics, small perturbations of the gay or lesbian popula-
tion do not disrupt the egalitarian equilibrium of the same-sex marriage market. To
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Table 2.6: Human capital profiles of couples under the replicator dynamics
Proportion of couples
Different-sex Same-sex
High / Low 1 2p¯i (1− p¯i)a
High / High 0 p¯i2
Low / Low 0 (1− p¯i)
a The value of this expression and, hence, the proportion of high-low couples in the
egalitarian equilibria never exceeds one-half.
the contrary, from almost any initial state, the replicator dynamics pull the population
toward the egalitarian equilibrium.
As promised, the application of evolutionary game theory to the marriage markets
has yielded clear predictions about the impact of sexual orientation on human capital
investments and specialization patterns. At the individual level, heterosexual men
and women make sex-based investment choices. All heterosexual women choose one
investment and all heterosexual men choose the other. Gay men and lesbians do not
make sex-based investment choices. Some sexual minorities of each sex choose each
investment. Because sex is destiny for heterosexual men and women, but not for gay
men and lesbians, the average gay man or lesbian is a more moderate investor than
the average heterosexual man or woman.
At the couple level, same-sex partners are less likely than different-sex partners to
have complementary human capital. As a result, same-sex couples practice egalitar-
ianism, while different-sex couples practice specialization. Table 2.6 summarizes the
human capital profiles of same-sex and different-sex couples in the equilibria that are
robust to evolutionary pressures.
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2.5 Discussion
The preceding analysis shows that marriage-market incentives can motivate be-
havior that is consistent with the stylized facts about work, family, and sexual orien-
tation. Results from both the frictionless and random models indicate that same-sex
marriage markets encourage gay men and lesbians to make moderate human capital
investments. If heterosexual men act as primary earners and heterosexual woman act
as secondary earners, than the intermediate roles of gay men and lesbians provide an
explanation for their intermediate labor-market outcomes. Gay men earn less than
heterosexual men and spend less time working in the market because some do not act
as primary earners. Lesbians earn more than heterosexual women and spend more
time working in the market because some do not act as secondary earners.
At the couple level, outcomes in the frictionless marriage markets suggest that
same-sex couples will adopt specialized roles under some conditions. In particular,
same-sex couples will adopt household roles that resemble those of different-sex cou-
ples when marriage markets are competitive. The intuition for this result is Becker’s
(1991) observation that, whatever the composition of a household, its members obtain
higher returns to their specific human capital investments when they use their human
capital more intensively. Importantly, this result also assumes that same-sex couples
incur no special costs from specialization. In reality, same-sex couples probably do
incur special costs because they are excluded from many of the institutional supports,
such as family health plans, Social Security spousal benefits, and joint income tax
filing, that facilitate specialization for different-sex couples.
Outcomes in the random marriage markets suggest that, when unmarried men and
women face uncertainty about their future partners, same-sex couples share house-
hold and market work more equally than different-sex couples. This result is espe-
cially pronounced when investment norms are subject to evolutionary pressures. The
prediction that same-sex couples are more egalitarian than different-sex couples is
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consistent with the stylized facts about sexual orientation and time allocation. Com-
pared with primary workers in heterosexual households, primary workers in gay and
lesbian households are responsible for a smaller proportion of the total household
labor supply.
Intuitively, the specialization patterns of same-sex and different-sex couples di-
verge under random matching because participants in gay and lesbian marriage mar-
kets cannot use sex to coordinate specialized human capital investments with partners
they have not yet met. For heterosexual men and women, fixed gender roles and their
corresponding investment strategies can eliminate uncertainty about the returns to
pre-marital human capital investments. For gay men and lesbians, gender roles have
no value as a coordinating mechanism. Cultural evolution reflects this difference,
promoting gender roles for heterosexual men and women and discouraging them for
sexual minorities.
While the theoretical predictions in this paper match the stylized facts about
sexual minorities in most domains, educational attainment is a notable exception.
Both gay men and lesbians obtain more education than their heterosexual peers.
While the incentives for moderate human capital investments in same-sex marriage
markets predict this result for lesbians, they predict the opposite for gay men. My
analysis suggests that gay men are less likely than heterosexual men to be primary
earners. Thus, to the extent that education represents preparation for market work,
my analysis implies that gay men should obtain less education than heterosexual men.
I do not have an explanation for the “puzzle” of highly educated gay men. I will note,
however, that a similar puzzle exists for heterosexual men and women. Young women
are now more likely to graduate from college than young men, even though they are
less likely to be primary earners. The sex gap in educational attainment is an active
area of research and has attracted the attention of marriage-market theorists (Iyigun
and Walsh, 2007; Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss, 2009).
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The finding that frictions in the marriage market diminish specialization in same-
sex households has novel implications for the fertility of gay men and lesbians. Economists
have argued that same-sex couples specialize less extensively than different-sex cou-
ples because they are less likely to have children. For Becker (1991), children are a
primary motivation for the division of labor between heterosexual men and women. It
is because couples have children that they allocate significant time to household work,
and it is because women have a comparative advantage in caring for children that cou-
ples allocate household work to women. In one of his few explicit mentions of sexual
minorities, Becker says the following: “Homosexual unions do not result in children,
and generally they have a less extensive division of labor and less marital-specific
capital than heterosexual marriages” (p. 330). Building on Becker, Black, Sanders
and Taylor (2007) argue that same-sex couples have fewer children than different-sex
couples because adoption is expensive and because sexual minorities may face dis-
crimination in the adoption process. Black et al. also observe that same-sex couples
are less likely to have a stay-at-home partner when they do not have children.
The analysis in this paper suggests that the causal relationship between children
and household specialization may run, not just from children to specialization, but
also from specialization to children. When investment norms evolve according to evo-
lutionary pressures, heterosexual men and women can coordinate their pre-marital
investments by adopting sex-based investment strategies. In the resulting special-
ized equilibria of the different-sex marriage market, all different-sex couples have
complementary human capital. Then, because they have made specialized human
capital investments, all different-sex couples have children. Gay men and lesbians
cannot use sex-based investment strategies to coordinate their pre-marital invest-
ments. Consequently, same-sex couples are less likely than different-sex couples to
have complementary human capital. Then, because many same-sex couples have not
made specialized human capital investments, many do not have children.
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The message of this discussion is that gay men and lesbians may become parents
less often than heterosexual men and women because they specialize less often. If chil-
dren are a normal good, then couples in which both partners have low earnings may
have relatively few children. At the same time, if child rearing is time-intensive, then
couples in which both partners have high earnings may have relatively few children.
To the extent that gay men and lesbians have trouble coordinating complementary
human capital investments before marriage, they may be more likely than heterosex-
ual men and women to marry partners with equal earnings. And to the extent that
they are more likely to marry partners with equal earnings, gay men and lesbians
may be more likely to find children prohibitively expensive. In this way, marriage-
market incentives contribute the pattern we observe: fewer children in gay and lesbian
households.
To provide a theoretical basis for empirical differences between sexual minorities
and their heterosexual peers, this paper develops the first formal model of same-sex
marriage market. Economists have produced a substantial and insightful theoretical
literature exploring the operation and outcomes of different-sex marriage markets.
As should be clear from my discussion, however, the conclusions from this literature
may not go through in analyses of same-sex marriage markets. Unlike heterosexual
men and women, gay men and lesbians compete for partners with their prospective
partners. This lack of structural separation between competitors and prospective
partners in same-sex marriage markets carries important implications. Accordingly,
a complete economic theory of marriage markets must include gay men and lesbians
alongside their heterosexual peers.
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CHAPTER III
New Economists on the Job Market
With Uniko Chen, Brooke Helppie McFall, and Robert J. Willis
3.1 Introduction
The primary job market for new economists unfolds in stages around the annual
meetings of the Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA).1 Each year, in the months
leading up to the meetings, hundreds of recent and soon-to-be graduates of doctoral
programs in North America and Europe submit thousands of applications for jobs
throughout the world. In early January, job candidates and employers travel to the
meetings to complete first-round job interviews, and in the months following the
meetings, job candidates travel to prospective job sites to complete second-round
interviews and to give presentations of their research. Within three months of the
meetings, most employers have extended job offers and most job candidates have
accepted an offer or made alternate plans for the following year. Because a majority of
graduates from the most prestigious doctoral programs participate in the job market
organized around the ASSA meetings, many hiring institutions that do not interview
at the meetings also conform to this schedule.
1This paper focuses on the largest job market based in the United States. Active job markets for
new economists exist elsewhere and may follow different timelines.
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Many new economists find the job market stressful, and most seek information
about what they can expect. Informal resources and anecdotal information abound.
Job candidates may follow postings on websites that track the job market, such as
the Economics Job Market Rumors website and the Economics Job Market wiki, or
they may seek advice from “how-to” guides to the job market (Cawley, 2009).2 In
addition, most job candidates learn about the experiences of their department in
placing graduates, and most consult with their advisors or with peers who preceded
them on the market.
Formal studies of the economics job market have illuminated several aspects of the
job-market experience. A number of studies have described the employment outcomes
of recent job-market participants and identified characteristics of the job candidates
that predict successful outcomes (Barbezat, 1992; Siegfried and Stock, 1999; Duncan,
Yandell and Kokila, 2000; Stock, Alston and Milkman, 2000; Stock and Alston, 2000;
Siegfried and Stock, 2004; Hilmer and Hilmer, 2007). Other studies have incorpo-
rated information about outcomes during the job market, including experiences with
applications, interviews, fly-outs, and job offers (Duncan, Yandell and Kokila, 2000;
List, 2000; Stock, Alston and Milkman, 2000; Stock and Alston, 2000). Finally, at
least one study has examined the preferences of job candidates with respect to dif-
ferent employment outcomes and the association between preferences and outcomes
(Barbezat, 1992).
This paper extends research on the economics job market in several says. First,
we provide the first summary of outcomes during the job market, including outcomes
related to applications, interviews, fly-outs, and job offers, using a representative
sample of new entrants to the job market. Second, we provide comprehensive infor-
mation about the job-market experiences and outcomes of job candidates in three
recent job-market cohorts. Prior studies characterized the job-market experiences of
2Websites are accessible at http://www.econjobrumors.com/ and
http://bluwiki.com/go/Econjobmarket.
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job candidates through the 2001-02 job-market cohort (Siegfried and Stock, 2004);
this study characterizes the experiences of job candidates in the 2007-10 job-market
cohorts using a slightly different, but largely comparable sample. Finally, we exploit
the structured timing of the economics job market to assess the preferences of job
candidates before they know what their job placements will be, and we corroborate
findings from research that relied on retrospective measures of peferences.
3.2 Overview of the economics job market
The application stage of the economics job market takes place in fall and early
winter. Beginning in September and continuing through December, hiring institutions
advertise their job openings. Most institutions advertise their openings on the Job
Openings for Economists website maintained by the American Economic Association,
and a growing number advertise their openings on the website of EconJobMarket.org.3
At the same time, some hiring institutions solicit applications from job candidates who
come to their attention through informational packets and job-placement websites
maintained by graduate departments. The deadlines for applications during this
stage of the job market range from October to December, with most deadlines falling
in the latter half of November.
The interview stage of the job market takes place in midwinter. From late Novem-
ber through the end of December, hiring institutions contact job candidates to sched-
ule interviews at the ASSA meetings. In early January, job candidates travel to the
meetings, where they meet with hiring committees for interviews lasting from 30 to
60 minutes.
The fly-out stage of the job market takes place in late winter and early spring.
Beginning after the ASSA meetings and continuing through the end of March, hiring
3The Job Openings for Economists website can be accessed at http://www.aeaweb.org/joe. The
EconJobMarket websites can be accessed at https://econjobmarket.org.
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institutions invite job candidates to visit their work site, meet with prospective col-
leagues, and give a research presentation. Some job candidates receive invitations for
fly-outs almost immediately after the meetings; others wait weeks or months to hear
from prospective employers. In some cases, variation in the timing of fly-outs reflects
the preferences of hiring institutions for some job candidates over others. Institutions
may invite their top candidates for fly-outs and wait for decisions from those can-
didates before they extend offers to their less preferred candidates. In other cases,
variation in the timing of fly-outs reflects differences between hiring institutions with
respect to such matters as budgetary concerns, bureaucratic procedures, or scheduling
constraints.
The job-offer stage of the job market overlaps considerably with the fly-out stage.
Most job candidates receive job offers and accept a job between early January and
late March. Sometimes, job candidates hear from a prospective employer within days
of returning from a fly-out; sometimes, they wait weeks to learn the outcome of the
fly-out. Many hiring institutions schedule fly-outs with several job candidates before
they extend an offer to any candidate. Hiring institutions with a small number of
openings, and institutions hoping to fill particular needs, may offer positions to job
candidates successively, waiting for each offer to be refused before extending an offer
to the next candidate on the list. Because hiring institutions generally wait until an
offer has been made and accepted before officially closing their search, job candidates
may wait for months after an interview or fly-out for confirmation that they will not
be hired.
While the economics job market is thickest in job seekers and open positions
between January and March, the matching process continues for several months after
the ASSA meetings. The job-market scramble, a secondary job market organized by
the American Economic Association, provides an opportunity for job candidates who
have not accepted an offer and hiring institutions who have not filled their positions
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to connect after the primary job market closes. By the time new economists graduate
with their PhDs, most have plans for employment or further study (Siegfried and
Stock, 1999, 2004).
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Overview
The standardized timing of the economics job market, together with with the
nearly universal practice of job candidates posting their contact information and CVs
on publicly accessible job-placement websites, presents an opportunity to study the
job searches of new economists as they unfold. To leverage this opportunity, the
data collection procedures for the Job Seekers project parallel the timeline of the
job market (Figure 3.1). In late November and early December, as job candidates
submit their applications, the project compiles a sample list using information from
the job-placements websites. In late December, just before job candidates travel to
their first-round interviews at the ASSA meetings, the project sends invitations for
the pre-market survey. Finally, in August, as job candidates prepare for or settle into
their new jobs, the project sends invitations for the post-market survey.4
We believe that the Job Seekers sample comprises nearly the universe of job candi-
dates who expected to participate in first-round job interviews at the ASSA meetings
between 2008 and 2010. The sampling frame for the project comprises job candi-
dates whose names and contact information appear on the job-placement websites of
their graduate departments. In 2007-08 and 2008-09, the sampling frame included
job candidates from graduate departments in the United States and Canada whose
departments were listed on the Job Candidates website of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER).5 In 2009-10, we expanded the sampling frame to include
4The project sent invitations for the 2008-09 post-market survey in November rather than August.
5The Job Candidates website of the National Bureau of Economic Research is accessible at
70
job candidates from graduate departments in Europe whose departments were listed
on the website of the NBER, as well as job candidates from several departments in
the United States and Canada whose departments were not listed on the website of
the NBER. As a result of this expansion, the number of institutions included in the
project increased from 105 in 2007-08 to 134 in 2009-10.
In November and early December of each year, our study team visits the job-
placement websites of graduate departments and gathers the names, e-mail addresses,
mailing addresses and CVs of all of the job candidates in our sampling frame. We
use information from the websites and the CVs to code a number of background
characteristics of the job candidates. First, we identify the graduate departments
with which job candidates are affiliated and assess the prestige of the departments
using the U.S. News and World Report (2009) rankings of graduate programs in
economics. Second, we identify the gender of job candidates using the photographs
they post on the job-placement websites and coding based on their first names. Third,
we classify the location of the institutions from which job candidates received their
undergraduate degrees using the educational histories from their CVs.6 Finally, we
obtain information about the doctoral training of job candidates, including their
research fields, research productivity, and teaching experience, using the relevant
sections of their CVs.
Since the 2008-09 job market year, we have mailed pre-notification letters to job
candidates in mid-December. The purpose of these letters is to introduce the study
and alert candidates that they will soon receive an e-mail invitation to complete
the pre-market survey. We invite job candidates to participate in the pre-market
survey in late December, just before most begin their first-round job interviews. The
survey is available for job candidates to complete online during the period leading
http://www.nber.org/candidates/.
6Data from the web surveys indicate the the location of a job candidate’s undergraduate institu-
tion is a good proxy for the job candidate’s country of origin.
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up to the annual meetings of the ASSA and remains available for several months
after the meetings. While the fielding window for the pre-market survey is long, most
respondents complete the survey in a timely manner. Between 2007-08 and 2009-10,
63 percent of the job candidates who completed the pre-market survey submitted their
responses before the meetings. Eighty-eight percent submitted their responses within
one month of receiving the invitation to participate. The pre-market surveys gather
information about demographic characteristics; relationship and cohabitation status;
educational background and careers of partners; preferences regarding the attributes
and location of their future jobs; decisions during the application stage of their job
search and the influence of preferences and personal constraints on these decisions;
and dates of survey login and completion.
Approximately six months after the job market closes, we invite job candidates
to participate in the post-market survey. By this time, most job candidates have
concluded their job search and know whether and where they will be working in the
coming year. In 2007-08 and 2009-10, we sent the invitation to the post-market survey
in August; in 2008-09, we sent the invitation in November. Like the pre-market survey,
the post-market survey is available for job candidates to complete online over a period
of several months. Also like pre-market respondents, most post-market respondents
complete the survey in a timely manner. Between 2007-08 and 2009-10, 79 percent of
the job candidates who completed the post-market survey submitted their responses
within one month of receiving the invitation to participate. The post-market surveys
gather information about decisions during the later stages of the job search, including
interviews, fly-outs, offers and job acceptance stages; extremely detailed information
about accepted jobs and other job offers, including satisfaction and the likelihood of
achieving particular career outcomes; the influence of partners and family constraints
on job market decisions; some information about the early stages of the market, for
candidates who had not responded to the pre-market survey; and expectations about
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both career and personal life.
3.3.2 Sample selectivity and weighting
Response rates for the Job Seekers surveys are comparable or superior to the
response rate for a typical web survey. Between 2007-08 and 2009-10, the response
rate for the pre-market survey was 53 percent, and the response rate for the post-
market survey was 39 percent. By way of comparison, a meta-analysis of response
rates to web and internet surveys found a mean response rate of 39 percent (Cook,
Heath and Thompson, 2000).
While the response rates to our surveys are reasonable, the fact that our response
rates are not 100 percent means that sample selection could bias inference based on
the raw data. For example, if candidates with poorer job outcomes are less likely to
respond to our post-market survey than those with better outcomes, inference from
our analyses of job placements and satisfaction may be biased. A unique strength of
this project is that our combination of data from web surveys and publicly-accessible
websites allows us to create weights to adjust for sample selectivity.
To illustrate the importance of weighting, Table 3.1 presents statistics comparing
respondents to both the pre-market and post-market surveys with the full sample of
job candidates for whom we have CV data. The proportion of female respondents is
similar to the proportion of female job market candidates in the full sample. The com-
position of the samples by rank of PhD institution also does not differ much between
respondents and the full sample, nor are there differences between the two groups in
the proportion of candidates with any journal publications. However, undergraduate
location seems to be related to response rate: candidates with undergraduate degrees
from the United States are over-represented among respondents, relative to the full
sample, while those with undergraduate degrees from Asia are under-represented.
Based on an examination of the variables available in data from CVs (and from
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websites, in the case of gender), we have concluded that response propensity appears
to be primarily related to socio-demographic characteristics. Using the information
available for both respondents and non-respondents from the CV data, we have gen-
erated weights based on the information from CVs to adjust for non-response.
We have developed weights based on estimated response propensities from regres-
sion models. Regression-based weighting allows us to fit the marginal distributions
along multiple dimensions in a simpler way than would be required using the post-
stratification method. Additionally, population distribution has to be known when
using post-stratification. Because the CVs of the job market candidates are not stan-
dardized, not all candidates provided the same information in their CVs, making
post-stratification less appropriate. Regression-based estimation allows us to avoid
this issue. For example, even though most candidates specified the location of their
undergraduate studies, not all did so. Using regression-based estimation of propensity
to respond, we can add one more category, “did not indicate,” for those who did not
indicate their undergraduate locations if we think whether undergraduate location is
indicated might be related to the propensity to respond or survey responses them-
selves. Therefore, in the regressions estimating the propensity to respond, we have
four dummies for undergraduate location: indicated undergraduate location as “US,”
“Asia,” “Other,” and “did not indicate undergraduate location.” Dummy variables for
other categorical variables are similarly defined.
To create weights, we first identified variables from the CV (and website) data that
might be related to survey results and response rates. Next, we ran logistic regres-
sions to estimate the probabilities of response for respondents and non-respondents.
The dependent variables in these logistic regressions were dummy variables, taking
the value of 1 for respondents, and 0 for non-respondents. The independent vari-
ables are from the CV data. We chose variables that we believe are related to both
response propensity and the variables of interest in our study. These include: gen-
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der, rank of PhD institution, citizenship (US, Asian countries, other countries, or
not indicated), location of undergraduate education (US, Asia, other countries or
not indicated), year completed undergraduate studies (2000 and earlier, or 2001 and
later), whether candidate held any postgraduate degree before the PhD (excludes MA
and MS degrees in the PhD field awarded while working toward the PhD), whether
candidate had taught as a primary instructor, whether candidate had taught as a
teaching assistant, whether candidate had presented papers during graduate school,
publication history (any papers published, any papers published in recognized jour-
nals, any papers published without reference as co-authors, any papers published as
single-authored, any papers forthcoming for publication, any papers forthcoming for
publication in recognized journals, any papers forthcoming for publication without
reference as co-authors, or any papers forthcoming for publication as single-authored),
whether candidate majored economics in undergraduate studies, whether candidate
majored in STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) in un-
dergraduate studies, whether candidate made CV available on the internet, whether
candidate would/did receive PhD from a US institution, whether candidate would/did
receive PhD from an economics department, cohort, and research fields (economet-
rics, economic history, economics of education, environmental economic, experimen-
tal economics, financial economics, game theory, international macroeconomics, labor
economics, microeconomics, and public economics).
The inverse of the predicted response probability as estimated from the logistic
regression would be the “raw” inverse probability weight. However, such raw weights
are highly dependent on regression model specification, and prone to extreme values.
To avoid inflation of the variance due to extreme weights, we “smooth” them to make
them less sensitive to the specification of our logistic regressions. Specifically, we
first order respondents and non-respondents together by their estimated probability
of response. Next, we group them by deciles of estimated probability of response.
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We then calculate the true response rates within each decile group. The inverse of
these true response rates are the smoothed weights. Based on comparisons of the
raw inverse weights with the smoothed weights and goodness-of-fit tests, there is no
evidence that our weights are misspecified.
We use three different sets of smoothed weights throughout the rest of this paper.
For analyses using variables from only the CV data or the pre-market surveys, we use
the weights developed to correct for non-response to the pre-market survey; for those
using data from only the CV data or the post-market surveys, we use the weights
developed to correct for non-response to the post-market survey. For analyses using
variables from both surveys, we use weights developed to weight respondents to both
surveys to mirror the full sample.
3.4 Characteristics of job candidates
The job-placement websites that comprise the sampling frame for the Job Seekers
project, along with the CVs that job candidates post on those websites, provide
detailed background information about job candidates in the Job Seekers sample.
Table 3.2 presents means and standard errors of key demographic, educational, and
professional variables coded from the websites and CVs. The table includes data from
all of the job candidates in the 2007-10 Job Seekers sample for whom we obtained
complete background information, whether or not they responded to the surveys.
Just under one third (32 percent) of job candidates in the sample were women.
Approximately one third had obtained their undergraduate education in each of the
three locations we coded: the United States (36 percent), countries in Asia (34 per-
cent), and countries in the rest of the world (31 percent).7 A large majority of job
candidates had obtained their doctoral training in the United States (91 percent) and
7Results from the surveys indicate that location of undergraduate institution is a good proxy
for citizenship. We identify Asian countries following the classification scheme of the Population
Reference Bureau (2008).
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from departments of economics (91 percent).
The distribution of job candidates across graduate departments indicates that
job-market participants come disproportionately from highly ranked departments.
More than one quarter (29 percent) of the job candidates in the Job Seekers sample
had obtained their doctoral training from economics departments ranked in the top
ten by U.S. News and World Report (2009). Another quarter had obtained their
doctoral training from departments ranked in the second ten (13 percent) or third
ten (12 percent). Just under 20 percent of job candidates had obtained their doctoral
training from departments ranked in the fourth ten (9 percent) or fifth ten (8 percent).
Finally, more than one quarter of job candidates had obtained their doctoral training
in departments not ranked by U.S. News and World Report (2009).8
Job candidates listed a wide range of fields on their CVs. We classified the fields
into 28 categories, using listings that appeared frequently on the CVs as the category
names and grouping listings that appeared less frequently with the larger categories
whenever possible. The average job candidate listed 3 of the 28 fields on his or her
CV. Fields listed by more than 20 percent of job candidates included applied econo-
metrics (21 percent), applied microeconomics (21 percent), industrial organization
(22 percent), labor economics (23 percent), and macroeconomics (23 percent). Fields
listed by between 10 and 20 percent of job candidates included development economics
(19 percent), econometrics (17 percent), financial economics (17 percent), and public
economics (17 percent).
Most job candidates used their CVs to convey extensive information about their
teaching and research accomplishments. Information from the CVs suggests that job
candidates are more likely to enter the job market with teaching experience than a
publication record. The average job candidate in the Job Seekers sample had served as
8Most (66 percent) job candidates from unranked departments were from lower-ranked economics
departments in the United States. A sizable minority (30 percent) were from departments outside
the United States, and a small number (4 percent) were from departments in fields closely related
to economics, such as business or public policy.
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a teaching assistant for more than three courses and had served as a primary instructor
for between one and two courses. In contrast, just 28 percent of job candidates had
published an article in a journal by the time they entered the job market, and most
of those who had published an article had published only one.
3.5 Applications, interviews, fly-outs, and job offers
Results from the Job Seekers survey suggest that new economists apply to a large
number of jobs, but that most of the applications they submit do not yield results
at subsequent stages of the job market. Table 3.3 presents the mean number of
applications job candidates submitted, the mean number of invitations they received
for interviews and fly-outs, and the mean number of job offers they received. The
table also summarizes the success rate of applications, interviews, and fly-out, or
the proportion of potential jobs at each stage of the job market that remained in
play at subsequent stages. Between 2007-08 and 2009-10, the average job candidate
submitted 107 applications. By the time the job candidate traveled to first-round
interviews, just 19 percent of the jobs to which he or she had applied remained in
play. Just 8 percent of the jobs to which the average job candidate applied resulted
in a fly-out, and just 4 percent resulted in a job offer.
While most of the applications new economists submit do not yield results at
subsequent stages of the job market, the subset of applications that result in an
interview are reasonably likely to result in a fly-out and, eventually, a job offer. The
average job candidate received 17 invitations for interviews. Of the interviews to
which the average job candidate was invited, 37 percent resulted in a fly-out, and
20 percent resulted in a job offer. By the time the average job candidate reached
the fly-out stage of the job market, his or her choice set contained a small number
of promising options. The average job candidate received 6 invitations for fly-outs,
57 percent of which resulted in a job offer. The average job candidate received 3 job
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offers.
At each stage of the job market, some job candidates enjoy larger choice sets than
others. Table 3.4 presents results from regressions of the number of applications, in-
terviews, fly-outs, and job offers on the background characteristics of job candidates.
With respect to demographic characteristics, the most notable pattern in Table 3.4 is
the negative association between the size of the choice sets and receipt of an under-
graduate degree from an institution outside the United States. Job candidates who
received their undergraduate degree from an institution in Asia obtain particularly
small choice sets. In the final stage of the job market, receipt of an undergraduate
degree from an institution in Asia rather than the United States is associated with a
reduction in job offers equivalent to 16 percent of the average job-offer set.
Turning to characteristics of doctoral programs, Table 3.4 presents evidence that,
at each stage of the job market, job candidates from lower-ranked programs obtain
smaller choice sets than those from higher-ranked programs. The estimates in the
table indicate that, in the final stage of the job market, graduating from a department
ranked in the second ten rather than the top ten is associated with a reduction in
job offers equivalent to 19 percent of the average job-offer set. Graduating from a
department ranked outside the top twenty is associated with a reduction in job offers
equivalent to between 45 and 58 percent of the average job-offer set.
Interestingly, the number of articles a job candidate has published is not statis-
tically related to the number of interviews, fly-outs, or job offers the job candidate
receives. On the other hand, we find modest evidence that teaching experience is neg-
atively related to the number of of interviews and fly-outs a job candidate receives. In
the final stage of the job market, serving as the primary instructor for an additional
course is associated with a reduction in job offers equivalent to 3 percent of the aver-
age job-offer set. We do not believe that employers penalize job candidates for their
teaching experience. Rather, we suspect that teaching experience is correlated with
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other characteristics that influence success on the job market – for example, because
time spent teaching harms research productivity or because job candidates who enjoy
teaching find success with a relatively small number of employers for whom teaching
is a priority.
The size of an interview, fly-out, or job-offer set depends on the size of the ap-
plication, interview, or fly-out set at the preceding stage of the job market, and on
the proportion of potential jobs from the preceding stage that remain in play at the
current stage. Table 3.5 presents results from regressions of the success rate of appli-
cations, interviews, and fly-outs on the background characteristics of job candidates.
The estimates in Table 3.5 suggest that characteristics associated with smaller choice
sets throughout the job market need not be associated with lower success rates in
the final stage of the job market. In particular, the fly-outs of job candidates from
lower-ranked departments and job candidates with more teaching experience are no
less likely than the fly-outs of job candidates from top-ten departments and job can-
didates with less teaching experience to result in a job offer.
Job candidates may wonder whether larger application, interview, or fly-out sets
yield more job offers. Data from the Job Seekers project suggest that they do, but
that the marginal return to an additional application, interview, or fly-out decreases
with the size of the existing set. Table 3.6 presents results from regressions of the
number of job offers on quadratics in the number of applications, interviews, and
fly-outs. The regressions include the background characteristics of job candidates
as control variables. In each column of Table 3.6, the estimated coefficient on the
quadratic term is negative and statistically significant, consistent with decreasing
marginal returns in job offers to prospective jobs at earlier stags of the market. To
take a concrete example, the estimates in Table 3.6 suggest that increasing the number
of applications from 50 to 100 yields additional job offers equivalent to 13 percent
of the average job-offer set, while increasing the number of applications from 100 to
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150 yields additional job offers equivalent to 9 percent of the average job-offer set. A
similar pattern obtains for interviews and fly-outs.
While the results in Table 3.6 show a positive association between the number of
job offers and the number of applications, interviews, and fly-outs in the cross section
of new economists, they do not imply that individual job candidates can obtain
more job offers by submitting more applications. The number of applications a job
candidate submits may reflect idiosyncratic strategies for success on the job market,
but is almost certainly responsive to demand-side factors as well. Job candidates
who submit a large number of applications, and who receive a correspondingly large
number of interviews, fly-outs, and job offers, may be job candidates whose skills
are in demand by many employers. For example, if the job postings in a given year
disproportionately seek health economists, health economists are likely to respond by
applying to a large number of jobs. Then, because demand for their skills is high, the
applications of health economists are likely to be successful.
The Job Seekers project is unique among studies of the economics job market
in measuring the preferences and expectations of job candidates before they know
what their job-market outcomes will be. The 2009-10 pre-market survey asked job
candidates how impressive they expected their initial placement to be, relative to the
placements of their peers in the same graduate department. In particular, the survey
asked job candidates to place themselves in the appropriate decile of the placement
distribution under the following scenario: “Imagine that, next year, the faculty in
your department compile a list of the job placements of their graduation over the
last five years. They put the placements they consider to be most impressive at the
top of the list. Thinking about the kind of job you expect to obtain, where do you
think you would fall in this list?” On average, job candidates are optimistic about
their prospects on the job market. More than 80 percent of the job candidates who
answered this question expected to place in the top half of the distribution for their
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graduate department (Table 3.7).
Table 3.8 presents results from regressions of the number of job offers on the
expected placement rankings and background characteristics of job candidates. The
estimates in the table indicate that the expectations of job candidates when they
enter the job market contain information about their outcomes throughout the job
market. Compared with job candidates who expected to place in the top decile of
the distribution for their graduate department, those who expected to place in lower
deciles received fewer invitations for interviews and fly-outs, as well as fewer job offers.
The economics job market places new economists in a wide range of academic
and non-academic jobs. To understand the value to job candidates of choice sets with
different compositions, the 2007-10 pre-market surveys asked job candidates to charac-
terize their preferences over jobs in several categories. The 2009-10 pre-market survey
asked job candidates to rank jobs in the following categories in order of their pref-
erence: assistant professor at a university; assistant professor at a four-year college;
postdoctoral fellow; researcher at a non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental
organization; and researcher at a business or industry establishment. The 2007-09
pre-market surveys asked parallel questions using slightly different category descrip-
tions. The complete text of the questions and the category descriptions from all
survey years is available in the appendix.
Table 3.9 reports the percentage of job candidates who ranked jobs in each cate-
gory as their most preferred outcome. A large majority (72 percent) of job candidates
preferred assistant professorships at universities over jobs in all other categories. Rel-
atively few job candidates preferred research positions at non-profit, governmental,
or quasi-governmental organizations (11 percent), assistant professorships at four-
year colleges (8 percent), research positions at business or industry establishments (7
percent), or postdoctoral fellowships (2 percent).
In addition to information about the preferences of job candidates over jobs in dif-
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ferent categories, the Job Seekers project gathers information about the composition
of their application, interview, fly-out, and job-offer sets. The 2009-10 post-market
survey asked job candidates how many of their applications, interviews, fly-outs, and
job offers fell into each of the categories enumerated above: assistant professor at a
university; assistant professor at a four-year college; postdoctoral fellow; researcher
at a non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental organization; and researcher at
a business or industry establishment. The 2007-09 post-market surveys asked parallel
questions using slightly different category descriptions. Again, the complete text of
the questions and the category descriptions from all survey years is available in the
appendix.
The composition of the average application, interview, fly-out, and job-offer sets
roughly mirrors the preferences of job candidates. Table 3.10 summarizes these re-
sults. A notable feature of Table 3.10 is the strong representation of university jobs.
At each stage of the job market, over half of the potential jobs in the average choice
set were assistant professorships at universities. Assistant professorships at four-year
colleges and research positions at non-profit, governmental, and quasi-governmental
organizations were considerably less common, with each representing between 10 and
20 percent of the potential jobs in the average choice set at each stage of the job
market. Postdoctoral fellowships and research positions at business and industry es-
tablishments were relatively rare. Job in each of these categories represented less
than 10 percent of the potential jobs in the average choice set at each stage of the
job market.
A second notable feature of Table 3.10 is the evolution of the average choice sets
over the course of the job market. In particular, the representation of academic jobs
is stronger at the beginning of the job market than the end, while the representation
of non-academic jobs is stronger at the end of the job market than the beginning.
Assistant professorships at universities and four-year colleges represented 80 percent
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of the average application set, but just 64 percent of the average job-offer set. In
contrast, research positions at non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental orga-
nizations and research positions at business or industry establishments represented
29 percent of the average job-offer set, but just 15 percent of the average application
set.
When we consider job candidates with different preferences separately, we find
an even closer correspondence between the types of placements job candidates seek
and the composition of their choice sets. Table 3.11 shows that the proportion of
job offers in each job category was larger among job candidates who preferred jobs
in that category than among other job candidates. The differences, moreover, were
not small. To take an example, job candidates who preferred assistant professorships
at universities received 62 percent of their job offers from universities, while job
candidates who preferred jobs in other categories received between 22 and 45 percent
of their job offers from universities. The pattern was similar for the remaining four job
categories. Table 3.11 also indicates that, with the exception of those who preferred
jobs at business or industry establishments, job candidates were more likely than not
to receive at least one job offer in their preferred category.
3.6 Job placements
The placements of job candidates, like their application, interview, fly-out, and
job-offer sets, mirror their preferences. Table 3.12 displays the percentage of job
placements by type, reported by job candidates at the post-market survey. The
most common outcomes were assistant professorships at universities (62 percent),
followed by research positions at non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental
organizations (19 percent), assistant professorships at four-year colleges (8 percent),
research positions in business or industry establishments (6 percent) and postdoctoral
fellowships (5 percent). Most jobs reported by job candidates were also on the tenure
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track (Table 3.14). Comparing the preferences of job candidates to their job outcomes,
we show in Table 3.13 that almost two-thirds of job candidates placed into their
first-choice job types (64 percent), while 20 percent placed into their second-choice
job types and 9 percent placed into their third-choice job types. Just 7 percent of
job candidates placed into job types that they had ranked as least- or second-least
preferred.
To examine the predictors of job type, we conducted multinomial logistic regres-
sions with job types as the outcome variables. Assistant professorships at universities,
being the modal preferred and actual outcomes, are the base category against which
the relative risk ratios for other outcomes are estimated. Column 1 of Table 3.17
displays the relative risk ratio estimates (that is, the exponentiated coefficient, eβi),
of assistant professorships at four-year colleges over assistant professorships at univer-
sities. For example, the estimate on the indicator variable for whether job candidates
completed their undergraduate education in a country outside the United States and
Asia is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level, and indicates that job
candidates from these countries are 1.5 times less likely than otherwise comparable
candidates to have a job at a college over a job at a university. The estimates show
that candidates from PhD programs in economics are more likely than others to end
up at colleges over universities, as are job candidates who have been primary instruc-
tors, and job candidates who preferred non-university jobs relative to university jobs.
Institution rank is not a statistically significant predictor of having college jobs over
university jobs.
Estimates in Column 2 reflect the relative risk ratios of jobs at non-profits, govern-
mental, and quasi-governmental organizations over university job outcomes. These
show that job candidates who completed their undergraduate education outside the
United States are less likely to be hired into jobs in these non-academic settings than
university jobs, relative to otherwise comparable candidates from the United States.
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In this column, the relative risk ratio estimates show that a preference for jobs in
non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental organizations and a preference for
jobs at business or industry establishments are associated with a greater likelihood of
the former job over a university. A preference for a postdoctoral fellowship relative
to other types of jobs is associated with a reduced chance of a job at a non-profit,
governmental, or quasi-governmental organization over a university job.
Column 3 displays the relative risk ratios of research positions at business or
industry establishments over assistant professorships at universities. Here, the esti-
mates show that a preference to end up in any type of job other than a university
job is associated with a greater chance of ending up in job at a business or industry
establishment over a university job. In Column 4, preferring postdoctoral fellowships
relative to other types of jobs increases the relative risk of a postdoctoral fellowship,
relative to a university job.
Overall, Table 3.17 highlights the importance of preferences in predicting job
outcomes. With respect to job-type preferences, job candidates who do not prefer
university jobs are more likely to end up with other types of jobs. Additionally,
measures of teaching experience, which might be thought of as providing measures
of revealed preference or aptitude for teaching versus research activities, are related
to job outcomes in expected ways. Candidates who were primary instructors during
graduate school revealed a strong preference to teach or aptitude for teaching, and,
indeed were more likely to end up at teaching-oriented colleges over universities,
and less likely to end up in business or industry establishments over university jobs,
relative to candidates without primary instruction experience. Candidates whose
graduate studies were funded by teaching assistantships, presumably an alternative
to research assistantships, are less likely to end up in research-oriented academia.
In addition to gathering information about the types of positions job candidates
accept as a result of their job searches, the Job Seekers surveys measure other ob-
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jective characteristics of job outcomes. One such outcome is salary. Table 3.15
displays means and other statistics about reported base salaries from all cohorts,
in 2010 dollars. Both the weighted9 and unweighted mean base salaries are around
$93,000. The median base salary (unweighted) is quite close to the mean and almost
exactly at the midpoint of the interquartile range, indicating a distribution that is
relatively symmetric. Salaries vary dramatically by job type. Jobs at business and
industry establishments, such as consulting and banking, tend to pay the most and
have the widest interquartile range; postdoctoral fellowships pay the least and have
the narrowest interquartile range. Universities and jobs at non-profit, governmental,
and quasi-governmental organizations have similar means and medians, though the
interquartile range for university salaries is larger.
Table 3.18 presents estimates from linear regressions of salary on our base set
of covariates and additional predictors of salary. In Column 1, only the base set
of covariates are included in the regression. It can be seen that an undergraduate
education outside the United States is associated with a significantly lower salary,
compared to an undergraduate education in the United States. This finding may
reflect two effects. First, job candidates from outside the United States may be
more likely to accept jobs outside of the United States, where salaries are lower.
Second, lower English fluency is likely correlated with having pursued undergraduate
studies outside the United States, and may therefore be associated with poorer job
outcomes. Candidates whose job-market information was posted on the website of
an economics department earn around $25,000 less than other candidates, probably
because a large proportion of the other candidates graduated from business schools.
Rank of PhD program is also strongly associated with salary. Holding all else constant,
job candidates from programs ranked in the top ten reported the highest salaries.
Compared with job candidates from programs ranked in the top ten, job candidates
9Mean is calculated using post-market sampling weights.
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from programs ranked in the second ten reported salaries that were almost $10,000
lower, on average; job candidates from programs ranked in the third ten reported
salaries that were $17,000 lower; and job candidates from programs ranked below the
third ten reported salaries that were between $25,000 and $30,000 lower.
Based on Table 3.18, it is clear that job type is associated with salary. In Column
2, we have added indicators of job type as additional explanatory variables. While
the coefficients on most of the base regressors are similar, job type is clearly also
an important predictor of salary. Compared with assistant professorships at univer-
sities, postdoctoral fellowships are associated with salaries that are $30,000 lower,
on average, and college jobs are associated with salaries that are $11,000 lower. In
contrast, jobs at business or industry establishments are associated with salaries that
are $15,000 higher.
In addition to job type, the number of job offers a job candidate receives may
influence salary for several reasons. First, receiving more job offers increases the
chance of a particularly good job outcome. If a high salary is desirable, a larger
choice set should be associated with increased salary. Second, the number of job
offers a job candidate receives is likely a strong indicator of quality, so should be
associated with better job outcomes, including higher salary. Third, job candidates
with multiple job offers have more bargaining power with which to negotiate higher
salary offers, and so more job offers may actually result in higher salary offers.
In Column 3 of Table 3.18, we have regressed salary on the base set of covariates
plus the number of job offers and the number of job offers squared. The coefficients
on the number of job offers indicate that the greater the number of job offers, the
higher the salary. However, the negative coefficient on the number of job offers
squared indicates that the marginal effect of job offers on salary is largest for the
first few job offers. The average marginal effect of an additional job offer is $5,705
(s.e. $648). At the second job offer, the average marginal effect of an offer is $6,425
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(s.e. $854), while at the fifth job offer the average marginal effect is $4,592 (s.e.
$525). In this regression, the coefficients on country of undergraduate education are
somewhat reduced, while the coefficient on the indicator for a PhD program in the
United States is now statistically significantly different from zero. The coefficients on
PhD program rank indicators are also somewhat reduced in magnitude, though still
large and statistically significant.
Column 4 presents results from a regression including the base set of covariates,
job type and the number of job offers and job offers squared. The coefficients on
the job type indicator variables and the job offer variables show similar magnitudes
and statistical significance as in Columns 2 and 3, and the R-squared statistic (0.50)
reveals surprisingly good predictive power of the regression.
Salary is not the most important job characteristic for most job candidates, how-
ever. In the post-market surveys fielded to the 2008-09 and 2009-10 job-market co-
horts, we asked respondents to rate the importance of achieving several different
career-related goals over their lives: having a high personal income, being successful
in the respondent’s line of work, making a contribution to society, and having plenty
of time for recreation and hobbies. Respondents rated the importance of achieving
each goal on a five-point scale where 0 is not important and 4 is extremely important.
Figure 3.2 displays the proportions of respondents giving each rating for each of these
outcomes. The modal response to the importance of having a high personal outcome
was just moderately important, and each of the other goals had modal responses of
very important or extremely important.
Because salary is not the only characteristic job candidates care about, nor even
the characteristic that is most important to them, we have also measured several
subjective characteristics of job outcomes. Specifically, in 2007-08 and 2008-09, the
post-market survey asked directly about job candidates’ satisfaction with several as-
pects of their jobs. Job candidates were asked to provide a rating on a six-point scale,
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with 1 indicating that they were extremely dissatisfied and 6 indicating that they were
extremely satisfied, for their overall satisfaction with the characteristics of their jobs,
satisfaction with their intellectual fit with colleagues, satisfaction with their social fit
with colleagues, satisfaction with their salary or compensation, and satisfaction with
their workload or work/life balance. Table 3.16 presents the mean ratings for each
measure.10 In each case, the mean rating is between 4, somewhat satisfied, and 5,
very satisfied. Figure 3.3 displays the ratings in histogram form. For each satisfaction
category, very satisfied is the modal rating. It is clear that most job candidates are
satisfied with most aspects of their jobs.
Column 1 of Table 3.19 presents the results from ordered probit regressions of
overall satisfaction ratings on the base set of covariates. Women tend to rate their
satisfaction higher than men, while job candidates from undergraduate institutions
in Asia rate themselves as less satisfied than do others. Additionally, candidates from
lower-ranked programs indicate lower satisfaction with their job placements, with the
coefficients on PhD programs ranked between 11 and 20, and those ranked between
41 and 50, being statistically different from zero. In Column 2, we add the number of
job offers to the set of covariates. We expect the number of job offers to be positively
related to satisfaction, since a larger number of offers may include better draws from
the distribution of jobs. As expected, the number of job offers is positively and
statistically significantly associated with satisfaction.
Column 3 reports the results from a regression of overall satisfaction on the base
covariates plus indicators for whether job candidates accepted their second-, third-,
fourth-, or fifth-choice job type (first-choice job type is the excluded category). We
expect that candidates who accepted jobs of types they ranked more highly will be
more satisfied with their jobs. All coefficients on these variables are negative, but only
10The ratings we summarize in this table are ordinal data. While means do not have a clear
interpretation in the context of the questions, we present means as a simple summary measure that
shows that candidates tend to be quite satisfied with their jobs.
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the coefficient on the fourth-choice job type is statistically significantly different from
zero. Column 4 includes both the number of job offers and the job-type preference
indicators. The estimators are similar to those in Columns 2 and 3.
Overall, the descriptive analysis of satisfaction, together with these regressions,
show that most job candidates are satisfied with their job outcomes. Women report
greater satisfaction than do men, and candidates from Asia report lower levels of
satisfaction, holding all else constant. Additionally, lower rank of the PhD-granting
institution may be negatively related to satisfaction, while the number of job offers
received is positively related to candidates’ overall satisfaction with their job out-
comes. Preference rating of the accepted job type is not statistically associated with
overall job satisfaction, possibly because most job candidates obtain the type of job
they most want.
3.7 Conclusions
New economists entering the job market seek accurate, up-to-date information
about what they can expect. Results from the Job Seekers project suggest that, on
the whole, they can expect to be successful. While several characteristics of job can-
didates – receipt of undergraduate training in Asia, receipt of doctoral training at a
lower-ranked departments, and lower expectations about results on the job market
– were associated with smaller choice sets, lower salaries, and lower levels of sat-
isfaction, job candidates generally achieved positive outcomes. The composition of
application, interview, fly-out, and job offer sets was consistent with the preferences
of job candidates, and the job candidates who most wanted a given type of job were
more likely than others to secure that type of job. Nearly two thirds of job candidates
secured jobs of their first-choice type. At the beginning of the job market, few job
candidates reported that they expected to do poorly; at the end, few reported that
they were dissatisfied with key aspects of their placement. We hope that these results
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enhance the optimism that is already apparent among new entrants to the economics
job market.
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3.8 Tables and figures
Figure 3.1: Timeline: Job candidate and survey project activities
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Table 3.1: Comparison of survey respondents and all job candidates for whom CV
data are available
Respondents only Respondents and
non-respondents
Frequency % Frequency %
Observations 706 100 2756 100
Female 215 30.45 858 31.13
Undergraduate location
US 342 48.44 916 33.24
Asia 123 17.42 871 31.60
Other 210 29.75 789 28.63
Unknown 31 4.39 180 6.53
Rank of PhD Institution
1-10 201 28.47 797 28.92
11-20 114 16.15 336 12.19
21-30 76 10.76 330 11.97
31-40 68 9.63 243 8.82
41-50 63 8.92 223 8.09
Unranked 184 26.06 827 30.01
Has journal publication 202 28.61 733 26.60
Notes: Respondents are job candidates who submitted both the pre-market and
post-market surveys. Beginning in 2009-10, we recorded up to three undergraduate
degrees. For the small number of job candidates with degrees from institutions in
multiple locations, we prioritize the locations as follows: (1) Asia, (2) Other, (3)
United States. Rank of PhD institution is from the (U.S. News and World Report,
2009) ranking of graduate programs in economics.
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Table 3.2: Means and standard errors of CV background variables
Mean Standard error
Female 0.321 0.009
Undergraduate locationa
US 0.356 0.010
Asiab 0.336 0.009
Other 0.308 0.009
PhD program in US 0.912 0.006
PhD program in economics 0.908 0.006
Rank of PhD programc
1-10 0.292 0.009
11-20 0.126 0.007
21-30 0.122 0.007
31-40 0.090 0.006
41-50 0.082 0.005
Unranked 0.288 0.009
PhD fieldsd
Applied econometrics 0.206 0.008
Applied microeconomics 0.213 0.008
Behavioral economics 0.054 0.005
Computational economics 0.024 0.003
Development economics 0.187 0.008
Econometrics 0.171 0.007
Economic history 0.024 0.003
Economic theory 0.024 0.003
Economics of education 0.039 0.004
Environmental economics 0.059 0.005
Experimental economics 0.049 0.004
Financial economics 0.165 0.007
Game theory 0.079 0.005
Health economics 0.088 0.006
Industrial organization 0.221 0.008
International economics 0.090 0.006
International finance 0.058 0.005
International macroeconomics 0.034 0.004
International trade 0.063 0.005
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Mean Standard error
Labor economics 0.228 0.008
Law and economics 0.024 0.003
Macroeconomics 0.229 0.008
Microeconomic theory 0.086 0.006
Microeconomics 0.058 0.005
Monetary economics 0.069 0.005
Political economy 0.073 0.005
Public economics 0.166 0.007
Urban economics 0.032 0.003
Journal publications
0 0.725 0.009
1 0.162 0.007
2 0.062 0.005
3+ 0.051 0.004
Number of courses as TAe 3.763 0.048
Number of courses as primary instructorf 1.329 0.030
Notes: Number of observations is 2,539. Estimation sample includes job candidates
who posted CVs on the job-placement websites of their graduate departments.
a Results from the surveys indicate that location of undergraduate institution is a
good proxy for citizenship.
b Asian countries as identified by the Population Reference Bureau (2008).
c Rankings are from U.S. News and World Report (2009).
d Field indicators are not mutually exclusive, so there is no omitted category.
e Number of courses as TA is topcoded to 10.
f Number of courses as primary instructor is topcoded to 5.
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Table 3.3: Mean number and success rate of applications, interviews, fly-outs, and
job offers
Applications Interviews Fly-outs Job offers
Mean number 107.2 16.8 5.7 2.9
(2.7) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1)
Observations 904 904 904 904
Mean proportion resulting
in interview
0.192 - - -
(0.006) - - -
Mean proportion resulting
in fly-out
0.076 0.365 - -
(0.004) (0.009) - -
Mean proportion resulting
in job offer
0.040 0.199 0.573 -
(0.002) (0.006) (0.011) -
Observations 903 897 862 -
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Mean number of applications, interviews, fly-
outs, and job offers are estimated for respondents who provided information about
outcomes at all four stages. Mean success rates are estimated for respondents who
provided information about outcomes at all four stages and had at least one potential
job at the current stage. Estimates are weighted to correct for non-response bias.
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Table 3.4: Linear regressions: Background characteristics that predict the number of
applications, interviews, fly-outs and job offers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Applications Interviews Fly-outs Job offers
Female 10.673* 1.182 0.496 0.122
(6.013) (0.888) (0.331) (0.181)
Undergraduate locationa
US − − − −
− − − −
Asiab −2.773 −3.465*** −1.565*** −0.456**
(6.111) (0.956) (0.386) (0.208)
Other −0.308 −2.460*** −0.650* −0.305
(6.158) (0.923) (0.373) (0.195)
PhD program in US 14.223 −0.573 −0.340 −0.229
(12.876) (1.402) (0.532) (0.301)
PhD program in
economics
32.271*** 1.247 0.109 0.153
(6.378) (1.571) (0.624) (0.324)
Rank of PhD programc
1-10 − − − −
− − − −
11-20 0.706 −1.089 −0.895 −0.550**
(6.275) (1.160) (0.545) (0.275)
21-30 14.738* −2.253* −2.482*** −1.318***
(8.629) (1.307) (0.549) (0.285)
31-40 −12.210 −5.898*** −3.317*** −1.320***
(7.794) (1.408) (0.550) (0.304)
41-50 7.550 −6.491*** −3.461*** −1.532***
(12.041) (1.739) (0.604) (0.298)
Unranked 9.378 −7.331*** −3.514*** −1.673***
(11.083) (1.187) (0.454) (0.239)
PhD fieldsd
Applied
econometrics
12.952* 2.339** 0.768* 0.342
(7.670) (1.038) (0.428) (0.212)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Applications Interviews Fly-outs Job offers
Applied
microeconomics
7.948 0.388 0.238 0.249
(7.219) (0.849) (0.350) (0.197)
Behavioral
economics
−3.914 −0.894 0.070 −0.339
(8.258) (1.559) (0.641) (0.319)
Computational
economics
−4.055 0.340 1.826* 0.934*
(11.604) (2.014) (1.096) (0.531)
Development
economics
−2.177 −0.853 −0.498 −0.043
(7.602) (0.942) (0.372) (0.195)
Econometrics 6.518 1.124 0.435 0.091
(7.473) (1.103) (0.453) (0.214)
Economic history −3.441 −2.286 −0.738 −0.695**
(7.813) (1.570) (0.812) (0.335)
Economic theory −1.300 0.908 0.247 0.988
(11.288) (2.306) (1.024) (0.739)
Economics of
education
−9.747 −1.728 −0.740 0.280
(12.082) (1.260) (0.640) (0.423)
Environmental
economics
−16.917** 0.006 −0.212 −0.187
(7.891) (1.300) (0.481) (0.263)
Experimental
economics
7.721 −0.735 0.027 0.317
(9.136) (1.566) (0.627) (0.322)
Financial economics 13.488** 3.688*** 0.457 0.098
(6.504) (1.194) (0.442) (0.229)
Game theory 2.443 −0.691 −0.273 −0.238
(7.709) (1.166) (0.515) (0.261)
Health economics 18.227 2.570* 1.677** 1.074***
(12.959) (1.416) (0.657) (0.342)
Industrial
organization
−5.239 −0.234 −0.232 −0.018
(6.046) (0.873) (0.360) (0.193)
International
economics
10.774 1.265 0.399 0.300
(9.155) (1.261) (0.467) (0.282)
International finance 11.511 2.201 0.373 0.430
(9.465) (1.901) (0.671) (0.344)
International
macroeconomics
19.403 0.511 0.275 −0.156
(14.204) (2.666) (0.969) (0.431)
International trade 19.134** 2.535 0.911* 0.186
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Applications Interviews Fly-outs Job offers
(8.352) (1.573) (0.528) (0.273)
Labor economics 14.954** 1.102 0.562 0.349*
(7.051) (0.902) (0.376) (0.197)
Law and economics 35.118*** −0.691 −1.027 −0.680*
(10.225) (2.011) (0.815) (0.351)
Macroeconomics 18.120*** 2.627** 0.186 0.023
(6.903) (1.149) (0.454) (0.228)
Microeconomic
theory
26.469*** 0.091 −0.327 0.101
(6.886) (1.111) (0.448) (0.266)
Microeconomics 1.961 −1.721 −0.039 −0.023
(11.339) (1.400) (0.585) (0.338)
Monetary economics −4.113 3.051 0.329 −0.111
(9.511) (1.945) (0.708) (0.391)
Political economy −3.947 0.587 0.664 0.466*
(7.818) (1.272) (0.508) (0.251)
Public economics 11.833* 2.878*** 0.360 0.185
(6.318) (0.907) (0.354) (0.204)
Urban economics 3.536 1.120 0.685 0.238
(12.498) (1.935) (0.738) (0.429)
Journal publications
0 − − − −
− − − −
1 −8.036 0.870 0.025 −0.021
(6.894) (1.074) (0.426) (0.204)
2 −11.802 0.730 0.091 −0.024
(8.469) (1.303) (0.580) (0.277)
3+ −10.787 0.302 0.716 0.610
(14.038) (2.065) (0.668) (0.428)
Number of courses as
TAe
3.827*** 0.006 −0.109* −0.039
(1.392) (0.159) (0.056) (0.032)
Number of courses as
primary instructorf
0.506 −0.094 −0.206** −0.089*
(2.248) (0.264) (0.094) (0.050)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Applications Interviews Fly-outs Job offers
Observations 858 858 858 858
R-squared 0.173 0.198 0.219 0.185
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent
variable is the number of applications, interviews, fly-outs, or job offers. Regression
sample includes job candidates who provided information about outcomes at all
four stages. Estimates are weighted to correct for non-response bias.
a Results from the surveys indicate that location of undergraduate institution is a
good proxy for citizenship.
b Asian countries as identified by the Population Reference Bureau (2008).
c Rankings are from U.S. News and World Report (2009).
d Field indicators are not mutually exclusive, so there is no omitted category.
e Number of courses as TA is topcoded to 10.
f Number of courses as primary instructor is topcoded to 5.
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Table 3.5: Linear regressions: Background characteristics that predict the success
rate of applications, interviews and fly-outs
(1) (2) (3)
Applications
to
interviews
Interviews
to
fly-outs
Fly-outs
to
job offers
Female −0.312 2.425 −2.882
(1.193) (1.769) (2.396)
Undergraduate locationa
US − − −
− − −
Asiab −1.260 0.184 8.960
(1.668) (2.487) (2.940)
Other −2.191* 2.082 2.464
(1.153) (1.896) (2.567)
PhD program in US 2.558 −3.507 3.798
(2.760) (4.361) (4.580)
PhD program in economics −6.416** −6.021 −1.273
(2.781) (3.994) (4.960)
Rank of PhD programc
1-10 − − −
− − −
11-20 −2.017 −1.253 −1.069
(1.593) (2.409) (2.877)
21-30 −4.425*** −9.674*** −4.146
(1.439) (2.562) (3.929)
31-40 −3.398* −8.822*** 7.759*
(2.059) (2.881) (4.373)
41-50 −7.537*** −3.799 2.765
(1.777) (3.828) (4.497)
Unranked −4.143* −4.149 4.149
(2.495) (2.656) (3.755)
PhD fieldsd
Applied econometrics 0.372 −0.373 3.243
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(1) (2) (3)
Applications
to
interviews
Interviews
to
fly-outs
Fly-outs
to
job offers
(1.436) (2.177) (2.739)
Applied microeconomics −2.085* 3.342 −0.161
(1.100) (2.229) (2.645)
Behavioral economics 1.318 5.926 −2.340
(2.988) (3.885) (4.651)
Computational economics 0.346 7.962* 3.008
(2.219) (4.323) (5.842)
Development economics −1.201 −2.264 5.519*
(1.491) (2.353) (2.914)
Econometrics −0.388 −2.233 1.600
(1.407) (2.129) (3.104)
Economic history −4.595** −0.078 −5.473
(1.931) (5.001) (6.584)
Economic theory −1.633 −0.211 11.760**
(2.235) (5.406) (5.738)
Economics of education 1.107 2.076 10.887**
(3.841) (5.033) (4.314)
Environmental economics 3.916* 0.703 −1.295
(2.214) (3.592) (4.190)
Experimental economics −3.022 2.719 5.853
(2.251) (3.594) (4.938)
Financial economics 1.511 −5.297** −5.976*
(1.465) (2.491) (3.387)
Game theory 0.047 −0.501 2.781
(1.975) (3.204) (4.674)
Health economics −0.527 3.788 6.192
(1.470) (2.698) (3.789)
Industrial organization −1.620 −3.085 1.995
(1.233) (2.201) (2.761)
International economics −0.840 −2.636 −3.248
(1.605) (2.736) (4.008)
International finance −2.612 −1.653 −0.566
(2.042) (2.997) (4.220)
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(1) (2) (3)
Applications
to
interviews
Interviews
to
fly-outs
Fly-outs
to
job offers
International
macroeconomics
0.354 3.433 −6.276
(4.467) (5.572) (5.447)
International trade −2.483 0.530 −3.798
(1.852) (3.186) (3.627)
Labor economics −1.667 −0.724 −1.361
(1.207) (1.971) (2.628)
Law and economics −7.144*** −9.915*** 2.886
(2.190) (2.850) (6.702)
Macroeconomics 0.303 −5.126** 5.712*
(1.530) (2.312) (3.242)
Microeconomic theory −4.530*** −4.161 1.249
(1.451) (2.744) (4.020)
Microeconomics 2.594 4.744 −1.890
(2.700) (3.616) (5.210)
Monetary economics 0.401 −7.187** −12.026**
(2.124) (3.041) (4.692)
Political economy 1.547 3.833 4.149
(1.532) (3.244) (3.567)
Public economics −0.909 −2.985 −0.240
(1.166) (2.089) (2.668)
Urban economics −2.553 −0.861 2.415
(1.856) (3.341) (6.186)
Journal publications
0 − − −
− − −
1 0.824 −2.765 4.124
(1.141) (2.120) (2.781)
2 4.814 −0.755 −4.282
(4.333) (3.283) (5.647)
3+ 5.530** 1.433 1.406
(2.773) (3.289) (4.574)
Number of courses as TAe −0.421* −0.928** −0.170
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(1) (2) (3)
Applications
to
interviews
Interviews
to
fly-outs
Fly-outs
to
job offers
(0.217) (0.372) (0.473)
Number of courses as primary
instructorf
−1.042** −0.450 1.410
(0.467) (0.719) (0.875)
Observations 857 852 819
R-squared 0.175 0.125 0.088
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. De-
pendent variable is the percentage of applications that resulted in interviews,
the percentage of interviews that resulted in fly-outs, or the percentage of fly-
outs that resulted in job offers. Regression sample includes job candidates who
provided information about outcomes at all four stages and had at least one
potential job offer at the current stage. Estimates are weighted to correct for
non-response bias.
a Results from the surveys indicate that location of undergraduate institution
is a good proxy for citizenship.
b Asian countries as identified by the Population Reference Bureau (2008).
c Rankings are from U.S. News and World Report (2009).
d Field indicators are not mutually exclusive, so there is no omitted category.
e Number of courses as TA is topcoded to 10.
f Number of courses as primary instructor is topcoded to 5.
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Table 3.6: Linear regressions: Marginal return in job offers from an additional appli-
cation, interview, and fly-out
(1) (2) (3)
Applications Interviews Fly-outs
Number 0.01303*** 0.18059*** 0.50878***
(0.00269) (0.02192) (0.03938)
Number squared −0.00003*** −0.00153*** −0.00628**
(0.00001) (0.00057) (0.00264)
Observations 858 858 858
R-squared 0.208 0.424 0.668
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent
variable is the number of job offers. Regressors are the number and number squared of
applications, interviews, or fly-outs, and all of the regressors from Table 3.4: gender,
location of undergraduate institution, indicator for PhD program in the United States,
indicator for PhD program in economics, rank of PhD program, PhD fields, number
of journal publications, number of courses as taught as TA, and number of courses
taught as primary instructor. Regression sample includes job candidates who provided
information about outcomes at all four stages. Estimates are weighted to correct for
non-response bias.
106
Table 3.7: Expected placement ranking, relative to peers in same graduate department
Mean Standard error
1st decile 0.164 0.028
2nd decile 0.241 0.030
3rd decile 0.194 0.028
4th decile 0.084 0.018
5th decile 0.141 0.026
6th decile 0.053 0.015
7th decile 0.042 0.013
8th decile 0.018 0.008
9th decile 0.027 0.012
10th decile 0.037 0.013
Notes: Number of observations is 253. Expected placement rankings are responses to
the following question from the 2009-10 post-market survey: “Imagine that, next year,
the faculty in your department compile a list of the job placements of their graduates
over the last five years. They put the placements they consider to be most impressive
at the top of the list. Thinking about the kind of job you expect to obtain, where
do you think you would fall in this list?” Estimation sample includes job candidates
from the 2009-10 job-market cohort who provided information about outcomes at all
four stages of the job market. Estimates are weighted to correct for non-response
bias.
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Table 3.8: Linear regressions: Association between expected placement ranking, rela-
tive to peers in same graduate department, and the number of applications, interviews,
fly-outs, and job offers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Applications Interviews Fly-outs Job offers
1st decile (most impressive) − − − −
− − − −
2nd decile −19.943 −2.082 −2.108*** −0.398
(12.719) (1.733) (0.776) (0.496)
3rd decile −13.659 −2.744 −3.496*** −1.117**
(13.470) (1.686) (0.731) (0.431)
4th decile −3.828 −5.814*** −3.963*** −1.419***
(16.972) (2.209) (0.932) (0.472)
5th decile −12.435 −3.046 −2.724*** −0.773
(13.553) (1.899) (0.884) (0.475)
6th decile or below −11.111 −7.971*** −3.776*** −1.270***
(15.687) (1.721) (0.771) (0.473)
Observations 253 253 253 253
R-squared 0.383 0.502 0.555 0.452
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent
variable is the number of applications, interviews, fly-outs, or job offers. Expected
placement rankings are responses to the following question from the 2009-10 post-
market survey: “Imagine that, next year, the faculty in your department compile
a list of the job placements of their graduates over the last five years. They put
the placements they consider to be most impressive at the top of the list. Thinking
about the kind of job you expect to obtain, where do you think you would fall in
this list?” Rankings in the bottom five deciles are combined to ensure adequate cell
sizes. Regressions include all of the regressors from Table 3.4: gender, location of
undergraduate institution, indicator for PhD program in the United States, indicator
for PhD program in economics, rank of PhD program, PhD fields, number of journal
publications, number of courses as taught as TA, and number of courses taught as
primary instructor. Regression sample includes job candidates from the 2009-10 job-
market cohort who provided information about outcomes at all four stages. Estimates
are weighted to correct for non-response bias.
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Table 3.9: Preferred job types of job candidates
Percentage ranking
as most preferred
Assistant professor at a university 72.4%
Assistant professor at a four-year college 8.2%
Postdoctoral fellow 2.1%
Researcher at a non-profit, governmental, or
quasi-governmental organization
10.6%
Researcher at a business or industry establishment 6.8%
Observations 1333
Notes: Table pools observations from respondents from the 2007-10 job-market co-
horts and uses pre-market survey sampling weights. Respondents reported preferences
at the time of the pre-market survey. Descriptions of job categories varied over time.
Descriptions in the table are from the 2009-10 pre-market survey. Descriptions from
other surveys are available in the appendix.
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Table 3.10: Composition of application, interview, fly-out, and job-offer sets
Applications Interviews Fly-outs Job offers
Assistant professor at a
university
0.623 0.608 0.567 0.540
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018)
Assistant professor at a
four-year college
0.167 0.133 0.114 0.103
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Postdoctoral fellow 0.056 0.032 0.046 0.070
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Researcher at an NGQOa 0.096 0.142 0.177 0.188
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
Researcher at a business or
industry establishment
0.058 0.085 0.097 0.098
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Observations 707 705 702 701
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Columns present the mean over job candi-
dates of the proportion of potential jobs at the given job-market stage that fell into
each job category. The estimation sample for each stage includes job candidates who
provided information about outcomes at all four stages and had at least one poten-
tial job at the current stage. Estimates are weighted to correct for non-response bias.
Wording of survey questions and descriptions of job categories varied over time. Word-
ing and descriptions in the table are from the 2009-10 post-market survey. Wording
and descriptions from other surveys are available in the appendix. In most (but not
all) surveys, questions included a residual category for jobs not otherwise classified.
Jobs in the residual category comprise less than 2 percent of the applications, inter-
views, and fly-outs, and less than 3 percent of the job offers reported in response to
questions that included the category. Proportions in the table exclude jobs in the
residual category from both the numerator and the denominator.
a NGQO refers to a non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental organization.
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Table 3.11: Composition of job-offer set by preferred job type
Prefers
university
Prefers
college
Prefers
postdoc
Prefers
NGQOa
Prefers
business
Assistant professor
at a university
0.620 0.366 0.453 0.215 0.278
(0.020) (0.052) (0.117) (0.045) (0.071)
Assistant professor
at a four-year college
0.076 0.372 0.093 0.097 0.105
(0.010) (0.052) (0.060) (0.040) (0.060)
Postdoctoral fellow 0.077 0.061 0.231 0.059 0.034
(0.010) (0.026) (0.068) (0.027) (0.022)
Researcher at an
NGQOa
0.164 0.124 0.063 0.451 0.200
(0.014) (0.028) (0.045) (0.057) (0.065)
Researcher at a
business or industry
establishment
0.063 0.077 0.160 0.178 0.383
(0.010) (0.027) (0.122) (0.051) (0.085)
Observations 525 70 12 73 35
Received at least one
offer of preferred
type
0.742 0.509 0.552 0.586 0.482
(0.022) (0.063) (0.155) (0.068) (0.094)
Observations 555 75 13 77 38
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Preferred job type is the job type the respon-
dent ranked as his or her first choice at the time of the pre-market survey. Columns
in the top panel present the mean, over job candidates with the given preference,
of the proportion of job offers that fell into each job category. Columns in the bot-
tom panel present the proportion of job candidates with the given preference who
received at least one job offer of their preferred type. The estimation samples in the
top panel exclude job candidates who did not report any job offers in the categories
listed in the table. Estimates are weighted to correct for non-response bias. Word-
ing of survey questions and descriptions of job categories varied over time. Wording
and descriptions in the table are from the 2009-10 post-market survey. Wording and
descriptions from other surveys are available in the appendix. In most (but not all)
surveys, questions included a residual category for jobs not otherwise classified. Jobs
in the residual category comprise less than 2 percent of the applications, interviews,
and fly-outs, and less than 3 percent of the job offers reported in response to ques-
tions that included the category. Proportions in the table exclude jobs in the residual
category from both the numerator and the denominator.
a NGQO refers to a non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental organization.
111
Table 3.12: Classification of job placements
Percentage of
job placements
Assistant professor at a university 61.9%
Assistant professor at a four-year college 8.2%
Postdoctoral fellow 4.5%
Researcher at a non-profit, governmental, or
quasi-governmental organization
19.1%
Researcher at a business or industry establishment 6.4%
Observations 934
Notes: Table pools observations from 2007-10 post-market respondents and uses
post-market survey sampling weights. Job placements are classified using information
from several questions in the post-market survey. Job candidates who accepted both
a temporary position, such as a postdoctoral fellowship, and a permanent position
are classified according to their permanent position.
Table 3.13: Preference ranking of accepted job type
Percentage of job candidates accepting a job of their...
1st-choice type 64.3%
2nd-choice type 19.9%
3rd-choice type 8.7%
4th-choice type 4.2%
5th-choice type 2.8%
Observations 704
Notes: Table pools observations from 2007-10 respondents who completed both the
pre-market and post-market surveys and uses longitudinal survey sampling weights.
Table combines pre-market information about preference ranking over jobs in different
categories with post-market information about job placements.
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Table 3.14: Prevalence of tenure track jobs
Percentage on
tenure track
Obs
Respondents with a job in any setting 59.0% 940
Respondents with a job at a four-year collegea 76.2% 82
Respondents with a job at a universitya 85.4% 569
Notes: Table pools observations from 2007-10 post-market respondents and uses
post-market survey sampling weights.
a Excludes respondents with postdoctoral fellowships.
Table 3.15: Base salary (in 2010 dollars)
Mean 25th
Percentile
Median 75th
Percentile
Obs
All jobs (weighted) $92,775 858
All jobs (unweighted) $93,097 $70,569 $90,732 $109,887 850
Assistant professor at a
university
$96,132 $71,021 $91,313 $111,605 514
Assistant professor at a
four-year college
$73,105 $59,868 $71,059 $79,067 76
Postdoctoral fellow $58,270 $47,398 $55,447 $67,545 41
Researcher at an NGQOa $95,478 $80,651 $95,778 $108,620 170
Researcher at a business
or industry
establishment
$113,154 $90,732 $106,532 $142,043 49
Notes: Table pools observations from 2007-10 post-market respondents. "All jobs
(weighted)" is calculated using post-market survey sampling weights. All other statis-
tics are calculated using unweighted data.
a NGQO refers to a non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental organization.
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Figure 3.2: Importance ratings of career-related outcomes
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Notes: Figure pools observations from 2008-10 post-market respondents and uses
post-market survey sampling weights. Respondents rated the importance of the fol-
lowing outcomes: having a high personal income, being successful in their line of
work, making a contribution to society, and having plenty of time for recreation and
hobbies. The number of observations for these measures is 692, 691, 688 and 692,
respectively.
Table 3.16: Satisfaction with accepted job
Mean rating Obs
Overall 4.77 580
Intellectual fit 4.72 602
Social fit 4.70 592
Compensationa 4.64 604
Work-life balanceb 4.78 601
Notes: Table pools observations from 2007-09 post-market respondents and uses
post-market survey sampling weights. Respondents rated their satisfaction with the
job they accepted on a six-point scale where 1 was extremely dissatisfied, 2 was very
dissatisfied, 3 was somewhat dissatisfied, 4 was somewhat satisfied, 5 was very satisfied,
and 6 was extremely satisfied.
a The 2007-08 survey asked about salary, while the 2008-09 survey asked about com-
pensation.
b The 2007-08, asked about work load, while the 2008-09 survey asked about work/life
balance.
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Figure 3.3: Satisfaction ratings
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Notes: Histogram pools observations from 2007-09 post-market respondents and uses
post-market survey sampling weights. Wording of the compensation and work/life
balance questions varied slightly over time. The 2007-08 survey asked about salary
and work load, while the 2008-09 survey asked about compensation and work/life
balance.
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Table 3.17: Multinomial logistic regression: Predictors of accepted job type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
College NGQOg Business Postdoc
Female 0.047 0.252 0.587 0.377
(0.412) (0.320) (0.572) (0.618)
Undergraduate locationa
US − − − −
− − − −
Asiab 0.112 −0.617* −0.142 −1.363
(0.447) (0.362) (0.816) (1.001)
Other −1.475** −1.325*** 0.382 0.799
(0.670) (0.411) (0.700) (0.634)
PhD program in US 0.851 −0.917 1.083 −2.960***
(1.028) (0.669) (1.271) (0.955)
PhD program in
economics
2.201* 0.990 0.235 −0.401
(1.273) (0.649) (0.891) (0.655)
Rank of PhD programc
1-10 − − − −
− − − −
11-20 −0.912 0.265 −1.670* 2.263***
(0.815) (0.414) (0.918) (0.776)
21-30 0.152 0.986** 0.396 0.204
(0.631) (0.498) (0.681) (0.996)
31-40 0.453 0.854 −0.554 3.183***
(0.719) (0.545) (1.352) (0.756)
41-50 −0.421 0.830 0.807 0.795
(0.861) (0.566) (0.857) (1.030)
Unranked 0.975 0.298 0.688 0.689
(0.598) (0.523) (0.707) (0.932)
PhD fieldsd
Applied
econometrics
−0.787 −0.691* −0.488 0.007
(0.485) (0.372) (0.677) (0.619)
Applied
microeconomics
−0.039 −0.123 0.075 −0.762
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
College NGQOg Business Postdoc
(0.510) (0.356) (0.547) (0.664)
Behavioral
economics
0.935 −1.552 −1.494 −2.161
(1.078) (1.020) (1.633) (1.347)
Computational
economics
0.727 −1.934 3.353*** −17.188***
(1.654) (1.227) (0.868) (0.789)
Development
economics
0.197 −0.089 −0.359 0.147
(0.503) (0.403) (0.616) (0.652)
Econometrics 1.062** −0.025 −0.116 −0.013
(0.507) (0.400) (0.833) (0.652)
Economic history 0.983 −0.398 1.006 −16.286***
(0.790) (0.754) (1.290) (0.964)
Economic theory −17.034*** −18.137*** −18.323*** 0.986
(0.852) (0.913) (1.500) (1.582)
Economics of
education
−0.906 0.328 −1.127 1.703
(0.875) (0.504) (1.145) (1.362)
Environmental
economics
0.961 −0.131 −0.875 1.986**
(0.591) (0.473) (0.832) (0.823)
Experimental
economics
−0.349 −1.231 −0.139 1.285
(0.846) (0.813) (1.118) (0.955)
Financial economics −1.467 0.080 1.350* 0.218
(0.926) (0.483) (0.765) (0.875)
Game theory −17.107*** 0.100 0.814 −1.689*
(0.620) (0.565) (0.855) (0.890)
Health economics −0.118 −0.270 0.177 1.092
(0.642) (0.409) (0.661) (0.997)
Industrial
organization
−1.379** −0.311 0.090 0.887
(0.580) (0.383) (0.615) (0.676)
International
economics
0.299 0.340 −0.040 0.996
(0.596) (0.487) (0.716) (0.843)
International finance 0.376 0.747 −0.637 0.189
(0.847) (0.575) (1.610) (0.785)
International
macroeconomics
0.815 −0.231 −14.408*** 0.746
(0.968) (0.750) (1.243) (1.115)
International trade 0.226 0.146 −1.439 −0.798
(0.697) (0.449) (0.884) (1.228)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
College NGQOg Business Postdoc
Labor economics −0.158 0.368 −0.110 −0.341
(0.480) (0.337) (0.700) (0.758)
Law and economics −18.315*** −1.189 −0.519 2.802***
(0.934) (1.231) (0.895) (0.896)
Macroeconomics −0.259 0.245 −2.120*** 0.753
(0.525) (0.404) (0.722) (0.651)
Microeconomic
theory
−0.495 −0.945 −17.749*** 0.581
(0.708) (0.589) (0.792) (0.816)
Microeconomics 1.040 0.949 1.501** 1.188
(0.780) (0.680) (0.760) (0.857)
Monetary economics −0.192 −0.325 −15.503*** −0.424
(1.095) (0.578) (1.484) (1.116)
Political economy 0.089 −2.816*** −0.681 0.804
(0.748) (0.959) (0.992) (1.114)
Public economics 0.687 −0.067 0.594 −1.071
(0.505) (0.333) (0.581) (0.886)
Urban economics −0.456 −0.596 0.773 −15.511***
(0.990) (0.730) (0.965) (1.008)
Journal publications
0 − − − −
− − − −
1 −0.043 −0.180 −0.918 0.419
(0.509) (0.416) (0.927) (0.625)
2 0.047 −0.076 −1.791 −1.663
(0.740) (0.548) (1.089) (1.015)
3+ −0.909 −0.590 0.149 −0.399
(1.217) (0.579) (1.873) (0.972)
Number of courses as
TAe
0.019 0.125** 0.284*** 0.038
(0.080) (0.060) (0.097) (0.106)
Number of courses as
primary instructorf
0.330** −0.072 −0.311* 0.209
(0.138) (0.101) (0.189) (0.146)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
College NGQOg Business Postdoc
Preferred job type
University − − − −
− − − −
College 1.501*** 0.199 1.899** 0.358
(0.530) (0.459) (0.918) (0.849)
NGQOg 2.160*** 2.844*** 3.812*** 0.152
(0.613) (0.415) (0.810) (1.001)
Business 2.593*** 2.142*** 3.546*** 0.586
(0.878) (0.605) (0.755) (1.164)
Postdoc 1.948* −19.026*** 2.942** 2.931**
(1.030) (0.821) (1.292) (1.206)
Observations 668 668 668 668
Notes: Outcome categories are university, college, non-academic research, private
sector, and postdoctoral fellowship placements. Estimates are weighted to correct for
non-response bias. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a Results from the surveys indicate that location of undergraduate institution is a good
proxy for citizenship.
b Asian countries as identified by the Population Reference Bureau (2008).
c Rankings are from U.S. News and World Report (2009).
d Field indicators are not mutually exclusive, so there is no omitted category.
e Number of courses as TA is topcoded to 10.
f Number of courses as primary instructor is topcoded to 5.
g NGQO refers to a non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental organization.
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Table 3.18: Linear regressions: Predictors of salary (in 2010 dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base + Job
type
+ Job
offers
All
Female 92 77 −989 −1, 083
(2, 284) (2, 179) (2, 139) (2, 035)
Undergraduate locationa
US − − − −
− − − −
Asiab −15, 115*** −16, 559*** −13, 006*** −14, 386***
(2, 958) (2, 852) (2, 749) (2, 674)
Other −6, 331** −5, 954** −4, 503* −4, 372
(2, 888) (2, 851) (2, 686) (2, 666)
PhD program in US 5, 879 1, 341 7, 950* 3, 793
(4, 459) (4, 366) (4, 116) (4, 061)
PhD program in
economics
−24, 965*** −24, 405*** −24, 768*** −24, 255***
(5, 632) (5, 670) (5, 073) (5, 099)
Rank of PhD programc
1-10 − − − −
− − − −
11-20 −9, 707** −8, 996** −5, 827 −5, 232
(4, 248) (4, 104) (4, 146) (4, 022)
21-30 −17, 423*** −17, 582*** −11, 890*** −12, 160***
(4, 256) (4, 130) (3, 941) (3, 851)
31-40 −29, 810*** −26, 935*** −22, 092*** −20, 023***
(4, 428) (4, 187) (3, 986) (3, 762)
41-50 −25, 618*** −24, 959*** −18, 465*** −18, 336***
(3, 986) (3, 877) (3, 918) (3, 830)
Unranked −27, 448*** −26, 881*** −18, 856*** −18, 915***
(3, 500) (3, 440) (3, 459) (3, 419)
PhD fieldsd
Applied
econometrics
−1, 185 −2, 306 −2, 537 −3, 602
(2, 738) (2, 629) (2, 539) (2, 454)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base + Job
type
+ Job
offers
All
Applied
microeconomics
240 −94 −1, 170 −1, 580
(2, 657) (2, 520) (2, 495) (2, 376)
Behavioral
economics
4, 384 4, 519 7, 106 7, 159
(5, 761) (5, 843) (5, 113) (5, 213)
Computational
economics
11, 223 7, 447 9, 557 5, 783
(8, 497) (7, 872) (8, 374) (7, 606)
Development
economics
−3, 951 −3, 806 −3, 895 −3, 737
(3, 023) (2, 952) (2, 795) (2, 733)
Econometrics −2, 735 −2, 298 −4, 319 −3, 849
(3, 150) (3, 078) (2, 865) (2, 778)
Economic history −6, 792 −6, 177 −2, 267 −2, 216
(6, 539) (6, 155) (5, 816) (5, 474)
Economic theory −6, 954 −5, 981 −8, 859 −8, 072
(7, 775) (7, 493) (6, 864) (6, 636)
Economics of
education
−8, 030** −5, 934 −10, 130*** −8, 046**
(3, 793) (3, 719) (3, 879) (3, 745)
Environmental
economics
−10, 776*** −6, 378** −10, 606*** −6, 859**
(3, 350) (3, 058) (3, 224) (2, 939)
Experimental
economics
−5, 385 −5, 247 −5, 730 −5, 501
(4, 840) (4, 762) (4, 413) (4, 393)
Financial economics 20, 000*** 18, 757*** 19, 132*** 17, 923***
(4, 194) (4, 136) (3, 805) (3, 776)
Game theory −906 −1, 662 1, 067 274
(4, 888) (4, 798) (4, 792) (4, 698)
Health economics −4, 315 −3, 984 −7, 727** −7, 492**
(4, 122) (3, 854) (3, 759) (3, 514)
Industrial
organization
−0 −89 717 498
(2, 646) (2, 563) (2, 484) (2, 432)
International
economics
2, 405 4, 002 664 2, 238
(4, 235) (4, 183) (3, 698) (3, 669)
International finance 10, 781* 9, 383 9, 960 8, 348
(6, 144) (6, 057) (6, 111) (6, 053)
International
macroeconomics
−15, 822** −14, 158** −15, 041** −13, 319**
(6, 334) (6, 126) (6, 067) (5, 789)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base + Job
type
+ Job
offers
All
International trade 5, 249 4, 961 3, 052 2, 882
(4, 293) (4, 223) (4, 366) (4, 344)
Labor economics −2, 895 −3, 527 −4, 205* −4, 707*
(2, 595) (2, 522) (2, 519) (2, 459)
Law and economics 1, 079 3, 896 4, 826 6, 870
(6, 879) (6, 081) (6, 843) (6, 413)
Macroeconomics −3, 358 −3, 479 −2, 357 −2, 541
(3, 437) (3, 401) (3, 222) (3, 230)
Microeconomic
theory
−4, 083 −2, 956 −5, 940 −4, 736
(4, 167) (4, 046) (3, 710) (3, 611)
Microeconomics −5, 826 −4, 587 −6, 489* −5, 403
(4, 360) (4, 329) (3, 851) (3, 683)
Monetary economics −8, 313* −7, 672 −9, 470** −8, 674**
(4, 736) (4, 660) (4, 253) (4, 212)
Political economy −3, 516 −4, 024 −5, 844 −6, 090
(3, 973) (4, 012) (3, 831) (3, 863)
Public economics 3, 375 2, 303 2, 745 1, 679
(2, 884) (2, 793) (2, 667) (2, 622)
Urban economics −2, 438 −1, 962 −2, 596 −2, 087
(4, 449) (4, 590) (4, 194) (4, 421)
Journal publications
0 − − − −
− − − −
1 −3, 511 −2, 358 −2, 518 −1, 358
(3, 469) (3, 382) (3, 134) (3, 047)
2 568 1, 225 605 1, 423
(3, 723) (3, 644) (3, 416) (3, 348)
3+ −4, 042 −3, 921 −4, 083 −3, 877
(4, 568) (4, 720) (4, 131) (4, 291)
Number of courses as
TAe
52 −75 192 49
(463) (466) (446) (451)
Number of courses as
primary instructorf
−1, 150 −633 −884 −386
(800) (811) (762) (773)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base + Job
type
+ Job
offers
All
Job type
University − −
− −
College −11, 402*** −9, 634***
(3, 048) (2, 939)
NGQOg 2, 168 2, 246
(2, 674) (2, 592)
Business or industry 15, 335*** 16, 984***
(4, 831) (4, 402)
Postdoc −30, 330*** −25, 455***
(3, 874) (3, 338)
Number of job offers 7, 817*** 7, 277***
(1, 225) (1, 215)
Number of job offers
squared
−315*** −279**
(113) (111)
Constant 135, 008*** 139, 091*** 107, 889*** 112, 881***
(7, 097) (7, 059) (7, 193) (7, 149)
Observations 815 809 815 809
R-squared 0.381 0.428 0.465 0.504
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent
variable is salary in 2010 dollars. Estimates are weighted to correct for non-response
bias.
a Results from the surveys indicate that location of undergraduate institution is a good
proxy for citizenship.
b Asian countries as identified by the Population Reference Bureau (2008).
c Rankings are from U.S. News and World Report (2009).
d Field indicators are not mutually exclusive, so there is no omitted category.
e Number of courses as TA is topcoded to 10.
f Number of courses as primary instructor is topcoded to 5.
g NGQO refers to a non-profit, governmental, or quasi-governmental organization.
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Table 3.19: Ordered probits: Predictors of overall satisfaction with accepted job
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates: Base + Job
offers
+ Pref-
erences
All
Female 0.280 0.258** 0.109 0.089
(0.124) (0.126) (0.152) (0.151)
Undergraduate locationa
US − − − −
− − − −
Asiab −0.627*** −0.583*** −0.532*** −0.475***
(0.140) (0.142) (0.165) (0.163)
Other −0.138 −0.118 −0.005 0.039
(0.128) (0.126) (0.147) (0.146)
PhD program in US 0.402 0.452 0.088 0.147
(0.279) (0.281) (0.280) (0.273)
PhD program in
economics
0.248 0.306 0.231 0.210
(0.211) (0.212) (0.274) (0.272)
Rank of PhD programc
1-10 − − − −
− − − −
11-20 −0.289* −0.269* −0.102 −0.087
(0.161) (0.162) (0.197) (0.193)
21-30 −0.215 −0.168 −0.384* −0.339
(0.184) (0.186) (0.207) (0.211)
31-40 0.097 0.154 −0.428* −0.386
(0.227) (0.229) (0.257) (0.256)
41-50 −0.438** −0.349* −0.372 −0.310
(0.211) (0.211) (0.239) (0.239)
Unranked −0.159 −0.067 −0.222 −0.127
(0.194) (0.205) (0.217) (0.222)
PhD fieldsd
Applied
econometrics
−0.208 −0.238 −0.065 −0.092
(0.151) (0.150) (0.174) (0.171)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates: Base + Job
offers
+ Pref-
erences
All
Applied
microeconomics
0.033 0.018 0.220 0.208
(0.134) (0.135) (0.161) (0.162)
Behavioral
economics
−0.208 −0.238 −0.027 −0.089
(0.228) (0.239) (0.305) (0.326)
Computational
economics
0.197 0.178 0.542 0.532
(0.308) (0.304) (0.377) (0.360)
Development
economics
−0.085 −0.102 −0.118 −0.130
(0.148) (0.149) (0.157) (0.157)
Econometrics −0.178 −0.186 −0.151 −0.127
(0.164) (0.161) (0.191) (0.186)
Economic history −0.558* −0.520* −0.480 −0.423
(0.309) (0.313) (0.383) (0.386)
Economic theory −0.217 −0.315 −0.534 −0.552
(0.291) (0.252) (0.368) (0.339)
Economics of
education
−0.352 −0.402 0.291 0.263
(0.338) (0.366) (0.268) (0.276)
Environmental
economics
−0.084 −0.088 −0.262 −0.231
(0.231) (0.235) (0.270) (0.272)
Experimental
economics
0.291 0.298 0.606* 0.605*
(0.211) (0.215) (0.318) (0.328)
Financial economics −0.162 −0.147 0.101 0.105
(0.171) (0.170) (0.215) (0.214)
Game theory 0.159 0.187 0.296 0.298
(0.212) (0.211) (0.218) (0.211)
Health economics −0.003 −0.049 0.516* 0.427
(0.230) (0.227) (0.269) (0.276)
Industrial
organization
−0.249* −0.249* −0.286* −0.265
(0.146) (0.146) (0.170) (0.170)
International
economics
−0.056 −0.053 0.240 0.240
(0.211) (0.214) (0.248) (0.254)
International finance −0.199 −0.206 −0.079 −0.088
(0.279) (0.286) (0.366) (0.370)
International
macroeconomics
0.394 0.384 0.566 0.550
(0.324) (0.334) (0.413) (0.401)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates: Base + Job
offers
+ Pref-
erences
All
International trade −0.132 −0.156 0.189 0.170
(0.167) (0.167) (0.228) (0.225)
Labor economics −0.092 −0.101 −0.015 0.002
(0.142) (0.142) (0.165) (0.166)
Law and economics 0.080 0.126 0.119 0.217
(0.207) (0.221) (0.275) (0.305)
Macroeconomics −0.278* −0.269* −0.464** −0.435**
(0.158) (0.157) (0.192) (0.192)
Microeconomic
theory
−0.273 −0.327 −0.178 −0.127
(0.197) (0.205) (0.220) (0.219)
Microeconomics −0.178 −0.102 0.028 0.071
(0.279) (0.279) (0.348) (0.358)
Monetary economics −0.173 −0.192 0.009 −0.005
(0.244) (0.248) (0.292) (0.288)
Political economy −0.128 −0.143 0.182 0.171
(0.196) (0.192) (0.265) (0.265)
Public economics 0.020 0.033 0.115 0.132
(0.141) (0.142) (0.155) (0.158)
Urban economics 0.575 0.590 0.454 0.456
(0.367) (0.363) (0.343) (0.332)
Journal publications
0 − − − −
− − − −
1 0.133 0.143 −0.010 0.000
(0.178) (0.177) (0.188) (0.188)
2 −0.089 −0.079 0.034 0.004
(0.206) (0.207) (0.211) (0.217)
3+ −0.232 −0.195 −0.529* −0.507*
(0.215) (0.212) (0.274) (0.272)
Number of courses as
TAe
−0.007 −0.004 −0.045* −0.044*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
Number of courses as
primary instructorf
0.040 0.048 0.069 0.078*
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043)
126
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates: Base + Job
offers
+ Pref-
erences
All
Preference rank of job
type
1st-choice job type − −
− −
2nd-choice job type −0.133 −0.078
(0.166) (0.167)
3rd-choice job type −0.191 −0.189
(0.227) (0.230)
4th-choice job type −0.659* −0.597
(0.365) (0.366)
5th-choice job type −0.260 −0.123
(0.564) (0.570)
Number of job offers 0.072*** 0.083***
(0.024) (0.029)
Cutpoints
1st cutpoint −2.509*** −2.122*** −3.248*** −2.89***
(0.437) (0.458) (0.570) (0.573)
2nd cutpoint −2.072*** −1.683*** −2.654*** −2.278***
(0.392) (0.407) (0.489) (0.484)
3rd cutpoint −1.622*** −1.232*** −2.052*** −1.666***
(0.402) (0.421) (0.476) (0.476)
4th cutpoint −0.494 −0.09 −0.746 −0.335
(0.386) (0.406) (0.465) (0.461)
5th cutpoint 0.96** 1.38*** 0.823** 1.248***
(0.378) (0.403) (0.458) (0.457)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates: Base + Job
offers
+ Pref-
erences
All
Observations 546 546 402 402
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Depen-
dent variable is overall satisfaction with accepted job. Respondents rated their
satisfaction on a six-point scale where 1 was extremely dissatisfied, 2 was very
dissatisfied, 3 was somewhat dissatisfied, 4 was somewhat satisfied, 5 was very
satisfied, and 6 was extremely satisfied. Estimates are weighted to correct for
non-response bias.
a Results from the surveys indicate that location of undergraduate institution is
a good proxy for citizenship.
b Asian countries as identified by the Population Reference Bureau (2008).
c Rankings are from U.S. News and World Report (2009).
d Field indicators are not mutually exclusive, so there is no omitted category.
e Number of courses as TA is topcoded to 10.
f Number of courses as primary instructor is topcoded to 5.
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CHAPTER IV
Moving Out to Move Up
With Brooke Helppie McFall
4.1 Introduction
In the past half century, historic increases in women’s labor-force participation
have prompted growing interest in the migration decisions of dual-career couples. In
1970, 41 percent of married women in the United States were in the labor force. By
2009, 61 percent of married women were in the labor force, and married couples with
two earners outnumbered married couples with a single earner (United States Census
Bureau, 2010). Unlike couples in which only the husband or, less frequently, only the
wife works for pay, couples in which both partners work must balance the potentially
competing demands of two careers. Career-related migration opportunities, which
can arise for partners at different times and in different locations, may be a source of
conflict for these couples.
How couples respond to conflicting locational preferences has implications for their
well-being. On one hand, living together may harm the career prospects of one or
both partners (Sandell, 1977; Mincer, 1978); on the other hand, living apart may
harm their relationship. Empirical studies suggest that living together constrains the
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location choices of married workers (Costa and Kahn, 2000; Gemici, 2008; McKinnish,
2008; Mincer, 1978) and lowers their earnings relative to what they could obtain in
their individually optimal locations (Sandell, 1977; Lichter, 1983; Jacobson and Levin,
1997; Gemici, 2008; Boyle et al., 2001). Because many studies have found that the
negative impact of living together falls disproportionately on women (Mincer, 1978;
Sandell, 1977; Jacobson and Levin, 1997; Compton and Pollak, 2007; Cooke, 2008;
Boyle et al., 2001), some researchers have also suggested that the migration decisions
of couples contribute to the gender gap in earnings and career attainment (Bielby
and Bielby, 1992). On the relationship side of the trade-off, one study found that
career-motivated migration is associated with higher divorce rates (Gemici, 2008).
Implicit in early theories of family migration was an assumption that couples who
remain together live together (Sandell, 1977; Mincer, 1978). Subsequent empirical
work has shown that this assumption is unwarranted. A number of qualitative stud-
ies outside of economics have identified long-distance relationships as an alternative to
career sacrifices or relationship dissolution for couples with conflicting locational pref-
erences (Gerstel and Gross, 1982; Magnuson and Norem, 1999; Gross, 1980; Rhodes,
2002). These studies have explored the circumstances under which dual-career cou-
ples live apart and have assessed the implications of living apart for the careers and
relationships of couples who choose the arrangement. Because they have relied on
non-representative samples, however, studies of long-distance relationships have not
estimated the prevalence of living apart in the population of dual-career couples. Nor
can we be confident that the results of these studies generalize to the population.
This paper uses data from original surveys of new economists – all of whom have
invested heavily in their human capital, most of whom will move for their first job,
and many of whom have highly educated partners – to assess the impact of conflicting
locational preferences on a group for whom the problem is likely to be severe. The sur-
veys combine questions about the job-market decisions and outcomes of new entrants
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to the junior PhD job market in economics with questions about their partners and
living arrangements. In addition, the surveys contain direct counterfactual questions
about the job-market outcomes the economists think they would have had if they
had responded differently to conflicts over location. Using data from the surveys, we
are able to characterize the impact of conflicting locational preferences on the career
outcomes of new economists who live with their partner. We are also able to esti-
mate, for the first time, the prevalence and predictors of long-distance relationships
in a known sub-population of dual-career couples.
Our results indicate that the impact of conflicting locational preferences on the job
choices of new economists is modest. Just 14 percent of the partnered economists we
surveyed had rejected their first-choice job offer for the benefit of their relationship,
and those who had rejected their first-choice job offer did not anticipate severe damage
to their long-term career trajectories. At the same time, 16 percent of the partnered
economists we surveyed expected to be living apart from their partner in the year
after the economists entered the job market. Economists who faced large career costs
if they lived with their partner were the most likely to live apart. In light of these
patterns, we argue that long-distance relationships attenuate the impact of conflicting
locational preferences on the career outcomes of new economists.
Our results corroborate several findings from the qualitative literature on long-
distance relationships. Dual-career couples are motivated to live apart when the
benefits of the arrangement to their careers are large, but they are not primarily con-
cerned with financial compensation (Gerstel and Gross, 1982; Gross, 1980; Magnuson
and Norem, 1999). The economists we surveyed were more likely to live apart when
they believed that the arrangement would increase their likelihood of publishing in
top journals and of having opportunities to move to different kinds of jobs; they were
not more likely to live apart when they believed that the arrangement would increase
their lifetime income. Our results also corroborate the finding that couples are less
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likely to live apart when they are parents or expect to become parents (Gerstel and
Gross, 1982; Gross, 1980).
While this paper assesses the impact of conflicting locational preferences on the
careers and relationships of new economists, our results have relevance for specialized
professionals more generally. In the contemporary United States, highly educated
men and women tend to marry highly educated partners (Schwartz and Mare, 2005).
Because educational attainment is positively associated with occupational mobility
(McKinnish, 2008), the pairing of highly educated partners is likely to complicate
migration decisions for dual-career couples across the professions.
4.2 Theoretical predictors of living apart
The seminal theoretical work of Jacob Mincer (1978) is the point of departure
for our analysis. Although he ignored the possibility that couples with conflicting
locational preferences live apart, Mincer characterized the circumstances under which
they live together and the circumstances under which they break up. Couples in the
Mincer model solve
maximize
xA,xB
GxAA +G
xB
B + IxA=xB · (MA +MB) ,
where xi is the location of partner i; Gxii is the utility gain of partner i from locational
amenities and career opportunities in location xi, net of the cost of moving to that
location; Mi is the utility gain of partner i from the couple’s relationship; and IxA=xB
is an indicator variable for the relationship.
Let GIA and GIB be the net utility gains of the partners from locational amenities
and career opportunities in the locations that solve
maximize
xi
Gxii
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for i = A,B. Let GFA and GFB be the utility gains of the partners in the location that
solves
maximize
xA=xB
GxAA +G
xB
B .
Mincer defines the migration tie of partner i as the difference between the net utility
gain of partner i from locational amenities and career opportunities in the location
he or she would choose as a single person, GIi , and the utility gain of partner i in the
location that maximizes the joint utility of the couple, GFi :
Ti = G
I
i −GFi .
He predicts that couples live together when the sum of their gains from their rela-
tionship exceeds the sum of their migration ties:
MA +MB > TA + TB. (4.1)
When the sum of their migration ties exceeds the sum of their gains from their
relationship, Mincer predicts that couples break up.
As discussed above, evidence from qualitative studies suggests that some couples
neither move together nor break up. Instead, these couples reconcile conflicts between
relationship commitments and career opportunities by maintaining long-distance re-
lationships. To explore the implications of long-distance relationships for relationship
and career outcomes, we develop a simple extension of the Mincer model. We decom-
pose the gain from a relationship, Mi, into a component that accrues to every person
in a relationship, Ki and a component that accrues only to people who live with their
partners, Hi:
Mi = Ki +Hi.
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Because we are interested in relationship stability only to the extent that it is influ-
enced by conflicting migration opportunities, we assume that couples maintain their
relationships in the absence of conflicting migration opportunities:
MA +MB > 0.
We also assume that couples prefer cohabiting relationships to long-distance rela-
tionships. Given a choice between living together and living apart in separate but
otherwise identical locations, couples choose to live together:
HA +HB > 0.
Finally, we allow for the possibility that some couples would rather live apart than
break up and for the possibility that some would rather break up:
−HA −HB < KA +KB < MA +MB.
In our extension of the Mincer model, couples solve
Maximize
xA,xB
GxAA +G
xB
B + Ir=1 (KA +KB) + Ir=1IxA=xB · (HA +HB) ,
where Ir=1 is an indicator variable for a relationship, either long-distance or cohab-
iting; IxA=xB is an indicator variable for cohabitation; and the other variables are
defined as above.
For couples who would rather break up than live apart, the predictions of the
extended model coincide with the predictions of the Mincer model. These couples
live together when the sum of their gains from their relationship exceeds the sum of
their migration ties and break up when the reverse is true. Formally, couples with
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KA +KB < 0 live together when Equation (4.1) holds, and break up otherwise.
In contrast, for couples who would rather live apart than break up, the predictions
of the extended model and the predictions of the Mincer model diverge. By main-
taining long-distance relationships, these couples can enjoy utility from from their
relationships without sacrificing utility to migration ties. Consequently, it is never
optimal for them to break up. Instead, these couples live together when the sum of
their gains from cohabitation exceeds the sum of their migration ties and live apart
when the reverse is true. Formally, couples with KA +KB > 0 live together when
HA +HB > TA + TB (4.2)
and live apart otherwise.
A comparison of Equations (4.1) and (4.2) indicates that, if there are couples
who would rather live apart than break up, the Mincer model makes inaccurate
predictions about their responses to conflicting migration opportunities. While the
extended model predicts that couples with
MA +MB > TA + TB > HA +HB (4.3)
and
TA + TB > MA +MB > HA +HB (4.4)
live apart, the Mincer model predicts that the former live together and the latter
break up. Thus, relative to the extended model, the Mincer model posits a stark
trade-off between personal relationships and professional success. As a result of this
simplification, the Mincer model overstates the negative impact of migration ties
on careers. Depending on the distribution of couples between the circumstances
described in Equations (4.3) and (4.4), the Mincer model may overstate or understate
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the negative impact of migration ties on relationships.
4.3 Data
This paper is a product of the Job Seekers Project, a longitudinal survey project
that tracks the professional and personal trajectories of recent entrants to the junior
PhD job market in economics. The project combines information from original web
surveys with information from job-placement and professional websites to create a
uniquely rich dataset for the study of work-family trade-offs. Since the 2007-08 job-
market season, the project has contacted graduating cohorts of economists as they en-
ter the job market and has followed up with them several months later to learn about
their professional and personal circumstances. At the same time, the project has
gathered detailed background information about the economists, including their de-
mographic characteristics, educational credentials, and professional accomplishments,
from the CVs they post on the job-placement websites of their graduate departments.
The sampling frame for the Job Seekers Project is comprehensive. We use publicly
available information to compile a list sample of a clearly defined population: job
candidates whose names and contact information appear on job-placement websites
linked by the National Bureau of Economic Research.1 Between the 2007-08 and 2009-
10 academic years, the Job Seekers sample included 2,756 job candidates from 134
job-placement websites. A large majority of the job candidates in the sample posted
information on websites maintained by departments of economics (90 percent) and
departments in the United States (91 percent); a minority posted information on
websites maintained by departments of business, public policy, or other fields closely
related to economics, or departments in Canada or Europe.2 We believe that the
1The National Bureau of Economic Research posts links to job-placement websites of graduate
departments on their own job-market website: http://www.nber.org/candidates/.
2The sample did not include job candidates from European departments until 2009-10. Prior to
2009-10, 95 percent of the job candidates in the sample were from departments in the United States;
in 2009-10, 84 percent were from departments in the United States.
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Job Seekers sample comprises nearly the universe of job candidates who expected
to participate in first-round job interviews at the annual meetings of the American
Economic Association between 2008 and 2010.
We invite job candidates to participate in the pre-market survey in late December,
just before most begin their first-round job interviews. The survey is available for job
candidates to complete online during the period leading up to the annual meetings of
the American Economic Association and remains available for several months after
the meetings. While the fielding window for the pre-market survey is long, most
respondents complete the survey in a timely manner. Between 2007-08 and 2009-10,
63 percent of the job candidates who completed the pre-market survey submitted
their responses before the meetings. Eighty-eight percent submitted their responses
within one month of receiving the invitation to participate.
We invite job candidates to participate in the post-market survey approximately
six months after the job market closes, when most have concluded their job search
and know whether and where they will be working in the coming year. In 2007-08 and
2009-10, we sent the invitation to the post-market survey in August; in 2008-09, we
sent the invitation in November. Like the pre-market survey, the post-market survey
is available for job candidates to complete online over a period of several months,
and like pre-market respondents, most post-market respondents complete the survey
in a timely manner. Between 2007-08 and 2009-10, 79 percent of the job candidates
who completed the post-market survey submitted their responses within one month
of receiving the invitation to participate.
The data sources compiled by the Job Seekers project have a number of desirable
features. First, the project’s combination of data from web surveys and job placement
websites allows for a detailed analysis of sample selectivity. We are confident that
the estimates derived from this data are reasonably representative of the population
of new entrants to the new PhD job market in economics. Response rates for the Job
138
Seekers surveys are comparable or superior to response the response rate for a typical
web survey. Between 2007-08 and 2009-10, the response rate for the pre-market survey
was 53 percent, and the response rate for the post-market survey was 39 percent. By
way of comparison, a meta-analysis of response rates to web and internet surveys
found a mean response rate of 39 percent (Cook, Heath and Thompson, 2000).
Complementing data from the Job Seekers surveys is publicly available information
from the job placement websites of graduate departments. Between 2007-08 and 2009-
10, using the US News and World Report rankings of graduate programs in economics,
we obtained rankings for the departments of 70 percent of the job candidates in the
Job Seekers sample.3 Using the photographs and CVs that job candidates posted on
the job placement websites, and supplementing with coding based on first names, we
identified the gender of 97 percent of the job candidates. From the CVs, we identified
the location of the undergraduate institutions attended by 93 percent of the job
candidates.4 Finally, also from the CVs, we obtained information about the doctoral
training of job candidates, including their research fields, teaching experience, and
research productivity, as well as information about their previous education.
Probit analyses predicting the probability of completing the Job Seekers surveys
indicate that, with respect to these background characteristics, respondents are gener-
ally representative of the population of job candidates. The primary exception to this
finding is an under-representation among respondents of job candidates from outside
the United States, especially from countries in Asia. The application of weights to
correct for non-response bias does not substantially alter the results from the analyses
presented in this paper.
3The US News rankings are available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-
graduate-schools/top-humanities-schools/economics-rankings. Most (66 percent) of job candidates
from unranked departments were from lower-ranked economics departments in the United States.
A sizable minority (30 percent) were from departments outside the United States, and a small
number (4 percent) were from departments in fields closely related to economics, such as business
or public policy.
4Data from the web surveys indicate the the location of a job candidate’s undergraduate institu-
tion is a good proxy for the job candidate’s country of origin.
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A second feature of the Job Seekers data is the availability of information about a
wide range of job-market outcomes and expectations regarding future career trajec-
tories. Previous studies of family migration have focused on the current employment
status and earnings of couples likely to face migration ties. This narrow focus is
largely attributable to data limitations; the large-scale datasets most studies have
used do not contain other measures of career attainment. The narrow focus of previ-
ous studies is also unfortunate. It is likely that specialized professionals – the group
most vulnerable to migration ties – care a great deal about career outcomes beyond
their employment and earnings. Especially at the beginning of their careers, they are
likely to value less tangible aspects of their jobs, such as prestige, and more forward-
looking aspects, such as access to career ladders. To the extent that previous studies
have neglected these other outcomes, they may have misrepresented or understated
the impact of migration ties on highly educated workers. In contrast, the Job Seekers
surveys contain detailed questions about a comprehensive list of career outcomes and
expectations.
A third feature of the Job Seekers data is the combination of information about
relationship status with information about household composition. Previous studies
of family migration have assessed its impact on couples who live together but have
largely ignored couples who live apart. Again, the narrow focus of previous studies
is understandable but unfortunate. Many large-scale datasets contain information
about household composition but not about family members who live outside the
household. Other datasets contain information about spouses or partners but assume
that couples live in the same household. Despite the possibility that dual-career
concerns induce couples to live apart, few datasets contain the information that would
be necessary to study living arrangements as a margin of adjustment to conflicting
migration opportunities. In contrast, the Job Seekers surveys contain questions both
about the partners of new economists and about the living arrangements of couples
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in the year after the job market.
A fourth feature of the Job Seekers data, and a key innovation of the project
relative to other studies of family migration, is our use of individual-specific measures
of counterfactual job-market outcomes. The structure of the junior PhD job market
in economics, where most job candidates submit applications, complete interviews,
travel to fly-outs, and receive job offers during narrow, pre-determined windows of
time, provides job candidates with well-defined choice sets, including well-defined
counterfactual outcomes. The structure of the job market also allows us to survey
job candidates about their choices while their memories of the job market are fresh.
To this end, the post-market survey includes a series of questions about the outcomes
respondents actually had on the job market and the outcomes they think they would
have had under counterfactual scenarios where their responses to migration ties were
different.
To determine whether respondents made individually optimal choices on the job
market, and to assess the impact of migration ties on the job placements of those
who did not make individually preferred choices, the post-market survey asks re-
spondents to consider the following counterfactual scenario: “Suppose your [hus-
band/wife/significant other] could have an equally satisfying professional and per-
sonal life in any location – that is, suppose it would not be a sacrifice for [him/her]
to move with you anywhere.”5 The survey then asks respondents to describe the
decisions they would have made and the outcomes they think would have had at
each stage of the job market under this scenario. For the remainder of the paper, we
refer to options the respondent would have chosen in the absence of migration ties as
individually preferred, or IP, options.
To determine whether respondents forwent living with their partner to accept their
5This is the text that introduced the counterfactual questions in the 2009-10 post-market survey.
The wording of the counterfactual questions has varied slightly over time, but the changes do not
appear to have affected response patterns. The text of the questions from other survey years is
available in the appendix.
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individually preferred job, the post-market survey asked respondents who expected
to be living apart the following March to consider a second counterfactual scenario:
“Please imagine the life you would have had if you and your [husband\wife\significant
other] were constrained to live together next March (i.e., share your primary resi-
dence or live close enough to each other that you could see each other after work
on weeknights).” To assess the impact migration ties would have had on the job
placements of respondents who rejected their jointly preferred option, had they in-
stead decided to accept it and live with their partner, the survey asks respondents
to describe the outcomes they think they would have had if living apart were not an
option. We refer to options the respondent would have chosen if living apart were
not an option as jointly preferred, or JP, options.6
Each analysis presented in this paper uses slightly different sample restriction
criteria. We have endeavored to use the largest sample possible for each analysis,
while ensuring that the results are not biased due to changes over time in the survey
questions and skip logic. Column headers and footnotes in each table describe the
samples used in each analysis, while the appendix provides detail about changes in
question wording and response scales between cohorts.
4.4 Results
The Mincer model provides strong reasons to believe that family migration harms
the career prospects of new economists. Like other specialized professionals, economists
participate in national and international labor markets. Their career opportunities
are geographically dispersed. Most economists move for their first job, and many
move for subsequent jobs.
At the same time, the Job Seekers data indicate that many new economists
6We added questions about jointly preferred options to the post-market survey in 2009-10. We
do not have information about the jointly preferred options of job candidates in the 2007-08 and
2008-09 job-market cohorts.
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are in relationships with highly educated partners. A majority (73 percent) of the
economists who responded to the Job Seekers surveys were in a relationship at the be-
ginning of their job-market year (Table 4.1). Almost half (48 percent) were married;
another fifth (20 percent) characterized their relationship as marriage-like or com-
mitted. The partners of the economists, like the economists themselves, had strong
educational credentials. More than three quarters (76 percent) of the partners had
earned or were pursuing a graduate degree, and more than one third (40 percent) had
earned or were pursuing a PhD (Table 4.2).
While both male and female economists reported personal circumstances that
made them vulnerable to migration ties, we observe gender differences in two domains.
On one hand, male economists were more likely than female economists to be in a
relationship during their job-market year. At the time they entered the job market, 76
percent of the men who responded to the Job Seekers surveys were in a relationship,
and 51 percent were married. The comparable figures for women were 67 percent
and 40 percent. On the other hand, conditional on being in a relationship, female
economists were more likely than male economists to have a partner whose educational
attainment equaled their own. More than half (57 percent) of the women who were
in a relationship during their job-market year had a partner who had earned or or
was pursuing a PhD. The same was true of less than one third (32 percent) of the
men.
4.4.1 Impact of migration ties on career outcomes
In light of the Mincer model, the impact of migration ties on the job choices of
economists in the Job Seekers sample was surprisingly small. Of 631 respondents who
received at least one job offer and had a relationship that spanned the job-market
months, a large majority (85 percent) reported that they had accepted their individ-
ually preferred job from their final choice set. A small number (1 percent) reported
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that their individually preferred option had been to reject all of their job offers and
that they had, in fact, rejected all of their offers. Unexpectedly, in a population the-
oretically vulnerable to severe migration ties, just 14 percent of respondents reported
that their job choice would have been different in the absence of relationship-related
constraints. These results are summarized in Table 4.3.
Both the Mincer model and the extended model predict that job candidates are
more likely to forgo their individually preferred job for the benefit of their relationship
when the career sacrifices involved are small. The 2009-10 post-market survey assessed
the career costs of forgoing an individually preferred job with respect to eight long-
term career outcomes a typical economist might value: earning tenure at a research
university, earning tenure at a four-year college, publishing regularly in top journals,
having opportunities to move to more prestigious jobs, having opportunities to move
to different kinds of jobs, having a lifetime income higher than average for their field,
finding their everyday work satisfying, and having plenty of time for life outside of
work. Respondents rated their likelihood of realizing each outcome, in light of the
job they accepted, using a six-point scale that ranged from 1 (extremely unlikely) to
6 (extremely likely).
When respondents faced a trade-off between their individually preferred job and
their jointly preferred job, the survey also asked them to rate their their likelihood of
realizing the long-term career outcomes under a counterfactual scenario where their
response to the trade-off was different. Respondents who rejected their individually
preferred job rated their likelihood of realizing each outcome under the counterfac-
tual scenario where they accepted it. Respondents who accepted their individually
preferred job rated their likelihood of realizing each outcome under the counterfactual
scenario where they rejected it in favor of their jointly preferred job.
Finally, to assess the overall impact of rejecting an individually preferred job on
the expected career outcomes of new economists, the survey asked respondents who
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faced a tradeoff between their individually preferred job and their jointly preferred
job to compare their overall career prospects with the prospects they would have
had under the relevant counterfactual scenario. Respondents who rejected their in-
dividually preferred job rated their career prospects at that job, relative to the job
they accepted, using a five-point scale that ranged from 1 (much better) to 5 (much
worse). Respondents who accepted their individually preferred job rated their career
prospects at that job, relative to their jointly preferred job, using the same scale.
Table 4.4 presents mean ratings for the eight specific outcome measures and the
overall outcome measure, for both the individually preferred job and the jointly pre-
ferred job.7 For each measure, results are presented separately for each of three
groups: partnered job candidates for whom the individually preferred job coincided
with the jointly preferred job (not constrained), partnered job candidates who were
constrained by their partners and accepted the individually preferred job over the
jointly preferred alternative (constrained, accepted IP job), and partnered job candi-
dates who were constrained by their partners and accepted the jointly preferred job
over the individually preferred alternative (constrained, rejected IP job).
On the whole, job candidates in all three groups believed that both their individ-
ually preferred jobs and their jointly preferred jobs would position them to succeed in
their careers. Mean ratings for all of the specific outcome measures exceed the scale
value corresponding to somewhat unlikely for each group. For job candidates in the
unconstrained group, ratings for the individually preferred job and the jointly pre-
ferred job are, by definition, identical. For job candidates in the constrained groups,
the results in Table 4.4 are consistent with the definition of individually preferred job
as the job that maximizes career-related utility: on average, job candidates believed
that their individually preferred jobs were more likely than their jointly preferred jobs
7The ratings we summarize in this table are ordinal data. We present means rather than ordinal
measures of central tendency, such as medians or modes, because the ratings for most outcomes
cluster at the high end of the scale, and the ordinal measures obscure important variation within
that range.
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to produce most of the specific outcomes we assessed. Job candidates also believed
that their individually preferred jobs offered better overall career prospects than their
jointly preferred jobs. Mean ratings of career prospects with the individually preferred
job, relative to career prospects with the jointly preferred job, fell between the scale
value corresponding to about the same and the scale value corresponding to somewhat
better for both constrained groups.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 apply sign tests to assess the statistical significance of differences
between the individually preferred and jointly preferred jobs of job candidates in the
constrained groups. Table 4.5 indicates that, among job candidates who rejected
their individually preferred job, the number who reported that their career prospects
would suffer from the decision statistically exceeds the number who reported that
their career prospects would improve. Differences with respect to the specific career
outcomes are not statistically significant for this group.
Table 4.6 indicates that, among job candidates who accepted their individually
preferred job, the number who reported that their career prospects would have suf-
fered from rejecting it statistically exceeds the number who reported that their career
prospects would have improved. Job candidates who accepted their individually pre-
ferred job also reported a statistically significant preponderance of differences favoring
that job in the likelihood of realizing five specific career outcomes: earning tenure at a
research university, publishing regularly in top journals, having opportunities to move
to more prestigious jobs, having opportunities to move to different kinds of jobs, and
finding everyday work satisfying. Taken together, the results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6
show that migration ties are a salient issue for some new economists.
Consistent with the predictions of the Mincer model and the extended model,
job candidates who rejected their individually preferred job – and who therefore
endured the career sacrifices associated with their migration ties – described the
decision as less costly than did respondents who accepted their individually preferred
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job. While job candidates in both constrained groups believed that their individually
preferred jobs were more likely than their jointly preferred jobs to produce most of
the long-term career outcomes we assessed, the differences tend to be smaller among
job candidates who rejected their individually preferred job. Returning to Table 4.4,
for most career outcomes, job candidates who rejected their individually preferred
job reported that their individually and jointly preferred jobs were more similar,
on average, than did job candidates who accepted their individually preferred job.
Returning to Tables 4.5 and 4.6, results from the sign tests tell a similar story. Six of
the tests show a statistically significant difference between the individually preferred
and jointly preferred jobs for job candidates who accepted their individually preferred
job. Despite a larger number of observations and correspondingly greater power, just
one test shows a statistically significant difference for job candidates who rejected
their individually preferred job.
While the evidence we have presented to this point suggests that the impact of
migration ties on the career prospects of new economists is modest, two caveats are
in order. First, even if migration ties do not shape outcomes substantially in the
final stage of the job market, they may shape outcomes at earlier stages, when job
candidates make decisions about which applications to submit and which interviews
and fly-outs to accept. To the extent that job candidates alter their application,
interview, or fly-outs sets in response to relationship commitments, the job offers
from which they choose in the final stage of the job market may differ from the offers
they would have obtained in the absence of migration ties.
Table 4.7 presents evidence that migration ties do, in fact, influence the decisions
of job candidates with respect to applications, interviews, and fly-outs. A sizable
minority (44 percent) of Job Seekers respondents with partners reported that they
would have applied to a different set of jobs if they had not been constrained by
relationship commitments. Twelve percent reported that they would have accepted a
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different set of interviews, and 14 percent reported that they would have accepted a
different set of fly-outs. By the time they reached the offer stage of the job market,
almost half (49 percent) of job candidates with partners had altered their choices in
some way in response to migration ties.
These results suggest that our measure of counterfactual job outcomes is not
accurate in every case. The magnitude of the results, however, suggests that our
measure is accurate in most cases. Even at the application stage, where the influence
of migration ties was most prevalent, respondents were more likely than not to have
made individually optimal choices. What is more, among respondents who altered
their application set in response to migration ties, the median change in the size of
the set was just five applications withheld. Given that the the median application
set contained 100 applications, changes of this magnitude are unlikely to have shaped
the offer sets of respondents in dramatic ways.
The second caveat is that the migration ties of new economists may influence their
job-market outcomes through another indirect channel: the behavior of employers in
the job market. Even if the choices of job candidates are unaffected by their rela-
tionship commitments, employers may consider family circumstances when deciding
which candidates to interview, invite for fly-outs, or hire. Employers may learn about
the relationships of job candidates in at least two ways. First, job candidates may tell
employers about their relationships when they meet for interviews or fly-outs. Sec-
ond, academic advisors and other members of the academic community may discuss
the relationships of job candidates in an attempt to facilitate good job matches.
Table 4.7 indicates that, whatever the source of the information, employers are
likely to learn about the relationships of job candidates before they extend job offers.
Seventy-two percent of Job Seekers respondents with partners said that some or all of
their prospective employers knew about their relationship by the time they completed
their interviews. Eighty-four percent said that some or all of their prospective em-
148
ployers knew about their relationship by the time they completed their fly-outs. To
the extent that employers learn about the relationships of job candidates from third
parties, without the knowledge of the job candidates, these results may understate
the amount of information available to employers.
Because the Job Seekers surveys focus on the supply side of the job market, we
do not know how employers incorporate information about relationships into their
decision making and cannot rule out the possibility that employer responses shape the
offer sets of job candidates in meaningful ways. In particular, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the individually and jointly preferred jobs we observe are more similar
– and the impact of migration ties we infer less pronounced – than they would be in
the true counterfactual situation. Despite this limitation, we argue in the remainder
of the paper that the supply-side phenomenon of long-distance relationships plays an
important role in attenuating the impact of migration ties on the job placements of
new economists.
Previous studies of family migration have not had access to direct measures of
migration ties. Consequently, previous tests of the Mincer model have relied on
proxies. Most often, studies have assumed the migration ties are more severe among
married men and women, and among men and women with highly educated partners.
These studies have shown that career outcomes theoretically related to being a tied
migrant (for example, reduced earnings or labor supply after a move) are more likely
for married couples – especially married women – and for men and women whose
partners have college or graduate degrees.
The Job Seekers dataset contains uniquely detailed information about the re-
sponses of new economists to migration ties. This information allows us to examine
the association between the proxies previous studies have used and direct measures of
migration-induced career sacrifices. Both the Mincer model and the extended model
predict that job candidates are more likely to reject their individually preferred job
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when their migration ties are large and when the value of their relationship is low. Be-
cause previous studies have suggested that migration ties increase with educational
attainment, we expect that new economists whose partners have graduate degrees
are more likely to alter their job-market choices in response to migration than new
economists whose partners have lower levels of education. Because we hypothesize
that the value of relationships usually increases with commitment, we also expect that
new economists in less committed relationships are less likely to alter their job-market
choices than new economists in more committed relationships.
Table 4.8 presents results from probit regressions examining the association be-
tween the probability that job candidates altered their job-market choices in response
to migration ties and the proxies for migration ties that previous studies have used.
In Column 1, the dependent variable takes a value of one for respondents who rejected
their individually preferred job and a value of zero otherwise. In Column 2, the de-
pendent variable takes a value of one for respondents who altered their choice set at
the application, interview, or fly-out stage of the job market and a value of zero oth-
erwise. In Column 3, the dependent variable takes a value of one for respondents who
rejected their individually preferred job, altered their choice set at an intermediate
stage of the job market, or did both, and a value of zero otherwise.
Consistent with our expectations, the results in Table 4.8 suggest that new econo-
mists whose partners have graduate degrees are more likely to reject their individually
preferred job than new economists whose partners have college degrees or less. The es-
timates in Columns 2 and 3 are similar in sign and magnitude to the results in Column
1 but are not statistically different from zero. Also consistent with our expectations,
the negative coefficients on the relationship status indicators for committed and dat-
ing relationships suggest that new economists who are in less formal relationship are
less likely than new economists who are married to reject their individually preferred
job or to alter their application, interview, or fly-outs sets in response to migration
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ties.
In contrast to the large number of studies finding that family migration imposes
larger costs on women than on men, we observe only minor gender differences in the
impact of migration ties on new economists. Of 631 job candidates who provided in-
formation about their counterfactual job choices, 17 percent of women and 12 percent
of men reported that they had rejected their individually preferred and had chosen an
option more favorable to their partner. This difference is not statistically significant,
χ2 (1, N = 631) = 2.07, p = 0.15.
On the other hand, women were somewhat more likely than men to report that
migration ties had influenced their decisions at intermediate stages of the job market.
Fifty-seven percent of women, but just 45 percent of men, reported that migration ties
had shaped the set of applications they submitted, or the set of interviews or fly-outs
they accepted, χ2 (1, N = 631) = 5.51, p = 0.02. Results from the probit regressions
suggest that gender differences in relationship status and the educational attainment
of respondents’ partners do not explain women’s greater likelihood of altering job-
market choices in response to migration ties. Controlling for these characteristics,
women were still 9 percentage points more likely than men to report that migration
ties had shaped their application, interview, or fly-out sets (Table 4.8).
4.4.2 Living apart to avoid career sacrifices
Results from the Job Seekers surveys indicate that living arrangements are an
important margin of adjustment for couples facing migration ties. Of 454 respon-
dents who described their expectations for their relationship in the year after the
job market, 16 percent reported that a long-distance relationship was the most likely
outcome. The prevalence of long-distance relationships among Job Seekers respon-
dents equaled or exceeded the prevalence of sacrifices migration ties can induce in
the Mincer model: we saw, in the previous section, that 14 percent of respondents
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rejected their individually preferred job for the benefit of their relationship, and just
7 percent of respondents reported that a break-up was the most likely outcome for
their relationship.
To be clear, the finding that economists were as likely to forgo living with their
partner as to reject their individually preferred job does not imply that couples were
as likely to live apart as to live together. Table 4.10 presents summary results from
adjustment along both the relationship and career outcome margins. Of 360 respon-
dents who were still in their relationships at the time of the post-market survey and
who provided information about both their counterfactual job outcomes and their
expected relationship outcomes, 73 percent accepted their individually preferred job
and expected to be living with their partner in the year after the job market. (See
right panel of Table 4.10.) That economists were likely to obtain optimal outcomes
in both their careers and their relationships suggests that many couples did not face
migration ties or, more likely, that the migration ties of the economists dominated
the migration ties of their partners. In the latter situation, it would be the partners
rather than the economists who rejected their individually preferred job.
Table 4.11 presents evidence that, as suggested in the previous section, the economists
most likely to live apart from their partners are those who believe their careers will
suffer the most if they live together. Specifically, the table presents results from ordi-
nary least squares regressions of the subjective probability of living apart in the year
after the job market on a series of indicator variables for perceived benefits of the
individually preferred job over the jointly preferred job. We examine the association
between living apart and the belief that the individually preferred job is more likely
than the jointly preferred job to produce each of the long-term career outcomes enu-
merated in the previous section: better overall career prospects, tenure at a research
university, tenure at a four-year college, regular publication in top journals, oppor-
tunities to move to more prestigious jobs, opportunities to move to different kinds
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of jobs, a lifetime income higher than average for their field, everyday work that is
satisfying, and plenty of time for life outside of work.
Column 1 of Table 4.11 presents results from regressions in which each of the
career outcomes enters as the sole regressor. Consistent with the extended model,
the coefficient on overall career prospects, as well as a majority of the coefficients
on other specific career outcomes, are positive. Respondents who believed that their
individually preferred job was more likely to produce a desirable outcome were more
likely to live apart than respondents who believed that their jointly preferred job
was as likely or more likely to produce the outcome. The two exceptions to this
pattern were a higher-than-average lifetime income and time for life outside of work.
Respondents who believed that their individually preferred job was more likely than
their jointly preferred job to produce these outcomes were no more likely than other
respondents to live apart. The finding that responses to migration ties were not
sensitive to changes in expected lifetime income is consistent with evidence from
previous studies that couples who choose long-distance relationships pursue career
opportunities not primarily as a source of income, but rather as a “central life interest”
(Gerstel and Gross, 1982).
Column 2 of Table 4.11 presents results from a regression in which all of the
specific career outcomes enter together. In contrast to the coefficients estimated for
these variables in Column 1, most of the estimates in Column 2 are statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The estimates that remain statistically significant in
the combined regression model suggest that perceived superiority of the individually
preferred job with respect to two specific career outcomes, publishing regularly in top
journals and having opportunities to move to different kinds of jobs, is associated
with a substantially greater likelihood of living apart.
The change in the pattern of estimates between Columns 1 and 2 probably indi-
cates that the eight outcome measures we use tap a smaller number of underlying job
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characteristics. Chi-square tests show that, among respondents whose individually
and jointly preferred jobs were different, those who believed that their individually
preferred job was more likely to help them publish regularly in top journals also tended
to believe that it was more likely to help them earn tenure at a research university, to
facilitate moving to more prestigious jobs, and to offer satisfying work (Table 4.12).
Similarly, respondents who believed that their individually preferred job was more
likely to facilitate moving to different kinds of jobs also tended to believe that it was
more likely to facilitate moving to more prestigious jobs and to offer satisfying work.
4.4.3 When does it pay to live apart?
Our extension of the Mincer model, which allows for the possibility that couples
with conflicting locational preferences live apart, carries predictions that are testable
using data from the Job Seekers project. In the remainder of this section, we assess the
extent to which circumstances in which Job Seekers respondents live apart correspond
to circumstances in which the model predicts that couples live apart. In particular
we estimate ordinary least squares regression models of the form
SPAPARTi = X
′
iβ + i,
where SPAPARTi is the job candidate’s subjective probability of living apart in the
year after the job market and Xi contains characteristics of the job candidate, his
or her partner, and their relationship that are theoretically likely to influence the
couple’s response to migration ties. Our focus in these analyses is the choice of living
arrangements by couples who expect to maintain their relationship. Accordingly,
we focus on predictions from Equation (4.2) and exclude from the regression sample
respondents who reported that they were more likely than not to break up with their
partner in the year after the job market.
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Role of partner’s career-related utility
Our extended Mincer model assumes that couples consider the migration ties
of both partners when deciding where to live and work. Accordingly, the model
predicts that economists are more likely to live apart from their partner not just when
their own migration tie is large, but also when their partner’s migration tie is large.
This prediction is consistent with findings from qualitative studies of long-distance
relationships, which indicate that the ability of dual-career couples to preserve their
relationship while pursuing desirable career opportunities in separate locations is their
primary impetus for living apart (Gerstel and Gross, 1982).
The Job Seekers data contain several measures of partner migration ties. First, like
most studies of family migration, we use the educational attainment of the partner as
a proxy for labor-force attachment and the possession of specialized human capital.
Second, we ask about the school enrollment of the partner in the year after the
respondent was on the job market. Third, we ask respondents what they think is the
percent chance that their partner will work at least 20, 40, and 60 hours per week over
most of the next ten years. Fourth, we ask respondents how good they thought their
partner’s job opportunities would be in the location of their new job, at the time they
accepted the job. Finally, we assess agreement with the following statement: “My
[husband’s/wife’s/significant other’s] career will not suffer if we move to the places
that are best for my career.”
Table 4.13 presents results from regressions of the subjective probability of liv-
ing apart on these measures of partner migration ties. Column 1 indicates that, as
expected, higher levels of educational attainment are associated with greater likeli-
hoods of living apart. Economists whose partner had or was pursuing a master’s
degree believed they were 9 percentage points more likely to live apart than those
whose partner had no more than a college degree. Economists whose partner had
or was pursuing a PhD believed they were 16 percentage points more likely to live
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apart. School enrollment was also associated with living apart. Economists whose
partner expected to be in school in the year after the job market believed they were
9 percentage points more likely to live apart than economists whose partner did not
expect to be in school.
Turning to labor-force attachment, the results in Column 2 suggest that the impact
of expected work hours on the likelihood of living apart is modest. The estimated
coefficients on the percent chance of working at least 20 and at least 40 hours per
week are small and are not statistically different from zero. The estimated coefficient
on the percent chance of working at least 60 hours per week is also small, but is
statistically significant. In particular, the estimate indicates that an increase of 10
percentage points in the percent chance that the partner will work long hours over
most of the next ten years is associated with an increase of 3 percentage points in the
percent chance that the couple will live apart in the year after the job market.
The quality of the partner’s job prospects in the location of the economist’s job
has a substantively and statistically significant association with the percent chance
that the couple lives apart. The results in Column 3 suggest that, compared with
economists whose partner had good job prospects in the location of their job, economists
whose partner had fair prospects believed they were 11 percentage points more likely
to live apart, and economists whose partner had poor prospects believed they were
33 percentage points more likely to live apart. The results in Column 4 are consistent
with the results in Column 3. Economists who agreed that the career attainment
of their partner would not be harmed by following them to their individually pre-
ferred location believed they were 18 percentage points less likely to live apart than
economists who thought that the career attainment of their partner would be harmed.
On the whole, the estimates from Columns 1 through 4 are robust to the inclusion
of additional variables in the regression model. Column 5 presents estimates from a
regression model that includes all of the measures of partner migration ties. While
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some estimates that were statistically significant in the partial models lose significance
in the full model, the signs and magnitudes of most estimates change only modestly.
Interestingly, the association between educational attainment and living apart is not
statistically significant in the model that includes direct measures of migration ties.
This result suggests that, while education is a reasonable proxy for migration ties in
studies that lack direct measures, it is not itself responsible for the decision to live
apart.
Role of relationship-related utility
Turning to the impact of relationship characteristics on living arrangements, the
extended model predicts that economists are more likely to live apart when their
value of living together is lower. A reasonable hypothesis is that couples have a
stronger preference for living together when they are more committed to each other
and more satisfied with their relationship. On the other hand, qualitative studies of
long-distance relationships have found that couples who live apart are not motivated
to do so by problems in their relationship, and do not expect to break up (Gerstel
and Gross, 1982).
The Job Seekers data contain two measures of relationship satisfaction and com-
mitment. First, we ask respondents to classify their relationship as “married,” “marriage-
like,” “committed,” or “dating.” Second, we ask them to rate their satisfaction with
the relationship in the months leading up to the job market. In addition, the sur-
veys contain six items designed to assess the relationship-related costs of living apart.
Specifically, we ask respondents how upset they would be if they were living apart
from their partner in the year after the job market, and we ask them to rate their
agreement with the following statements: (1) “It would be possible for me to have
a fulfilling relationship while living apart from my [husband/wife/significant other],”
(2) “I would never consider living apart from my [husband/wife/significant other],”
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(3) “I would be willing to make a large career sacrifice so that I could live with my
[husband/wife/significant other],” (4) “I would consider jobs that require me to live
apart from my [husband/wife/significant other] for up to one year,” and (5) “I would
consider jobs that require me to live apart from my [husband/wife/significant other]
for up to five years.”
Table 4.14 presents results from regressions of the subjective probability of living
apart on relationship commitment, relationship satisfaction, and other relationship-
related cost measures. Column 1 indicates that lower levels of relationship com-
mitment are associated with greater likelihoods of living apart. Compared with
economists who were married, those in marriage-like and committed relationships
believed they were between 11 and 33 percentage points more likely to live apart.
Column 2 suggests that relationship satisfaction plays a moderately important role in
decisions about living arrangements. Economists who were extremely satisfied with
their relationship in the months leading up to the job market believed they were 15
percentage points less likely to live apart than economists who were less satisfied.
Column 3 presents estimates from a regression model that includes dummy vari-
ables indicating that the respondent would be very upset or extremely upset to be
living apart in the year after the job market, along with dummy variables indicating
that the respondent agreed with the statements enumerated above. Surprisingly, just
two estimates in Column 3 are statistically significant. Economists who would be
extremely upset to be living apart believed they were 19 percentage points less likely
to live apart than economists who would be less upset. Those who agreed that they
would consider jobs that required them to live apart from their partner for up to five
years believed they were 19 percentage points more likely to live apart than those
who disagreed that they would consider such jobs.
Column 4 presents estimates from a model that includes all of the relationship-
related cost measures. The estimates in this column are comparable to estimates in
158
the preceding columns. Economists who are less committed to their relationships are
more likely to live apart than those who are more committed, and economists who
report a strong preference for living together are less likely to live apart than those
who report a weaker preference for living together. Taken together, these results
contrast with, but do not contradict, the findings of the qualitative studies. Previous
studies of long-distance relationships have identified participants using non-random
sampling methods. Consequently, they have not estimated predictors of living apart
for the population – or a known sub-population – of dual-career couples. To the extent
that the snowball sampling methods employed by these studies identified the most
successful and enduring long-distance relationships, they may have overrepresented
couples who were committed and happy in their relationships.
Role of child-related utility
Couples are likely to place a higher value on living together when they have
children. Qualitative studies of long-distance marriages have found that couples with
young children find living apart more stressful than couples without children. In
addition, couples who anticipate having children report that they will not continue
living apart when they become parents (Gerstel and Gross, 1982). These findings are
understandable for two reasons. First, to the extent that parents enjoy spending time
with their children, men and women whose children live with their partner during a
long-distance marriage lose an important source of utility. Second, to the extent that
the demands of parenting conflict with the demands of work, those whose children
live with them may harm their careers as much by parenting alone as they would by
moving with their partner to their jointly preferred location.
The Job Seekers data includes measures of current parental status and expecta-
tions of future fertility. We identify respondents who already had children by the
time of the job-market year, and we ask all respondents what they think is the per-
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cent chance that they will have a child in the next year and the next five years.
In addition to these measures, the surveys contain several items designed to assess
the child-related costs of living apart. Specifically, we ask respondents to rate their
agreement with the following statements: (1) “I would consider having a child while
living apart from my [husband/wife/significant other],” (2) “Living apart from my
[husband/wife/significant other] over the next year would prevent us from having as
large a family as we would like,” (3) "Living apart from my [husband/wife/significant
other] over the next five years would prevent us from having as large a family as
we would like,” (4) “My children would live with me if my [husband/wife/significant
other] and I were living apart,” and (5) “I could have a very good relationship with
my children even if they were not living with me.”
Table 4.15 presents results from regressions of the subjective probability of living
apart on parental status, fertility expectations, and other child-related costs of living
apart. Column 1 shows that, as expected, parenthood is associated with a lower
likelihood of living apart. Parents believed they were 15 percentage points less likely
to live apart than non-parents.
Column 2 shows that the expectation of having children is also associated with
a lower likelihood of living apart. An inspection of the distributions of subjective
probabilities of having children indicated that they were tri-modal, with responses
clustering near 0, 0.5, and 1. To assess the role of fertility expectations on decisions
about living arrangements, we regressed the expected probability of living apart on
dummy variables corresponding to subjective probabilities of less than 0.25, probabil-
ities between 0.25 and 0.75, and probabilities greater than 0.75. Estimates from this
regression model are small in magnitude and, with one exception, are not statistically
different from zero. The exception is a strong expectation of having children within
five years. Economists who thought that they would probably have a child in the
next five years believed they were 10 percentage points less likely to live apart than
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economists who were less sure that they would have children.
Results from Column 3 suggest that, consistent with the findings of qualitative
studies of long-distance marriages, some couples will not consider living apart while
growing their families. Economists who disagreed that they would consider having a
child while living apart from their partner believed they were 18 percentage points
less likely to live apart than economists who viewed long-distance relationships and
parenting as compatible. With one exception, the estimated coefficients for the re-
maining child-related cost measures are of the expected signs. None, however, are
statistically different from zero. Notably, while we find suggestive evidence that re-
spondents who would bear the burden of daily caretaking for their children are less
likely to live apart, and that respondents who could maintain good relationships with
their children are more likely to live apart, these results are not statistically signifi-
cant.
Column 4 presents estimates from a regression model that includes all of the child-
related cost measures. The estimates in this column are comparable to the estimates
in Columns 1 through 3. Like the qualitative studies of long-distance relationships,
we find consistent evidence that children increase the cost of living apart and deter
couples from adopting the arrangement.
4.5 Conclusions
Findings from the Job Seekers project are partially consistent with the Mincer
model. Some of the new economists we surveyed rejected desirable career outcomes
in order to live with their partner. Surprisingly, however, given that many economists
are members of highly educated dual-career couples – precisely the sort of couples
most vulnerable to severe migration ties – the career sacrifices they anticipated were
not large. Just 14 percent of Job Seekers respondents rejected their individually
preferred job for the benefit of their relationship. Among respondents who rejected
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their individually preferred job, the differences between that job and the job they
accepted were moderate.
We argue that the gap between the substantial career sacrifices we expected based
on the Mincer model and the relatively minor career sacrifices we observe is explained,
in part, by the availability of an option Mincer never considered: living apart. Stud-
ies using non-probability samples have found that living apart allows some couples
with severe migration ties to avoid both career sacrifices and relationship dissolu-
tion. Our study corroborates that finding using representative data from a known
sub-population of dual-career couples. Sixteen percent of the new economists we sur-
veyed expected to be living apart from their partner in the year after they entered
the job market, and economists whose careers stood to gain most from living apart
were the most likely to adopt the arrangement.
Previous research on the migration decisions of dual-career couples has assessed
the impact of migration ties on their employment status and earnings. Our results
suggest that this focus is too narrow. Of the eight specific career outcomes we con-
sidered as likely components of new economists’ assessments of their overall career
prospects, expected lifetime income was one of just two outcomes that did not signif-
icantly influence the living arrangements of new economists. Instead, the economists
we surveyed were motivated to live apart when they believed that the arrangement
would improve their research productivity and facilitate their future career mobil-
ity. To the extent that these findings are representative of dual-career couples more
generally, studies that focus exclusively on earnings and employment status neglect
important costs that migration ties impose on highly educated workers.
Finally, results from the Job Seekers project suggest that living apart is a more vi-
able option for some couples than others. While severe migration ties can induce even
happy couples to live apart, relationship commitment and satisfaction are deterrents
to long-distance relationships. Children and the expectation of having children are
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also deterrents. In light of these findings, we posit that the impact of migration ties
on the professional outcomes of dual-career couples is conditioned by their personal
circumstances. Couples who are deeply engaged in family life find it more difficult
than other couples to protect their careers when their locational preferences diverge.
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4.6 Tables
Table 4.1: Relationship status
All
respondents
Men Women
In relationship 73% 76% 67%
Relationship status
Married 48% 51% 40%
Marriage-like 8% 8% 10%
Committed 12% 12% 12%
Dating 5% 5% 5%
Not in relationship 27% 24% 33%
Observations 1,503 707 503
Notes: Table includes respondents from the 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 job-market
cohorts who gave relationship information in the post-market survey. “In relation-
ship” and “Not in relationship” indicate whether the respondent was partnered in
November of the job-market year. Relationship status is the most committed status
the respondent ever reported with respect to that relationship.
Table 4.2: Partner educational attainment
All
respondents
Men Women
Bachelor’s degree or less 24% 27% 18%
Master’s or professional degree 36% 41% 25%
PhD 40% 32% 57%
Observations 1,057 730 327
Notes: Table includes data from 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 cohort respondents
who were in a relationship in November of the job-market year and responded to
questions about the educational attainment of their partner. Educational attainment
is the highest degree the partner had earned or was pursuing during the job-market
year.
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Table 4.3: Respondents choosing individually preferred job outcomes
Chose individually preferred job outcome? Percent
Yes 86.4%
No 13.6%
Observations 631
Notes: The individually preferred job outcome is the outcome the respondent would
have preferred in the absence of constraints imposed by thee partner’s preferences
or career. It may refer to a particular job offer or to a preference to reject all job
offers. Sample includes respondents from 2007-10 who were in relationships at least
from November until March of the job-market year (2007-09 cohorts), or through the
post-market survey (2009-10 cohort).
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Table 4.4: Career outcome ratings of individually preferred (IP) and jointly preferred
(JP) jobs
Chance respondent will ... Meanb Obs
Constraint group IP JP
Earn tenure at a research university
Not constrained 3.76 143
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.43 3.57 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.10 3.90 21
Earn tenure at a four-year college
Not constrained 3.14 139
Constrained, accepted IP job 3.29 3.14 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 3.35 3.15 20
Publish regularly in top journals
Not constrained 3.76 144
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.14 3.14 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.10 3.95 21
Have opportunities to move to more
prestigious jobs
Not constrained 4.04 143
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.20 3.20 5
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.38 4.29 21
Have opportunities to move to different kinds
of jobs
Not constrained 4.26 143
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.57 3.71 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.24 4.52 21
Have higher-than-average lifetime income for
field
Not constrained 3.93 144
Constrained, accepted IP job 3.71 3.57 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.19 4.00 21
Have everyday work that is satisfying
Not constrained 4.95 144
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.83 3.83 6
Constrained, rejected IP job 5.00 4.67 21
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Chance respondent will ... Meanb Obs
Constraint group IP JP
Have plenty of time for life outside of work
Not constrained 4.48 143
Constrained, accepted IP job 3.71 3.57 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.43 4.52 21
Rating of overall career prospects at IP job,
relative to JP joba
Not constrained – –
Constrained, accepted IP job 2.00 10
Constrained, rejected IP job 2.39 28
Notes: Respondents rated the likelihood of each outcome for both the individu-
ally preferred and jointly preferred jobs on a six-point scale, where 1 is “extremely
unlikely,” 2 is “very unlikely,” 3 is “somewhat unlikely,” 4 is “somewhat likely,”
5 is “very likely,” and 6 is “extremely likely.” Observations are from coupled re-
spondents from the 2009-10 cohort only, since these questions were not asked
before 2009-10. “Not constrained” indicates that respondent’s individually pre-
ferred choice coincided with couple’s jointly preferred choice. For those who were
constrained, “accepted individually preferred job” indicates that the respondent
accepted the individually preferred job and “rejected individually preferred job”
indicates that the respondent accepted the jointly preferred job.
a Respondents rated the overall quality of the individually preferred job relative
to the jointly preferred job on a five-point scale, where 1 is "much better," 2
is "somewhat better," 3 is "about the same," 4 is "somewhat worse," and 5 is
"much worse." Mean ratings below 3 indicate that, on average, respondents felt
that the individually preferred job was more likely to yield better long-term career
prospects than the jointly preferred job.
b The ratings we summarize in this table are ordinal data. We present means rather
than ordinal measures of central tendency, such as medians or modes, because the
ratings for most outcomes cluster at the high end of the scale, and the ordinal
measures obscure important variation within that range.
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Table 4.5: Career costs experienced by respondents rejecting individually preferred
job offer
Number of
respondents rating ...
Sign test
(p)
Chance respondent will... IP > AJ IP < AJ
Earn tenure at a research university 6 3 0.254
Earn tenure at a four-year college 5 5 0.623
Publish regularly in top journals 5 2 0.226
Have opportunities to move to more presti-
gious jobs
6 2 0.145
Have opportunities to move to different
kinds of jobs
3 4 0.773
Have higher-than-average lifetime income
for field
6 4 0.377
Have everyday work that is satisfying 8 3 0.113
Have plenty of time for life outside of work 5 5 0.623
Observations: 21
Overall career prospectsa 14 2 0.002
Observations: 28
Notes: Observations represent partnered respondents from the 2009-10 job-market
cohort who rejected the individually preferred job (IP) and accepted an alternative
job (AJ). The middle two columns in the table present the frequencies of ratings
indicating that the individually preferred job is more likely than the accepted job to
yield a particular outcome (IP > AJ) or that the individually preferred job is less
likely to yield the outcome (IP < AJ). The excluded category is IP = AJ. The sign test
column presents one-sided p-values based on the probability of observing the given
frequencies of positive signs on the differences between ratings of the individually
preferred job and the accepted job from a binomial distribution with mean 0.5. For
the eight specific outcomes, respondents rated the likelihood of realizing the outcome
on a six-point scale, where 1 is “extremely unlikely,” and 6 is “extremely likely.”
a Respondents rated their overall career prospects with the individually preferred job
relative to their prospects with the accepted job on a five-point scale, where 1 is "much
better," 2 is "somewhat better," 3 is "about the same," 4 is "somewhat worse," and
5 is "much worse." Ratings below 3 indicate that the individually preferred job is
better than the accepted job, while ratings above 3 that the accepted job is better
than the individually preferred job.
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Table 4.6: Career costs avoided by respondents accepting individually preferred job
over jointly preferred job
Number of
respondents rating ...
Sign test
(p)
Chance respondent will... IP > JP IP < JP
Earn tenure at a research university 5 0 0.031
Earn tenure at a four-year college 3 2 0.500
Publish regularly in top journals 5 0 0.031
Have opportunities to move to more presti-
gious jobs
4 0 0.063
Have opportunities to move to different
kinds of jobs
5 0 0.031
Have higher-than-average lifetime income
for field
2 1 0.500
Have everyday work that is satisfying 4 0 0.063
Have plenty of time for life outside of work 1 2 0.875
Observations: 7
Overall career prospectsa 8 0 0.004
Observations: 10
Notes: Observations represent partnered respondents from the 2009-10 job-market
cohort who faced a choice between an individually preferred job (IP) and a jointly
preferred alternative (JP), and who chose to accept the individually preferred job.
The middle two columns in the table present the frequencies of ratings indicating
that the individually preferred job is more likely than the jointly preferred job to yield
a particular outcome (IP > JP) or that the individually preferred job is less likely
to yield the outcome (IP < JP). The excluded category is IP = JP. The sign test
column presents one-sided p-values based on the probability of observing the above
frequencies of positive signs on the differences between ratings of the individually
preferred job and the jointly preferred job from a binomial distribution with mean
0.5. For the eight specific outcomes, respondents rated the likelihood of realizing
the outcome on a six-point response scale, where 1 is “extremely unlikely,” and 6 is
“extremely likely.”
a Respondents rated their overall career prospects with the individually preferred job
relative to their prospects with the jointly preferred job on a five-point scale, where 1 is
"much better," 2 is "somewhat better," 3 is "about the same," 4 is "somewhat worse,"
and 5 is "much worse." Ratings below 3 indicate that the individually preferred job is
better than the jointly preferred job, while ratings above 3 that the jointly preferred
job is better than the individually preferred job.
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Table 4.8: Probit regressions: Impact of migration ties and gender on job-market
choices
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Altered
job
choice
Altered
earlier
choice
Altered
any
choice
Female 0.041 0.095** 0.057
(0.030) (0.048) (0.049)
Relationship status
Married – – –
– – –
Marriage-like −0.035 −0.084 −0.062
(0.040) (0.067) (0.068)
Committed −0.074** −0.094 −0.109*
(0.033) (0.064) (0.064)
Dating 0.006 −0.346*** −0.254**
(0.072) (0.085) (0.102)
Partner education
Bachelor’s degree or less – – –
– – –
Master’s or professional degree 0.072** 0.017 0.042
(0.033) (0.056) (0.056)
PhD 0.059* 0.069 0.074
(0.032) (0.056) (0.057)
Observations 613 537 537
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression
samples include observations from partnered respondents from all cohorts. Column
1 requires at least one job offer, while Columns 2 and 3 also require that respondents
provided information about the impact of migration ties at application, interview and
fly-out stages. Dependent variables are dummy variables for rejecting the individu-
ally preferred job (Column 1), for altering the application, interview, or fly-outs set
in response to migration ties (Column 2), or for doing either of these (Column 3).
Partner education is highest degree completed or in progress.
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Table 4.9: Relationship outcomes in March after the job-market year
Likely relationship outcome Percent
Live together 77.8%
Live apart 16.1%
Break up 6.2%
Observations 454
Notes: Expected relationship outcomes are the expected outcomes in March of the
year after the job-market year, asked at the time of the post-market survey. Live
together refers to sharing a primary residence or living close enough that the partners
can see each other on weeknights; live apart refers to not living close enough that
the partners can see each other on weeknights. Outcomes are coded as the most
likely outcome based on respondents’ subjective probabilities of each outcome; re-
spondents were also coded as break up if their relationship had already ended by the
time of the post-market survey. Sample includes respondents from 2008-10 who were
in relationships from November until March of the job-market year.
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Table 4.11: Linear regressions: Impact of job trade-offs on subjective probability of
living apart
(1) (2)
Regressors: Single regressor All
regressors
Coef Obs Adj R2 Coef
IP > JP with respect to chance
respondent will...
Have better job prospects overall 0.246*** 176 0.089 –
(0.060) –
Earn tenure at a research
university
0.228*** 171 0.049 −0.135
(0.073) (0.124)
Earn tenure at a four-year college 0.163* 166 0.016 0.087
(0.084) (0.130)
Publish regularly in top journals 0.326*** 172 0.083 0.423***
(0.080) (0.157)
Have opportunities to move to
more prestigious jobs
0.261*** 169 0.057 −0.177
(0.078) (0.148)
Have opportunities to move to
different kinds of jobs
0.446*** 171 0.117 0.346**
(0.092) (0.141)
Have higher than average income
for field
0.139 172 0.006 0.068
(0.097) (0.167)
Have satisfying everyday work 0.169** 171 0.025 −0.124
(0.072) (0.136)
Have plenty of time for life outside
of work
0.041 171 −0.005 −0.128
(0.112) (0.129)
Observations – – – 160
Adjusted R2 – – – 0.085
175
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent
variable is the subjective probability of living apart in the year after the job market.
For overall career prospects, counts are based on a direct counterfactual question with
a 1 to 5 response scale, where 1 indicates that "IP is much better than AJ" and
5 indicates that "IP is much worse than AJ." For each of the eight specific career
outcomes, respondents rated the likelihood of each outcome on a six-point scale where
1 was “extremely unlikely,” 2 was “very unlikely,” 3 was “somewhat unlikely,” 4 was
“somewhat likely,” 5 was “very likely,” and 6 was “extremely likely.” Regressors for all
regressions are dummy variables indicating that respondent thought the individually
preferred job was better than the jointly preferred job. Column 1 reports estimates from
regressions in which the dummy variable for each outcome enters as the sole regressor.
Column 2 reports estimates from a regression in which all of the dummy variables enter
together.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
The new millenium is an exciting time for family economists. Widespread changes
in the structure and behavior of families offer unprecedented opportunities to study
novel arrangements. This dissertation moves beyond studies of heterosexual married
couples to explore the implications of work-family trade-offs for two groups of non-
traditional families. My results suggest that families are innovative in the face of
changing constraints. They also suggest that a break with traditional norms in one
area may prompts similar breaks in other areas.
In the first essay, I show that men and women who seek same-sex rather than
different-sex partners also invest in less the human capital members of their sex have
traditionally obtained and spend less time in the activities members of their sex have
traditionally performed. The theoretical analysis in this essay indicates that a non-
traditional choice with respect to household formation – formation of a same-sex
household – may prompt a non-traditional choice with respect to household roles.
In the third essay, I show that professional men and women who choose professional
partners may live apart to avoid career sacrifices associated with family migration.
The empirical results in this essay suggest that a non-traditional choice with respect
to household specialization – a relative lack of specialization – may prompt a non-
traditional choice with respect to living arrangements.
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This dissertation underscores the close connection between outcomes in the home
and outcomes in the labor market. The choices people make about their family
lives have implications for the choices they make about their work lives, and vice
versa. The essays I have presented show that new models and data can illuminate
the structure and behavior of modern families. Family economists stand to learn
much if they are as flexible in their research approaches as families in their private
and public arrangements.
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